MYANMAR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ASEAN PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract: ASEAN hopes to resolve Myanmar's current internal conflict because the military tends to be open to outsiders. Therefore, this paper tries to examine the state of military domination in Myanmar and how effective the attitude of ASEAN intervention is to its internal conflicts. This study used a qualitative method. The method can be used to understand and explain how Myanmar's conflict resolution is from an ASEAN perspective. The result showed that signs of democratic life in this country are sinking further with the strong will of the military to maintain and strengthen its power in the country. Therefore, it takes a big role from the international community to give spirit to every democratic movement that occurs. Simultaneous pressure must be continued on the ruling regime to develop democratic values and abandon the authoritarian character which has proven increasingly unpopular in this era of globalization.

Keywords: Political System of Myanmar, Military Coup and ASEAN Intervention.

INTRODUCTION
Myanmar has always been known as a country ruled by the military. Because some important positions in the country are dominated by the military. So it is only natural that this hegemony has an impact on the political system in Myanmar itself which can be said to be an authoritarian and totalitarian regime. As a result of this system, it is undeniable that a coup will occur and the coup case will never be resolved independently. In fact, throughout Myanmar's history, the government has never lasted long because there has always been an overthrow of power by the civilian regime with the replacement of a militaristic system of government.

According to information, in 1962, approximately 149,000 of the 20,457,000 inhabitants served as soldiers, on the other hand, there were close to 5000 people. The expenditure allocation for the military is also quite large, at 31%. This is an interesting phenomenon. Maybe the activity in the military field decreased, with the number of soldiers, so that the conclusion was that the army was involved in politics.
If traced further, since Myanmar’s independence in 1948-1958 and 1960-1962 apart from that decade, Myanmar has always been under the control of the military stronghold. At the beginning of World War II, Aung San travelled to Japan in 1939, which at that time was Japan as a pioneer of liberation in the Southeast Asian Region. Thanks to the assistance of Colonel Suzuki through the establishment of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) which aims to provide military training from Japan to Myanmar, Thailand at that time was quite supportive of Japanese forces in Myanmar. The establishment of BIA was initially well-received so that the development of contacts with local thakins in rural areas could be realized into a solid and popular force in the community in a short time. However, due to the strengthening of BIA, Japan felt threatened because of the increasing popularity of BIA and carried out attacks on BIA. So in 1942, Japan military administration ordered the disbandment of BIA. The establishment of BIA was initially well-received so that the development of contacts with local thakins in rural areas could be realized into a solid and popular force in the community in a short time. However, due to the strengthening of BIA, Japan felt threatened because of the increasing popularity of BIA and carried out attacks on BIA. So in 1942, Japan military administration ordered the disbandment of BIA.

The dissolution of the BIA was not an excuse for Myanmar to remain silent, they continued with repressive actions against the Japanese military so those anti-Japanese movements emerged throughout the region.

By the time of its independence on January 4, 1948, Prime Minister U Nu had served as the main government. Then in 1958, General Ne Win strongly dominated the military group to carry out a coup to seize power in the government. Therefore, the political crisis escalated drastically due to the split within the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPL) party. General Ne Win held elections in 1960 to establish democracy and restore government to civilians. After the election was won by the United Party led by U Nu so that he was re-elected as Prime Minister but unfortunately U Nu on March 2, 1962, was a coup again with a power struggle between civilian politicians and the military. This led to military intervention into the dominating politics.

The causes of military intervention have several main causes, namely: First, the inability of civilian politicians to create a politics healthy and stable. Second, the security dangers that always threaten Burma are insurmountable well by U Nu. Like a rebellion carried out by a group ethnic Karen and Shan and the rest of the Guo Min
Dang army that seeped there post World War II. Third, U Nu’s self as a leader and politician. Even though U Nu looks charismatic, but less firm in making decisions. Though the decision sometimes it must be taken quickly when the situation is urgent.

After the coup, the government was running with a socialist concept called The Burmese Way to Socialism whose objectives were:

- Economic reform
- Restrictions on the foreign influence of various sizes, whether economic, political or social.
- Changes in people's values and attitudes, so that the new leadership can bring about a revolution.
- The unification of the multi-ethnic Burmese people into one nation.

In practice, in manifesting these goals the military regime has run aground in carrying out the government or making policies that have good results for the people. The proof is that rice production continued to decrease by 5.3% in 1965-1966 compared to the previous year. Rebellion is still often found everywhere. Not only that, crime and crime continue to increase. So that the myth of the failure of civilian politicians on people’s lives is also reduced. So military politicians make people's lives continue to deteriorate.

The military's role in Burmese politics can also be seen from the existence of the State Development and Peace Council (SDPC), which was established in 1997. Previously, the SDPC was called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). SLORC was originally founded to correct the political situation in Burma. In whatever terms, the institution which is an accomplice to the military regime has not yet presented a great opportunity to lead a democratic regime such as the issue of the NLD's victory in the 1990 election which was simply ignored. This means that the military will always maintain its hegemony. The military involvement in political life or government above is indeed by the theory that the intervention was caused by several aspects:

1. The assumption that the military carries out a sacred duty, to save the country. Indeed, Burma needs to be saved because of the various threats that exist, but whether these threats can be resolved with a more dominant military approach to its violent actions.

2. Sectoral or group interests. Burma has a view of national interest which is caused by 3 things, namely non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of National Solidarity, and perpetuation of national sovereignty. The national interest is whether it is really for the national interest or a way to launch the interests of military groups.

3. Soldiers feel more meaningful (self-important motive).
5. The feeling of military superiority over civilians.

So far, civilians are considered inefficient and effective in carrying out the government, while the civilian regime has not been in government long enough. So that the military itself felt that the civilians did not know anything before there were good facts.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Political Crisis

Since the 1 February military coup, the death toll from Myanmar military anti-coup protesters as of 19 March 2021 has reached 231 (Kompas.com., 20 March 2021). The number of victims of the pro-democracy masses who oppose the military junta is estimated to increase and exceed that number, because the security forces are still carrying out acts of violence, including shooting, against anti-coup mobs. The political crisis that occurred in Myanmar, and especially the actions of 7 Vol. XIII, No. 6/II/Puslit/March/2021 the violence perpetrated by the security forces against the pro-democracy masses has sparked international condemnation. Several Western countries then imposed sanctions, because the military junta’s actions against the pro-democracy masses were considered to have exceeded human boundaries and were contrary to universal human rights principles. The European Union will impose sanctions on 11 Myanmar military officials who were involved in the violence against the anti-coup mob (cnbcindonesia.com, 23 March 2021).

The political crisis that occurred in Myanmar is of course also a concern for ASEAN, at least this was reflected in the informal meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in early March. At that time, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said that all ASEAN members were obliged to carry out the principles and values stated in the ASEAN Charter as a whole, such as non-interference. However, at the same time, respecting and implementing other principles and values in the ASEAN Charter, including democracy, respect for human rights, good governance, rule of law, and constitutional government are equally important.

Myanmar student activists led massive protests in 1988 in response to economic mismanagement by the military junta and demanding reforms towards democracy. The action on August 8, 1988, known as the 8888 Resistance, was later recorded as one of the most brutal acts of violence by the security forces. Around 5,000 people are reported to have died as a result of military violence. That same year Suu Kyi founded the NLD and began pressuring the military government to hold democratic elections.

The Myanmar military said the coup was a response to fraud in the 2020 general election. The leader of the coup, General Min Aung Hlaing, in his speech promised...
free and fair new elections. He also claims his government will be different from the military regime that previously ruled for 49 years and brutalized protesters in 1988 and 2007. But if you look at the military’s repeated steps to maintain its influence, at least this coup can be seen as the military’s desperation for a landslide victory.

what the NLD achieved from the 2020 election. The NLD won 396 of the 476 seats in parliament. The dominance of the NLD in parliament could bring about significant changes that could lead to constitutional changes that undermine the military’s role in politics.

The coup this time was also followed by the imposition of a curfew, cutting off the internet, limiting crowds, deploying armoured vehicles and using violence to suppress protests. Despite a series of abuses of power, up to more than two weeks of the military in power, there have been no reports of significant casualties on the part of the demonstrators. Violence during the protests has indeed decreased compared to the previous military junta rule.

UN Special Envoy Christine Schraner Burgener has warned the deputy head of Myanmar’s military junta that any use of force against demonstrators will have severe consequences, and the international community is watching. This warning is very important to protect the people of Myanmar, especially since the warning was delivered through a very rare communication channel between the junta and the outside world. This can be a hope that mediation is still possible as long as the junta is willing to open communication with the outside world. Indonesia and ASEAN must take advantage of this opportunity to restore Myanmar's condition to its original state.

ASEAN Intervention

The coup in Myanmar has sparked calls for ASEAN to play a more active role. Brunei Darussalam as chairman of ASEAN asked Myanmar to seek dialogue, reconciliation and normalization. By referring to the ASEAN Charter, Brunei calls on Myanmar to adhere to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and reminds that political stability in ASEAN is very important to achieve a peaceful, stable, and prosperous ASEAN Community. prosperous. ASEAN's response so far is considered very weak, especially since individual member countries show different attitudes. Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand, Prawit Wongsuwan said the coup was an internal matter of Myanmar. Philippine Foreign Minister, Teodoro Locsin Jr. considers the incident in Myanmar as a possible measure to protect the country’s democracy. Cambodia's leader Hun Sen also called it an internal affair and declined to comment on it. Meanwhile, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore expressed concern over the situation in Myanmar and asked all parties to dialogue. A more assertive and open attitude was shown by several countries from outside the region. The
United States, Britain, Australia and the European Union condemned the coup and its military detention, as well as its declaration of a state of emergency. The Joe Biden administration is even considering imposing sanctions on Myanmar. New Zealand cut ties with the military junta government, suspended aid and banned the travel of Myanmar's military leaders. This is the most decisive action by a state entity for the Myanmar coup. Not all countries can afford to be tough, for example, China, India, and Japan.

ASEAN has adhered to the principle of non-intervention since the regional organization was formed and has been tested on several occasions. The 1998 reform in Indonesia can be an example of how this principle is held by ASEAN. No ASEAN member country tried to intervene when Indonesia's domestic politics was turbulent. The principle of non-intervention is considered as one of the important factors that help the organization of this region to survive and stabilize. It is undeniable, in recent years, this principle on a minimal scale has begun to soften.

ASEAN's historical record shows that the principle of non-intervention has been excluded in several conditions, including the issue of Myanmar. In 2007, ASEAN had reached one vote to postpone Myanmar's turn to chair ASEAN, as a consequence of its military actions during the Saffron Revolution when tens of thousands of Buddhist priests took to the streets and protested against the junta. When Typhoon Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008, ASEAN also acted out of the ordinary. When the death toll reached 134,000 people and the junta refused foreign aid, ASEAN responded to international outrage at the Myanmar military government's poor handling of the disaster.

ASEAN convinced the junta to be willing to cooperate with the international community and ASEAN took on the role of channelling foreign aid. ASEAN has also been heavily criticized for its weak role in responding to the Rohingya crisis. With the principle of non-intervention, ASEAN cannot do much about every development in Myanmar. However, it is evident that, in recent years, ASEAN has begun to dare to express its position on the Rohingya issue. This can be seen from the statements of the ASEAN chairmen and the joint declarations produced by several ASEAN Summits.

ASEAN's long effort to embrace Myanmar's military junta is also an important note. ASEAN accepted Myanmar's membership in 1997 by prioritizing "constructive engagement" efforts so that the junta would be more open to the aspirations of the people and compromise with Suu Kyi. Political reforms during PM Thein Sein's reign, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, and the opening of the way for the NLD to return to its role in Myanmar politics cannot be separated from ASEAN's efforts since Myanmar joined as a member. Myanmar's readiness for the presence of election observers from ASEAN in the 2012 elections also needs to be noted.
What about the context of the current political crisis in Myanmar, which has caused a large number of casualties, and it is even feared that it could disrupt regional stability. What kind of interventions can ASEAN, as an association of Southeast Asian nations, be able to do, which should also pay attention to efforts to achieve regional peace and stability. Indeed, ASEAN cannot intervene directly to restore Myanmar's situation, but it does not become a barrier for ASEAN to contribute to finding the best solution to the crisis that occurred in Myanmar. ASEAN must be able to enter by promoting other principles contained in the ASEAN Charter into Myanmar's political life, such as democracy, respect for human rights, and good governance.

Returning to the current situation of Myanmar, it seems that the desire to reform the Myanmar military is not easy if it is associated with the recent attitude of the military junta which has not shown the will to reconcile. On the other hand, the military junta is getting tougher and will sue Aung San Suu Kyi and her group in court, because they are considered to have cheated in the November 2020 election, making it difficult to engage in dialogue with pro-democracy civil society.

The military coup and political life in Myanmar that do not provide room for respect for human rights and democracy seem to show that this is an internal problem for Myanmar that does not need to be interfered with by other countries. Meanwhile, ASEAN's intervention is also limited in nature, and ASEAN currently considers that the crisis in Myanmar has not had a significant impact on regional stability. However, if you pay attention to ASEAN's wishes, especially through the pillars of its political and security community, then the development of democratic life and the protection of human rights in Myanmar must continue to be voiced by ASEAN, and even encourage them to be present in Myanmar. When ASEAN intervention is not effective, then an alternative solution to deal with the Myanmar crisis could be to involve the wider international community.

Alternative Solutions from the United Nations

The solution to the political crisis in Myanmar is not impossible to involve the wider international community, including the United Nations, because the issue of the military coup and the violence experienced by the Myanmar people has indeed captured international attention. The violence of the security forces in responding to mass pro-democracy actions in Myanmar, in the current era of information disclosure, cannot be hidden from the spotlight of the international media. It is not surprising then that several countries, such as the United States, European Union countries, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada strongly condemn the violence by the Myanmar security forces against the peaceful pro-democracy and anti-coup demonstrations in Myanmar. Likewise, the United Nations deeply regrets the situation in Myanmar, which is far from democratic values and respect for human rights.
The United Nations, in its capacity as an international organization, and with the international provisions it has, can intervene constructively to take a role in overcoming the political crisis in Myanmar. The first alternative solution that can be done is to invite the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Military) to hand over power to the civilian government. Through the involvement of international parties, including ASEAN, reconciliation needs to be encouraged through negotiations between the military and civilian government leaders regarding the role and place of the military in a democratic Myanmar state.

The second alternative solution that can be done is to form a temporary government with a leader not from the military or civilians (not from the Tatmadaw or Aung San Suu Kyi's party/NLD). This formation is provided if the Tatmadaw agrees because it refuses to return power to civilians. In addition, this government is only tasked with bringing the general situation back into stability and holding re-elections that are fair and honest so that whatever the results, they must be mutually acceptable. With this re-election, the international community will certainly be able to participate in overseeing the electoral process.

The third solution that can be provided is to do what the Tatmadaw wants, namely re-election within one year after the invalid declaration of the November 2020 election results.

If the situation is out of control and endangers humanity, through its authority, the United Nations may take a firm stance against the Myanmar military junta regime because it is considered unable to run the government properly. Strict sanctions can be made by giving punishments (through the International Criminal Court/ICC) to elements of the military junta who are considered to have committed gross human rights violations. The United Nations, in particular the Security Council, can be the pinnacle of hope to get a statement as well as stronger action in overcoming the political crisis in Myanmar.

Reported from Kompas.com, that the ASEAN Summit will be held on Saturday, April 24, 2021, in Jakarta, Indonesia. Several national and international mass media stated that the Myanmar Military Commander Min Aung Hlaing would attend to fulfil the invitation. Despite the controversial figure of Hlaing and not being recognized as a representative of the country, Indonesia as the host must treat all guests equally. It is precisely the presence of Myanmar that must be utilized by Indonesia and ASEAN member countries. His presence is an opportunity to resolve the political and security crisis in Myanmar. Member countries need to remind ASEAN's goals and urge Myanmar to carry out democracy as it should. Domestic issues in Myanmar have become regional issues, especially those related to refugees and human rights. Southeast Asia is currently in the international spotlight. Regional conflicts need to be anticipated lest they pose a threat to peace in other countries, including Indonesia.
Indonesia’s diplomatic capability needs to be demonstrated by consistently supporting Myanmar’s reconciliation not only for the national interest but also for the region. Indonesia has supported Myanmar in gaining the trust of neighbouring countries and the international community. This effort was recognized by Myanmar through the words of President U Thein Sein during a special dinner with the Indonesian delegation. “We appreciate the Indonesian people who have supported the transformation and continuation of the democratization process in Myanmar, a role that is not small,” he said. Hosting the ASEAN meeting does not mean just preparing logistics. Moreover, Indonesia needs to take a central role by building communication and acting for Myanmar and regional stability. Constructive ideas are needed to create an orderly and peaceful area.

At the meeting, ASEAN leaders agreed on several points of consensus regarding the crisis in Myanmar, including:
First, the violence must be stopped immediately by the military in Myanmar. Second, the leaders agreed to hold a constructive dialogue to find a peaceful solution among all interested parties in Myanmar. Third, the leaders agreed to send a special envoy to the chair of ASEAN who will facilitate the mediation and dialogue process with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN. Fourth, ASEAN will provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar through the AHA Centre. Fifth, special envoys and delegates will visit Myanmar to meet with all relevant parties. Jokowi also demanded the Myanmar military to immediately end the killings and release political prisoners in his country. ASEAN also told Myanmar's Senior General Min Aung Hlaing during the two-hour talks in Jakarta that dialogue between the warring parties in Myanmar should begin immediately, with the help of ASEAN envoys. There was no rejection of the demands on the part of General Min Aung Hlaing not even making an official public statement.

METHOD
This study used a qualitative method. The method can be used to understand and explain how Myanmar's conflict resolution is from an ASEAN perspective. In this study, we also use data collection techniques in the form of literature studies by collecting various data from books, articles, journals. The data analysis method used in this research is the data interpretation process. So after the data is collected, the researcher needs to sort, categorize and interpret it so that it is by the research objectives.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Myanmar democracy

a. Myanmar's democratic prospects
Myanmar has been ruled by an authoritarian military regime ranging from General Ne Win to General Than Shwe who carries out policies by carrying out democratic values and replacing them with an authoritarian and centralized order. Because of the domination of the military regime, every democratic movement that appears will certainly be met with resistance. The opposition movement in the perspective of the military regime as a weakening of the power system.

In the book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth, Samuel P. Huntington (1991) counts from 1974-1990 as the third wave of world democracy. The Movimento das Forcas Armadas movement in Portugal succeeded in carrying out a coup by young officers to overthrow the dictator Marcello Caetano so that this event became the beginning of a period of democratic movements around the world. Even though Myanmar is controlled by a military regime, it does not rule out the possibility of a democratic movement in this country. The faster the democratic action in this country, the harder the regime will oppose the Movement’s actions, for example, the military’s rejection of the 1990 election results which placed Aung San Suu Kyi with her NLD party as the winner at that time. Military coups are not new because they have happened from the previous military government any since 1962. At the beginning of independence in 1948, Myanmar was still running a democratic system of government by implementing a parliamentary system under the civilian government of U Nu. Myanmar’s democracy began to collapse in 1962 due to the coup of Prime Minister U Nu. During his reign (1962-1988) Ne Win only recognized one political party, namely the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), which he had formed himself. The BSPP or better known as the Lenzin Party can be said to be a single party implemented to support the socialist program with the majority of members coming from the military group. Since its establishment in 1962 and legalized in 1964, the membership of this party has been dominated by the military. In 1972 the military became the main pillar of the party (Taylor, 1980: 40).

Furthermore, the action of destroying democracy by the military regime occurred back in 1990. General Saw Maung thwarted Aung San Suu Kyi’s victory as the winner of the election. Until now, the military is still very strong in controlling the political, social and economic life of the Myanmar people.

b. Myanmar policy choices
According to Huntington, when the military staged a coup against a civilian government then the military government had to choose between retaining power or returning it to civilian politicians; and between expanding the political
participation of community groups or limiting it (Huntington, 1968: 233-237), thus, the leadership of the military regime is faced with 4 choices:

1. Maintain power and limit participation;
2. Maintain power and expand participation;
3. Restore power and limit participation; and
4. Restore power and expand participation.

In the case of Myanmar, it is not difficult to see which policies are being adopted by the military regime. By looking at the policies implemented by the military regime led by General Ne Win (1962-1988) and the military regime led by General Saw Maung after 1988, we can see that the regime chose the policy of maintaining power and limiting participation. During Ne Win’s time, for example, immediately after he carried out a coup against the civilian government led by Prime Minister U Nu in 1962, he established an authoritarian government and ruled in a dictatorial style (Steinberg, 1982: 33-35). The people were not allowed to choose their leaders, because political decisions had to go through the military leadership in Rangoon. The Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), led by General Ne Win, became the only official party that was established.

When Myanmar under the general leadership of Saw Maung took power on 18 September 1988 (Sulistiyanto, 1993: 78), the authoritarian character of its predecessor was inherited by this Government. This coup in 1988 cannot be interpreted as a change of power in Myanmar. This is just one eye on the former military administration’s change in government. The army is the "Newî, BSPP to law and restoration of state order. Tip (SBORC). The power of decline is left. In the hands of the military. As its predecessor, the military government. General Sierra Maung also directed the country in an authoritarian manner. Great evidence This shows this, for example, the rejection of the SLORC results from the election results.27 May 1990. As you know in this election, the NLD Party learned to Take 392 out of 485 seats in the National Parliament. This result went beyond the military's predictions. Previously SLORC was convinced that the party. The government, the United National Party (NUP), will win the election. This is where the authoritarian military nature emerges. Some people protest against it. Military repressive measures. In late 1991, SLORC started. launched an intensive campaign to crush opposition forces in urban areas and between ethnic minorities. SORRC’s practical actions further diminished the civilian position in the political scene in Myanmar. launched an intensive campaign to crush opposition forces in urban areas and between ethnic minorities. SORRC's practical actions further diminished the civilian position in the political scene in Myanmar. launched an intensive campaign to crush opposition forces in urban areas and between ethnic minorities. SORRC's practical actions further diminished the civilian position in the political scene in Myanmar.
Until recently, under the rule of General Shwe, although SLORC was replaced with the State Peace Development Council (SPDC), this institution is still functioning. The previous institution was to control Myanmar’s popular socio-political life. According to Sundhaussen, determining what decision to use can only depend on the inclination or will of the leadership. Sundhaussen then developed a slip of theorem that the success of a military intervention depends on appropriate internal and external factors, which include not only military entry into politics, but also policy forces. For example, choosing from the available options depends on the appropriate internal factors and military factors, including not only the military’s entry into politics, but also the policy army, and then choosing among the available options depends on internal factors and military factors, external. Sundhaussen then created an analysis tool by grouping these internal and external variables for reasons and prerequisites.

There are three basic reasons for the military to withdraw from government responsibilities, namely: Military external factors, namely the existence of opposition to the continuity of its power. Factors external to the state, economically, militarily and logistically depend on the donor country. Military internal factors, if the leadership believes that a democratic order that still incorporates the principle of civilian supremacy over the military is fundamentally needed. Sundhaussen then listed three prerequisites for military withdrawal.

First, which is an absolute prerequisite, are all groupings in the military that are capable of carrying out political action by agreeing to hand over power. If such a consensus is not reached, certain military factions may seize power from regime leaders intent on fleeing politics or may intervene again after a brief period of civilian rule. Second, the interests of the military regime’s leadership as important must be guaranteed. Understandably, they are very reluctant to give up power if this means exposing themselves to the wrath of their political opponents. Therefore, procedures must be designed to protect the physical safety of the leadership of the military regime. Then the alternate civilian regime must, at least for some time, avoid drastic cuts in defence budgets if this could lead to deterioration of service conditions or reduce the size of the armed forces. Civilian groups must take into account what the military considers the national interest. Military regimes will not give up voluntary power if they believe that the ideological foundations of the nation will be raped by their civilian replacement. Third, is the availability of what military leaders see as viable political alternatives. The military regime must be convinced that the existence of the Elites not only provides security for their personal and group interests but also must be able to create a stable government so that they will be willing to surrender.
The leadership of the military regime, in deciding one of the four options as mentioned by Huntington above, will depend on a constellation of reasons and preconditions. That is, reasons and prerequisites become important in policy choices; although not all of them have the same order of preference. Some variables may not apply, while other variables may dominate the consideration (Sundhaussen, 1995: 63).

This military dominance in the Burmese government is constant and permanent, possibly quite rare in Third World countries. Although in third world countries I often maintain military dominance that is not fixed or has its ups and downs, it is still moving even if it is not radical. The Burmese army is very difficult to change by civilian politicians. Even a civilian politician, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, who proclaims democracy, is an external prisoner in the country while trying to reduce the influence of the military regime. Civil power is not moving in the country. You can also see from the NU era, which was defeated by NE WIN. Then, in the civil-military competition, the military always wins. This is very unique experienced by a country because civil society does not affect articulating their desires and interests. All this is caused by several sectors of life that exist, the government is always regulated and dominated by the government. Civilians inevitably have to obey the rules set by the government or military regime.

The Military Government (CPDC) also seeks to limit the movement of civil society through various sectors such as education, culture, communication, etc. In the field of communication technology, for example, in 2001, there were only 11 telephone lines for 2000 residents, while the cost of wireless telephones was very expensive, rarely had. It can be seen that being a civil society in Burma is less prosperous. Despite the demonstrations or demonstrations of civil society against the government, the military government was faced with violence. Such was the case in 1989, where student activists and the Democratic Party for New Companies (DPNS) who led the democratic campaign were later arrested and imprisoned. So is Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been under house arrest since 1989.

Until now, the military power in Burma is of course still very strong, even if it is doubtful whether the military group is favoured by the people. In the mind of the military government, it is important that they can continue to exist in government and that does not provide opportunities for civilians in government, on the pretext of the experience of civilian governments in previous years which failed to solve the problem. So people are sometimes forced to enter the military scene to gain strategic positions in various sectors of life. Of course, the number of military personnel increases every year.

According to available data, the number of military personnel in 1998 was about 450,000 people so that it was 2 times larger than in 1988. So the number Burmese Army - is the number ranked second in Southeast Asia after Vietnam. In 2001 the
number of soldiers or military personnel increased to around 550,000 consisting of 470,667 male personnel and 479,691 female personnel. The number of military personnel that continues to increase may also be due to the government’s budget in the military sector which is quite good at around the US $ 39 or about 2.1% of GNP. With a military budget, it is possible that military life can be more enjoyable than civilian life so that every year there is an increase in numbers.

Military strength in this regime (SDPC) can also be seen from the main characters who play a role there. These figures are general seniors than Shwe as Chair of the SDPC, Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw, Head of State, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. With various positions and overlaps, it is likely to cause decision-making to be far from democratic or even unilateral. This is because the interests of one position affect other positions. So the role or task is running less than optimal.

Looking at the Burmese military strength, in reality, both inside and outside the regime, it is difficult to shake it. With the increasing number of military personnel each year, the forces outside the regime are getting stronger. With the presence of figures in a strong regime, the military government also lasted a long time. The regime’s strict policies also made the military power stronger. This can be observed from the example of the National Convention of January 9, 1993, which describes military control of the executive and legislative councils by placing 25% of Tatmadaw officials in parliament—110 of the 440 seats in the Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw) and 56 of the 224 seats in the Upper House. If the important seats continue to be controlled by the military, automatically military power will be maintained.

Check the strength of the Burmese army in fact both inside and outside the scheme is indeed difficult to shake. With more and more militaries every year, forces from outside the regime became stronger. Having figures in a strong regime also triggers a sustainable military government. The strict diet policy also led to a stronger military power. This can be observed from the example of the National Convention of 9 January 1993, which illustrates the military control of the Executive and Legislative Councils, including by including 25% of Tatmadaw officials in Parliament—110 seats 440 seats in the lower house (Pyithu Hluttaw) and 56 of 224 places in the bedrooms. Above, if the large seat is controlled by the army, the military power is automatically maintained. It’s just that it gets stronger or weaker according to the parameters to use.

As part of the role of a strong and low-level civilian-military, to reduce the influence of troops in all sectors of life, civil society must be more persistent. For example, by entering the military scene but always having civilian ideas and trying to fight for civil rights. This is quite effective because if you occupy a military seat, it will experience the strengths and weaknesses of the army so that the parties can work
to reduce the influence of government forces. But it is not easy, because if he does not see the professional regime or opposes the plans, the position will not last long and we can be immediately removed from Ezim or even sanctions.

CONCLUSION
The coup of 1 February 2021 reflected the military’s unpreparedness to hand over the government completely to civilians. Despite the military abuse of power, so far this coup seems more lenient than ever before. The junta is also more open to the outside world. This is an opportunity that ASEAN must take advantage of to play a more active role. This active role requires ASEAN’s courage to be more flexible with the principle of non-intervention. The Indonesian government, with parliamentary support, can take on the role of driving other ASEAN member states towards a common ground.
Signs of democratic life in this country are sinking further with the strong will of the military to maintain and strengthen its power in the country. Therefore, it takes a big role from the international community to give spirit to every democratic movement that occurs. Simultaneous pressure must be continued on the ruling regime to develop democratic values and abandon the authoritarian character which has proven increasingly unpopular in this era of globalization.
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