KHALIFATULLAH PANATAGAMA:
CONTINUITY & CHANGE IN THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL ISLAM
IN MODERN INDONESIA

Hari Zamharir¹, Mohammad Noer², Sahruddin Lubis³  
¹Assoc. Prof., the Faculty of Social & Political Sciences, Universitas Nasional.  
²Assoc. Prof., the Graduate School of Political Science, Universitas Nasional.  
³Faculty of Social & Political Sciences, Universitas Nasional. 
hari.zamharir@civitas.unas.ac.id, mohdmoer@yahoo.com, sahruddinlbs@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: As the culminating point of long history of penetration de pacifique of Islam across the archipelago of Indonesia (Nusantara), several Kingdoms of Islam emerged in the early 19th century of modern Indonesia. The kings not only perform the functions in political domain but also in religious matters; with the rulers being the guidance of Islamic law (syari’ah). Gaining the independence of the country in Mid 20th century (1945), this historical legacy continues to be tackled by the post-monarchy state of Republic Indonesia under the Ministry of Religious Affairs—but its legal basis was a controversy when the Indonesian Constitution, UUD 1945, was agreed upon, without explicit mention of the duties to be performed by Muslims to implement the Islamic law. Now that power politics in 2019 poses heated debate over the khilafah ideology and political system vis-a-vis Pancasila, it is interesting to look into deeper insights of the legacy of Khalitullah Panatagama. From the duality of nomocracy and democracy, the legacy could be re-interpreted to gain proper understanding of religion—politics relationship. The conceptual basis of the study is Habermasian's claim of post-secular social science with its notion of the old-fashioned axioms of secularism under which modern politics has been in practice.

Key words: legacy, Nusantara, khalifatullah, post-secularism

INTRODUCTION
Religion and politics, though separated in the reasoning of the 16th century Enlightenment and the philosophy of Secularism, in reality have always been interwoven. The following account by Kristianto (2018) on the problem terror and religious or theological response is worth mentioning: instead of being defensive, theology needs to be more constructive for coping with acts of terror. To do this there should be a partial link between religion and politics. Using the concept “spirituality of politics”, the Christian perspective is used. The term “politics” is referred to the church document whose meaning “mencakup hal khusus yakni keterlibatan langsung dalam politik praktis demi tercapainya kebaikan umum (bonum comune). Keterlibatan langsung dilakukan oleh mereka yang secara aktif berperan dalam
bidang legislatif, eksekutif, yudikatif di tingkat nasional maupun daerah” (“covering specialized conditions, i.e. involvement in real politics for the purpose of attaining public goodness. Direct involvement is carried out by those actively playing the role in the fields of legislation, government and judicial functions either in national or regional levels”) (Kristianto, 2018).

Though compatibility of Islamic ideas on social and political life with modernity is widely known and accepted, Indonesia’s experience has proved to pose problematic as if Islamic ideas in socio-political aspects were incompatible with the nation’s move towards modernity and consolidated democracy. Continuity of the practice of political Islam may be hindered by several factors. What has mostly hindered are the orthodoxy of belief system in Sunni society that does not give rooms for re-interpretation of Islamic doctrines; and sociological contexts of a given Muslim societies—in this regards lack of development of social sciences in Indonesia that eventually gives negative impacts among others on the political thought emanating from Islamic doctrines.

The seemingly discontinuity in the practice of political Islam in Indonesia is to a greater extent the consequences of moderate modernists-Muslims (Khan, 2005) stance to moderation that significantly suffice adoption of Western political ideas (such as “secular-libertarian” democracy) at the expense of undermining the legacy of what Suryo (2000) described as the Indonesia’s Santri-based Great Tradition that is based on the SANTRI (Islamic values centering around Pesantren communities across the country) of the Indonesian society (Suryo, 2000). Areas of the death toll of the practice of political Islam include misunderstanding the history of stages of changes in government system: similar to the Western experience of stages of colonized nation, (and then was developed to) de-colonized with two typology—Independence and the nation under protection or Negara protektorat by former ruler(s), and on—in “British Empire” case to member of Commonwealth. Similar changes should also have taken place in the practice of political Islam: from khilafah, and on to political system that is based on fully Muslim-dominated society (with the coining of such category of territory as Darul Islam and Darul Harb in the Middle Ages, and to Empire of Utsman until the early 20th century. Of the latter, in some kingdoms in Nusantara, several kingdoms became under protection of the Utsman Empire. However, it is observed that no longer development of concepts or theories resulted by social sciences to cultivate the practice of political Islam when nation-state countries are adopted.

How should progress of political theories be made? What does the practice in Java Islamic kingdoms mean to such a call for developing political theory? Why did the agenda for debate over the search for philosophical grounds of the newly proclaimed state of 1945 the Republic of Indonesia present the discourse on this by discussing other nation’s history—
Kemalism model of Religion-political relationship? Why not benefiting from our own history of 18th century Nusantara when political Islam—symbolized in *Khalifatullah Panatagama* (KP)—was practiced. The dynamic symbolizing in the term KP may be considered Java model of politics and religion relationship. As is explained in the literature, changes in government system evolve from monarchy to monarchy along with the Constitution, and on to rule of law or democracy or government system of republic. The gradual shift of kingdoms across Java from Hindu-based values or doctrines to that of Islam-based did reflect the gradual changes from traditional monarchy to monarchy with the syari’ah (Islamic law) influence Constitution, along with the introduction and practice of deliberation (democracy) among elite religious scholars to put legitimacy on the respected kings. All these should be a few significant institutions coming from the Santri-based Great Tradition that contribute to the flourishing of modern Indonesian civic culture entering the nation-state of Indonesia.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

First of all it is appropriate to give emphasis that in history of Muslim world since the city-state of Madinah in the 7th century, system of government changes, reflecting the stages of development of a given society. From monarchy to gradual change in this traditional political system. From monarchy with constitution to rule of law. From city-state to large empire. Second, the CEO of government though originally takes the name “khalifah”, it has taken various terms such as Amiir, Sultan, and khalifah. The word khalifah or caliph was used in the beginning of Muslim world in the 7th century, denoting to those ruling a given political system. This was especially true with regards to the four consecutive leaders (popularly called the four *khulafaaurrasyiduun*) who act as the successors of leadership of the Prophet Muhammad (P B H). CEO was elected by Ummah, meaning through syuro or musyawarah or “democracy” (Zaman, et. al. 2017). The question may be: is musyawarah purely instituted by Islam? The answer is as follows: The universality of conducting session to discuss issues seems obvious in the Arab culture. Long before Muhammad Rasulullah, it was the tradition of the Arabs to conduct deliberation under the local institution of *majlis*, *mala* and *nadi* — the practices that, according to Maarif (1985), are then adopted by Muslim society in the era of Khalifah Abu Bakar (replacing leadership of Muhammad Rasulullah). The practice of consulting and deliberation among the elites was done during the periods of the four (4) consecutive administrations. It is such a deliberation by senior followers, called tabi’in) of Rasul Muhammad that later on the Muslim Ummah instituted and developed *Ahl Hall wa al-Aqd* (Darban. 2004), or only those of highly competent and wise can be in the session of deliberation(Hidayat, 2015). Such
practices of elite deliberation (Sani & Hara, 2007) can now days be found in contemporary Deliberative Theory of Democracy (DTD). In middle ages and entering to the modern world, it was the Empire of Utsmany—with huge territory across Asia, some parts of Europe and some parts of Africa—existed as the dominant global political system and was known as Turkey-based Caliph of Ustmany. And it is written in history that the well-known secularist leader of Turkey, Kemal Attaturk (later on Kemal’s political practice and thought was then known as Kemalism) seized the power and along with the mushrooming of adoption of nation-state system, Turkey was made nation-state and the khilafah system was abolished in the early 20th century. Throughout this study the hypothesis guiding it is that KP in Islamic Kingdoms across Nusantara does not have connection with what is termed as khilaafah system; the Islamization in Nusantara provide ample rooms for promoting civility and deliberation practices and the crucial role of ulama in politics has been significant in modern Indonesia. The emergence of theory related to the word khalifah or caliph was a modern phenomenon: one prominent theory or political thought was that of Abu A’la Al-Mawdudy’s theory—khilaafah ‘alaa manhajj al’nubuwwah. Al-Bagir in Hidayat (2015) mentions one of conception in Al-Mawdudi’s political thought that people’s sovereignty is excluded in his thought.

**Conceptual & Theoretical Basis**

First, a civic culture as defined by Almond & Verba (in Kawmura, 2011), “Citizens in stable democracies possess a relatively common set of understanding about the appropriate boundaries of government, the sanctity of political rights, and the duties of citizens to preserve them...” (Kawamura, 2011). Though Indonesian society has not yet achieved stable democratic political system, the definition is likely relevant to appreciating the legacy of Santri-based Great Tradition like the practices of deliberation among the elites and provide fertile land for mushrooming democratic culture. The interesting legacy of Santri-based Great Tradition in Indonesia is the significant impact on civic culture amongst vast people to implement the duality of monocracy & democracy.

**RESULTS & DISCUSSION**

**The Concept**

The universality of “God Save the King’ is shown in almost all culture across the globe (before secularism then replaced it), as is the case of ancient Rome in Europe, there were *une roi, une loi, une foi* (one king, one law, and one religion). (Riyadi in Heriyanto, 2018 ). Modern political theory introduces the term legitimacy. Of the four (4) kinds of legitimacy, there is one based on religion—one legitimacy that is considered no longer valid in modern
era—the era of secularism. The era when theology was replaced by purely the study of human phenomena, anthropology. But now days the belief in worldly reality and not believing other world has been eroding as is indicated in the writing of notable figures, Jurgen Habermas and former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s; their article is, “Secularism Crisis of Faith” (Blair & Debray, 2008) (the use “faith” is interesting, replacing philosophy, exactly making equal status of faith in religion terminology.

**Before the 20th Century Islamization**

Among the actors spreading Islam is Sunan Giri of Gresik in East Java under the Hindu-Buddha kingdom of Majapahit in the 16th century. Its penetration included the spreading in southern part of Central Java, example in Banjarneghara region, where two children of Sunan Giri—Prince Giri Wasiyat & Prince Giri Pit—shared the role. And later it is written in local history that a few “rulers” in particular local regions or *adipati* were the descendents of the two prince (Marwah, 2019). In terms of sub-culture of Santri sub-culture, one variety of the legacy of Santri-based Great Tradition is Gresik-based Mataraman culture. Chalik (2015) explains that the varian quite probably emerged and has developed as a result of influence of regimes in the kingdom of Mataram along with other localities in Java where local people adopt some typical norms and customs during the kingdom once became dominant. This sub-culture takes the period “yang secara historis mencakup masa Islam sampai dengan masa Indonesia modern” (Chalik. 2015). Seen from economic perspective, Mataram Kingdom, established after the fall of Majapahit kingdom in the 15th century, was one new emerging economic forces in the inland of Java economy, with the competing kingdoms in negeri-negeri pantai—where the dynamic in pesisir was also viewed suspiciously by Portuguese, the colonial rule in Malacca (Singgih & Rochwulaningsih, 2013). Along with those kingdoms across Java, Long before hand, there were in Sumatera the following kindoms: Samudera Pasai in the 13th century, kingdom of Aceh in 15th century, kingdom of Minangkabau in the 16th century (Auliahadi & Nofra, nd). Concerning theories of the early time when Islam was spread in Nusantara, one theory is the one that Islam first came from China. Kasdi (2017) wrote that Raden Patah, the king of Islamic kingdom Demak “is a Chinese descent. His mother came from Campa, southern China(Kasdi, 2017).

Though already well-known of Walisongo’s central role of Islamization across Nusantara, little was realized the fact that these elites of ulama took initiative to institute trustees (note that in political science, two varieties of political representations are made—representatives as a mandate, and the other one as trustees). Trustees of the wali-s or wilayaat. As Kasdi explained, there were periods of Walisongo trustee-ship: during the fourth period, beginning 1466, there were successors of trustee-ship, namely Raden Patah...
and Fathullah Khan. “Raden Patah was Sunan Ampel’s student, he was the son of King Brawijaya of Majapahit. He was appointed Duke of Demak Bintoro in 1462”. Concerning the emphasis of Syari’ah or Islamic law vis-à-vis Sufism (spirituality of Islam) there are indications that Indonesian Islam was originally more of Sufism:

“It is based on Sunan Bonang primbon, primbon I and II representatively represent Walisongo’s teachings. ...there are several paragraphs quoted from the book of al-Bidayah and Ihya Ulumu al-diin written by al-Ghazali.....they (Walisongo—HZ) combine Sufism with the fiqih (parts of the science of Syari’ah—HZ) in a harmonious blend. The reason is that, ..., if studying Sufism without the starting with fiqih, it is likely someone will be zindiq (atheists—HZ). Conversely, if studied fiqih with no regard to Sufism, the brain is only met by a case study of halal-haram, while the soul is empty and hollow. Thus, in their struggle, tried to end the dispute that occurred between the great Sufi scholars and scholars of fiqih”.

**After the 20th Century Indonesia**

First it is about the crowning “Sultan”. Safitri (2019) noted that it was the 3rd king Mataran, sending messenger to the credible ulama of Makkah, Saudi Arabia, to obtain the crown “Sultan” (Safitri, 2019). Second, the description of Kahalifatullah Panatagama & related crowning. Quoting de Graaf, in Hariyanto (2018) finds that in exchange of sharing mutual support, the third king of Mataram (the then Sultan Agung) and one of his smaller kings under protection gave title to each other. One proposal (and then was accepted by Sultan Agung) was the title Susuhunan Ing Ngalaga (Mataram warlord) in exchange of the title Raden Arya Wira Nata given to the small king that proposed. The occasion took place in August 1924—in modern history of Nusantara. In addition, the prince of Cirebon—who was also invited at the ceremony of Gerebek Puasa or the ceremony welcoming Ramadhan month, the ninth month in Hegira calendar—awarded the title Panembahan to Sultan Agung. In the words of power politics, initially this new kingdom (Mataram) had its king coming from lay people (lower class); such a king coming from a low class was unprecedented in the history of Hindu-Budha kingdoms in Java. As the kingdom of Mataram expanded and experienced high pressure coming from various forces (cultural, political, and other interests), it was the third king of Mataram taking the initiative to do some politics of crowning the king to gain more powerful authority & legitimacy. This radical measure was taken in the early 17th century (in1624).

With the title “sultan” itself Mataram King (and now days Sultan Yogya), the king remains in relation to the influence of political Islam: referring to Sindung Haryanto’s book *Dunia Simbol Orang Jawa* (2013), Sindung Hariyanto in Hariyanto (2018) describes the concepts as follows.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description/definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sultan</td>
<td>The word is mentioned in the Quran 33 times, many is also mentioned by the prophet frequently (no description is made)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngadurrahman</td>
<td>Being the ruler, raja remains the man with submission to god. All his deeds are but oriented towards submission to him)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyidin</td>
<td>The honorable of the noble yang dipertuan agung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panatagama</td>
<td>The patron responsible to the execution of religious doctrines by the people (who are muslims – HZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalifatullah</td>
<td>Mandate from God, his ruling is in essence “God Save the King”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hariyanto, 2018: the Chart is modified & translated, p.140)

Woodward (in Hariyanto, 2018) points out that among the problems of legitimacy that are encountered by the king of Mataram were (1) resistance coming from Java rooted spirituality and (2) Javanese elites who were opposing the massive influence of Islam and political Islam. The King's politics of crowning himself (sole authority, Islamic symbol, etc) was one of his strategies to cope with rivalries of other powers across Java.

The establishment of the then Islamic kingdoms of Demak (coastal, more business center regions) and then the kingdom of Mataram (more rural areas) was just one dimension of penetration of Islam across Java/Indonesia society, and reflected more of political sphere. The other multi faced dimension was economic, cultural, and social phenomena that is of significant influence and when the concept political force is used this social capital provide *elan vital* of potential political Islam as well. In this regard, KP was more of elites, formal arena of social change whether or not the little is no longer used, the dynamic of influence of political Islam is likely to take place.

One many make a distinction of influence: one influence has been taking within (real) political realms centering around political sphere or formal structure under such terms as super structure as well as infrastructure.

*Abolition of the Crowning KP*

About omission of the crowning KP in the 20th Century. Hadi (in Pradikti & Tur 2017), wrote that the title KP as one legacy of Santri-based Great Tradition was marginalized by the 10th descendant of Sri Sultan, Herjuno Darpito, in contemporary Java, exactly in 2015, i.e. the time of the era of political reform in Indonesia. BRM Herjuno Darpito “was mandated to be next king of Yogyakarta Sultanate on March 7, 1989”. Darpito “chose a noble title *… Sayidin Panatagama Khalifatullah*……... however, on April 30th, 2015 (meaning 17 years after the fall of Suharto and beginning of political reform) through sabda Raja, ....
Deleting two non Javanese words which were *Khalifatullah* and *Sayidin*. It seems that Darpito’s determination to abolish these Islamic Symbols of influence is meant for efforts to stay away from “political Islam”. wave of Indonesia’s political reform seems to provide room to think it over again, and Derpito’s account is that the social setting is no longer justify the use of these two titles.

**After the Independence**

Early independence of 1945 until 1959 when the Parliament had a session to finalize drafting the Constitution as a consequence of the fact that—as Soekarno formally mention of ad hoc status of th 1945 Constitution. With compromise of ideology of the new state, Pancasila, the practice of political Islam had no longer benefited the legacy of ideas of instituting khalifatullah in the new nation-state; as consonant to the acceptance of nation-state system, we note that from Muslim groups political forces, prominent leaders and notable ulama accepted democracy and democratic procedure whereby some function of controlling the execution of Islamic law was not formally linked to the responsibilities of the “khalifah” or president, but rather rested on the accommodation at the state ideology of Pancasila, and further within judicial body of government. Such diffusion of authority, it seems, is a continuity of the role of ulama in the field of religion when kingdom Mataram existed. Still, under the Constitution and state ideology, a president is to be responsible to God—implying the vicegerent status of his temporal power.

So far as the impulse of legacy the Santri-based Great Tradition, the above political culture and orientation among Muslim leaders and ulama reflected the fruitful transformation of the Indonesian society to be capable to perform democratic politics—having deliberation, develop discourse on social and political issues, and respecting democratic procedure and decision.

One astonishing point during the debate over the draft of the Constitution and the ideological basis for the nation-state of Indonesia in 1959 was the fact that no intention coming from Muslims group to some form of developing the idea or the practice of Islam kingdoms of Mataram (with the adoption of the term KP); instead, Muslim groups had intended to pursue the religion of Islam being the ideology or bases of nation-state of Indonesia (that did not gain majoritarian votes). Astonishing because Muslim groups (either political forces or political parties) could have pursued the Nusantara’s own history of the past—KP—of early 19th century by way of developing concepts and theory.

During Soekarno’s rule notably from 1958 to 1966, when the political system had no longer practice democratic politics, modernists wings of Muslims during —along with other political parties pursuing democracy—were determined to demand for more democratic politics that Soekarno should have done. This fact again reflected the fruitful
transformation that the Santri-based Great Tradition contributed to the nation’s efforts to democratize us. Similar spirit was also shown by several political groups 32 years rule of Suharto—both political parties and civil society had demanded better practices of democratic politics. In terms of Khalifatullah Panatagama, Muslim groups no longer dream about making Islam the state ideology of NKRI; in the words of Afan Gaffar (1993), the ideal pursued is achieve more proportionate portion of political gains in real politics.

In contemporary politics after the fall of Suharto (1998) until now days, though not united, political forces coming from Muslims groups generally welcome democratic politics. Coalition of “nasionalis-netral-agama” party of Gerindra Party and a Muslim-based political party, Partai Keadilan & Sejahtera (PKS) enjoyed a democratic contestation in 2019 presidential election. The election that present only two candidates of Joko Widodo vs. Prabowo results in the winning of Joko Widodo—meaning that the coalition of Gerindra and PKS becomes the loser. But again, democratic politics becomes the political system that is accepted by main stream Muslims group. It is again astonishing that during the campaign and debate by the respective candidates, a claim was made that Muslims group had an agenda to replace Pancasila with khilafah. The ideology of khilafah so far is promoted by small faction of Muslims group, i.e. by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) (Atabik, 2014). As far as formal debate and discourse no idea of khilafah was mentioned by main stream Muslim groups or Muslim-based political parties.

In the mean time, the Islamic influence politically has also been obvious when the contestation of presidency in 2019. In conjunction to the Great Tradition, the prospect of democratic politics may be facilitated by the fact that monarchy and aristocratic regimes in Java are thought to be more or less fragmented and less institutionalized—thus giving freer maneuver of dynamic of civil society to promote democracy (Dardias, 2016).

CONCLUSION
One of the lessons learned is that developing concepts and perspective of political Islam Indonesia will not mean that we look backward with the past “God Save the King”. But rather we further develop civic culture and politics with incorporating—borrowing from Kristianto’s term—political spirituality into the body of our future political culture and system. And among the values in Great Tradition’s civic culture is (elite) deliberation and the institution of trustee-ship; In a Monarchy, the kings are the sole individuals in power; in ulama’s elite segments, trustee-ship along with its practice of deliberation is introduced, challenging the status quo. Again about “political spirituality” it may be a misfortune for Muslim groups in Indonesia that in principle in Islam politics is inherent or imbedded but the supreme institution like MUI does not have a clear disposition on the matter. This seems in contrast to what Kristianto indicates that the Church of (Vatican) has had clearer
stance to this matter—that there is a partial link between religion and politics, and that politics in the eye of Church includes real politics. What seems to be demanded is that studies on KP as the legacy of the Indonesian society be conducted. Without serious researches or studies by amongst academics in related fields, the legacy of KP may not be fruitful for us—in the future, the legacy should not be understood as if Muslims groups would be willing to replace Pancasila with the so-called an ideology of Khilafah. Because of the fact that mainstream most Muslims groups in Indonesia have accepted Pancasila since our independence, we can infer that the concept khilafah and its practice by several CEOs of kings of Islamic kingdoms is more about best practices of what in contemporary world is termed good & corporate governance. The practice of political Islam is not about an ideology. The legacy of KP as part of Santri-based Great Tradition may mean that elites in power had made use of the Islamic term of khilafah first for his own political interest—especially to gain centralized authority and develop legitimacy. Second, the role of CEO of government include the assurance that religious doctrines be implemented by the citizens. In our nation-state system of NKRI, basically the ideas remain effective; only the term khalifah has no longer in use. The 1945 Constitution mandated rulers’ responsibilities to perform accountability within the framework of believing in One God or Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, and the division of authority in the area of religion regulated in the Laws. Such legacy as ahl al-hall wa al-’aqd could be translated as a political institution whose members are of highly trusted individuals with main responsibility of providing guidance to the country’s chief executive officer (CEO). Such a modification would mean that it is no longer the possession of Muslim groups, but the possession of across social groups. This legacy of trustee-ship along with capability and capacity to deliberate (a concept that is promoted in Deliberative Democratic Theory) is likely a crucial asset amidst the current turbulence of political life in the country—when trust is very hard to find and when dialog and negotiations across elites are difficult to do. The abolition of KP has been done in Kesultanan Yogyakarta. However the abolition would not mean the omission of religious legitimacy in the older format. Within the framework of Habermas’s post-secularism, religious legitimacy is imbedded in the sociological legitimacy across the society. This continuity by way of imbedded-ness also applies in some other kesultanans of Islam across the Nusantara, meaning that “political Islam” both in the levels of high politics and low politics remain influential sociologically. Therefore, it would be better to think that abolition of crowning KP is not abolition the influence of political Islam. What is termed as “cultural Islam” and “political Islam” does prevail in many of the Indonesian society. The ruler’s decision to omit or abolish the title KP and sultan, or sayyidin, however, does not reflect the sociological phenomenon of social political influence of political Islam in
contemporary Indonesia. One gigantic political event did prove the above proposition: the winning of the governor Anies Baswedan in Jakarta in its full support of the mass & Islam-based political party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) in collaboration with Gerindra party.

In addition, KP was a power play phenomenon and was elite stratum of the society; though abolished, political influence among the vast people in the society remain strong. Political Islam under such terms as KP and Sultan was abolished but it only in formal structure. In informal structure and in domain of Society, the Santri-Great Tradition and political Islam remains alive. There has been discontinuity in state system where political symbol of Islamic influence has no longer in use; however, there has been changes in the Islamic influence is forged according to the rule of the game in nation-state system of democratic politics in the framework of state ideology of Pancasila.*** (God or Allah the competent of knowledge)

REFERENCE
http://www.sttintheos.ac.id/e-journal/index.php/dunamis


Pradika, Ajar & Ananta Tur (2017). “Arabic Names for Young Children : Evaluating Muslim Javanese Identity” Atlantis press (an open access article under the CC by-NC license)


