NARRATIVE AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY: PATTERNS OF THE SPREAD AND ACCEPTANCE OF RADICALISM AND TERRORISM IN INDONESIA
(Case Study on the ROHIS Groups and Youth Organizations in DKI Jakarta Province)

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ABSTRACT: This study aims to examine the narrative map, acceptance and spread patterns, and factors influencing the spread and acceptance of the narrative associated with the phenomenon of radicalism and terrorism in DKI Jakarta Province. It was conducted with a qualitative approach: the data were collected through in-depth interviews with as many as 24 subjects (informants) divided into seven categories, namely, the Rohis (Islamic organization in secondary schools), the LDK (Basic Leadership Training)), mosque youth, youth organizations, religious leaders, da'i (preacher)/ takmir (mosque board), political activists, and cultural leaders. The finding of the study showed that the radicalism narrative has spread through a variety of patterns and has more importantly spread through interpersonal relationship patterns. However, the spread of the narrative has not been accompanied by an acceptance by the respondents of the narrative’s substance. From 96 radicalism and terrorism narratives posed as questions, a total of 62 responses (64.58%) showed an opposition to these narratives that are present in the midst of the people of Jakarta. A total of 20% of the respondents expressed an improvement attitude towards the narratives, and the rest were receptive and accepted them with considerations. This finding proves that Jakarta residents not only are relatively free from the influence of radicalism and terrorism narratives but also have an immune system (improvement group) whose numbers among the groups of respondents to the narratives are balanced.

Keywords: youth, organization, radicalism, terrorism, Jakarta
INTRODUCTION

Jakarta, a metropolitan city in the centre of Indonesia, serves as the centre of the Indonesian government. It is also an important business centre in Southeast Asia. Because of its strategic and complex function, Jakarta has become a *melting pot* for various groups from many regions and countries. Jakarta, portrayed graphically, resembles cobwebs amid a haystack. There is a pattern of regularity, which is also evident in the cobwebs. However, Jakarta (or the cobwebs) is often biased because it is in a tangled environment.

As a metropolitan city and the centre of government, Jakarta is inhabited by various tribes, ethnicities, and religions. From the aspect of religion and belief, ethnic (tribal), culture, economics, and other demographic factors, the people of Jakarta are a miniature representation of Indonesia’s diversity (heterogeneous). All religions and beliefs that exist in Indonesia are in Jakarta. Jakarta includes a variety of different interest groups with different perspectives, and Islam is the religion of the majority of the population. These differences also underlie their perspective in responding to central government policies and in responding to the existence of non-Muslim groups in Jakarta.

The Jakarta area has become very important for research on radicalism and terrorism, as Jakarta has unique characteristics when viewed from the perspective of government, business, social and political culture. Jakarta is a melting pot of various interest groups. It is the centre of administrative and political activity. Jakarta is also a melting pot of all ethnic backgrounds, cultures, and religions. On the other hand, Jakarta is also a *stage* and a strategic objective of radicalism and terrorism behaviours. Based on these conditions, the findings of this study on radicalism and terrorism in Jakarta will be distinctive and crucial.

Radicalism and terrorism are social movements understood as movements that are done in an organized manner, of a group of people who refuse or accept new values. According to Situmorang (2007: 4), a social movement is a conscious, collective, and organized effort to encourage or reject changes in the social order. This description indicates that the main criterion of a social movement is a movement that aims to bring about a fundamental change in society. Antony Gidens (in Situmorang, 2007: 4) viewed that the social movement is a movement to achieve a common interest through collective action outside the scope of the established institutions.

Basically, a religious movement is a social movement based on a particular religion (faith-based social movement). As part of social movements, in general, religious movements can be analysed using the theory of social movements. By using the theory of social movements, a religious movement is considered as a social fact, not a collection of religious doctrines alone. It is seen as the movement of thought, as a thing-in-itself, with an emphasis on the issues of the theological thinking or the religious-political thoughts of its founder, its institution profile, and on sometimes merely the doctrines of its movement. Moreover, a
religious social movement must be seen as a dynamic movement, which is responsive to the challenges outside the movement and which builds networks and social change.

Some social theories, which can be used to understand religious social movements, are, among others, the following: (1) the theory of Structural Political Opportunity (POS), (2) the Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT), and (3) the Framing theory. (Situmorang, 2007: 4). In the Structural Political Opportunity (POS) theory, social movements occur because of changes, which are seen as opportunities, in the political structure. POS theory is always associated with resources that are external. Actors wanting change use these resources through open political access and through the networks of political institutions and divisions within the political elites, to make changes (Tarrow, 1998: 20).

To explain the development and the formation of networks of radicalism and terrorism movements in Jakarta, we use the theory of Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT). Religious social movement is seen as a rational and organized manifestation of collective action. In other words, a religious social movement will be able to evolve if it is able to optimize its various resources, such as material resources, legitimacy, identity, and institution (Tarrow, 1998: 15; Sigh, 2001: 102; Situmorang (2007).

Radicalism is often associated with violence, even terrorism. It is not separated from the increasing violence and terrorism committed in the name of religion or by a participant in a particular religion. However, conceptually, according to Taher (in Azca, 2013: 24), radicalism is not synonymous with terrorism and violence. The term radical that makes up the term radicalism is derived from the Latin radix, meaning root. Thus, radical thinking is synonymous with thinking up to the roots. In other words, then, why is it associated with thinking that is likely to cause anti-establishment attitudes?

Radicalism is a concept that is both contextual and positional. In this case, its presence is the antithesis of the orthodox or the mainstream, whether in a social, secular, scientific, or religious aspect. Radicalism is more about position and ideology questioning or challenging something (or everything) that is considered an established, accepted, or a common view. Radicalism can be understood as a social and political phenomenon born in a state of dislocation or a permanent crisis in society. Therefore, it should be seen as a collective political phenomenon and not as a mere individual psychological phenomenon.

This research aim to study the areas covered by the narratives of radicalism and terrorism in Jakarta, it is important to know the patterns of spread and the acceptance in the region. This is due to the position of Jakarta as the centre and capital city of Indonesia. Therefore, Jakarta serves as a barometer for radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia.
METHOD

This study is included in the category of the qualitative research, that is, a study aimed at generating data in the form of written or spoken words from people being observed (Moloeng, 2000, 4). As a case study, this research is aimed at studying in detail particular social units that include an individual, a group, or an institution (Zuriah, 2006: 48). The data were collected through interviews, observations, and a study of the documents. The interviews were conducted with leaders of rohis in schools, figures of the LDK (Basic Leadership Training)), mosque youth, youth organizations, religious leaders, da’i/ takmir, political activists, and cultural leaders in Jakarta.

In this research, a descriptive analysis was used in order to create a systematic, factual, and accurate picture of the facts, nature, and the relationship among the phenomenon investigated. The data obtained was then presented and analysed using a descriptive technique, which included a series of data reduction and data presentation activities, and a conclusion was developed. The analysis of this study not only provides explanations through descriptive sentences but also attempts to give clarity to the research object (Moloeng, 2000: 36).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Social, Political, and Religious Setting in DKI Jakarta

According to data from the DKI Jakarta government in 2005, the composition of religious followers in this city was as follows: Islam (84.4%), Protestants (6.2%), Catholics (5.7%), Hinduism (1.2%), and Buddhism (3.5%). The number of Buddhists who follow Confucianism was also included. This composition was not very different from the religious composition in 1980, which was as follows: Muslims (84.4%), Protestants (6.3%), Catholics (2.9%), Hinduism and Buddhism (5.7%), and non-religious followers (0.3%). According to Cribb, in 1971, the adherents of Confucianism in relative terms were 1.7%. In 1980 and 2005, the census does not record religious affiliations other than the six religions recognized by the government.

Various places of worship of world religions can be found in Jakarta. Mosques and Mushala, as houses of worship for Muslims, are scattered in all corners of Jakarta, even in almost every environment. The biggest mosque is the national mosque, i.e., Masjid Istiqlal, located in Gambir. Other important mosques are Masjid Agung (the Great Mosque) Al-Azhar in Kebayoran Baru, Masjid At-Tin in Taman Mini, and Masjid Sunda Kelapa in Menteng. On the other hand, the Christians also have large churches in Jakarta, such as, for Catholics, the Jakarta Cathedral Church, the Church of Santa Theresia in Menteng, and, the Church of St. Jacobus in Kelapa Gading. In addition, for Protestants, there is the Immanuel Church, located across from Gambir Station, the Koinonia Church in Jatinegara, the Jakarta Zion
Church in Jakarta Kota, and the Toraja Christian Church in Kelapa Gading, North Jakarta. For Hindus who live in Jakarta and the surrounding areas, there are places of worship, such as the Pura Adhitya Jaya located in Rawamangun, East Jakarta, and the Pura Segara in Cilincing, North Jakarta. The houses of worship for the Buddhists are, among others, Vihara Dhammacakka Jaya in Sunter, Vihara Theravada Buddha Sasana in Kelapa Gading, and Vihara Silaparamitha in Cipinang Jaya. The places of worship for the Confucians in Jakarta are the Temple of Jin Yin Tek and a synagogue used by the Jewish foreign workers.

DKI Jakarta is a melting pot of all social groups fragmented in terms of religion, ethnicity (tribes), culture, economics, and other factors. This fragmentation of Jakarta's people into these different social groups has created a dynamic that frequently has given rise to social radicalism in the fight over economic resources. In addition, political radicalism has also emerged as a way to seize political and economic power.

**Narratives On Islam, The State And Politics**

The respondents generally showed a moderate stance against the political system in Indonesia. The narratives do not radically criticize or reject the existing system. In general, informants opine that the political system is a tool to achieve the goal of providing benefits to the citizens. This view implies that whatever the system does is not important: its most important function is to provide for the well-being of human beings. However, the informants criticize the existing system for not yet being an ideal one. They consider that the political influence in the management of the country is too large; therefore, the country’s resources and energy are severely drained by political activities. Consequently, some crucial issues that would benefit the citizens and the country, i.e., economics, education, health, and others, are subject to neglect. An LDK of University of Indonesia (UI) committee member stated the following:

"I saw that there were too many parties in Indonesia, so that our energy is drained for political activities. As a result, other aspects, such as economic issues, have become less overcome. It is not a problem to follow the existing system, for it is basically a tool to achieve the goal, i.e., the realization of benefit."

In addition, the respondents apparently had moderate attitudes towards the democratic system. Most respondents agreed or did not reject the democratic system, and others conditionally agreed with it. The respondents do not reject democracy but evaluate that there are weaknesses in its implementation. Democracy in Indonesia has not been complemented by the level of maturity and the level of education of the citizens. Therefore, the majority of respondents rate the democracy in Indonesia as having gone too far.
Didi Setiadi, the Chairman of Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI) Kepulauan Seribu, claims that the political system of Indonesia is considerably democratic but that there are weaknesses in its implementation. However, he considered that Pancasila was in accordance with Islam and supports the concept of Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia (NKRI). He says the following:

"The political system in Indonesia, I think, is quite democratic. Even, it is too democratic to the point that it creates a dilemma for government. For now, I disagree that our society should be given very broad democratic freedom. This is a boomerang for Islam. Yes, to some extent, there are some that are conformable, and some are not so. Pancasila, in Islam, is more universal. (Is Pancasila compatible with Islam?) Yes. NKRI, in my opinion, is “a fixed price” for us to defend, and we should not let anyone mess it up."

A similar voice is echoed by Ahmad Zaenudin, Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI) Jakarta Brigade Commander. He further states as follows:

"When it comes to democracy, it does not change that much. If you look at political parties, the system is still a monarchy. Thus, the current system does not support it. I would not fix it by radical ways. Let us criticize it from the outside through real actions. Fundamentally, Pancasila and NKRI do not contradict Islam since the Prophet Muhammad never talked about the countries and Islam is indeed rahmatan lil 'alamiin. Mercy for the universe"

Some respondents felt that as a form of a democratic system implementation, the process of generally and directly electing leaders is not entirely good. In the democratic system, everyone has the right to pick and choose leaders, but a majority of voters may not have a sufficient understanding and the wisdom to determine leaders. As a result, regardless of the individual's quality, the elected leaders can be anyone and may possibly be elected based on popularity. Moreover, this election process may provide the possibility of misuse by certain interest groups.

Some respondents stated that democracy is not fully in accordance with Islam. However, with respect to Indonesia's current condition, they do not reject the system. There are two considerations the respondents propose in this regard. First, the system's implementation should be adapted to specific situations and conditions. Second, as long as the system is still considered appropriate or closely in accordance with Islamic values, democracy is regarded as an acceptable tool or instrument that aims to establish benefits for people. In other words, democracy as a tool can be anything and does not have to formally carry out the label of Islam. More importantly, its goal is achieved through its benefit to humans. The chairman of the cadre teen mosque in northern Jakarta stated the following:
"It (democracy) did not exist in the Prophet Muhammad’s era, but if democracy is defined as deliberation, it means just talking about methods (of democracy as a method in making decisions or choosing a leader). So, it is legitimate (allowed), if beneficial. Depending on the conditions (if today the democratic system is possible to be applied, it does not matter, as long as it can be beneficial). Implementation of any system is largely determined by its leaders. The disadvantage (of the democratic system implementation) is that all people with different capacities have the same vote (voting with the same power at the time of the election). The ways conducted by the prophet are difficult to apply today, as people’s thoughts are very diverse."

A similar narrative has been received as well from the chairman of the LDK Universitas Negeri Jakarta (UNJ). He asserts that democracy basically does not come from Islamic teachings. However, for Indonesia’s current situation and the political system existing today, democracy is not considered a problem. This is because the democratic system is considered to still include positive values that are not contradictory with Islamic values, although there are some parts of the implementation that are, he considers, less than ideal. Even though it is not fully in accordance with Islam, it is considered the closest to the values of Islam.

The respondents’ narratives on Pancasila and the concept of NKRI are generally very positive. All responses declare that Pancasila and NKRI are something good and instruments that benefit the lives of society and the nation. The respondents mostly agree on this view of these two concepts. Respondents embrace these attitudes because the respondents claim that the Pancasila and the concept of NKRI are not inconsistent with Islam. A respondent from FPI, for example, says that "Pancasila has been well received and is not contrary to Islam." The same response is also delivered by FKUB. A representative from FKUB utters that "the majority people are no longer concerned with Pancasila".

A number of respondents specifically questioned Pancasila’s implementation. They ponder that as a concept or ideology, Pancasila is good but that they are still facing the problem of practising the values of Pancasila in their daily lives. This issue was revealed by three groups of respondents, i.e., the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Bamus Betawi and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) party figures. An MUI respondent stated the following: "Pancasila is not an issue, yet its practice is questionable." Then, PKB figures expressed, "the very issue of Pancasila is that it has not yet been put into practice."

In line with the above narratives, the LDK leader of UI believes that Pancasila is not an issue when applied as a basis or system of values in life as long as Pancasila is not juxtaposed with the Qur'an. Pancasila was positioned as an instrument, interpretation, or declaration to strengthen the implementation of noble values. He stated the following:
“Not a problem (with Pancasila), as long as Pancasila is not aligned with the Qur’an. As such, Pancasila should be positioned as a formal declaration to strengthen the values, not as the primary basis.”

A similar comment was expressed by the leader of the LDK from UNJ. He viewed that there is no problem with Pancasila because Pancasila is not in opposition to Islamic values, although it is not labelled as part of Islam. He claims as follows:
“(Pancasila) as a value system is fine. This country is the achievement of the struggle of our predecessors, who were mostly Muslims. See the previous formulation of Pancasila (there were some words written “to implement sharia law for Muslims”). (I saw that) it (Pancasila) did not contradict Islamic values, although it does not use any Islamic terminology. If its application is not in accordance with the values of Islam, it must be denied.”

The respondents’ narratives on NKRI are as positive as their narratives on the concept of Pancasila are. All respondents from various categories even agree and accept the concept of NKRI. They reasoned that NKRI is an instrument to strengthen the unity and sovereignty of the country. The respondents of the LDK said the following:
“I accept (agree). Do not let this country become fragmented! There are souls of nationalities (which bind a unity as citizens). However, these conditions do not erode the concept of harmony of Muslims among nations.” (UI).

A similar narrative was expressed by another LDK respondent, who stated the following: “No problem (with NKRI). It is a good thing to unite people in the country. Its implementation must be in conformity with Islamic values covering the guarantee in exercising rights to practising religious teachings.”

For the activists of the ethnic and cultural based-organizations in Jakarta, such as Kembang Latar, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is “the fixed price” that cannot be negotiable. Their proximity to national figures and youth organizations, such as Pemuda Pancasila, is evidence of this. In fact, in our conversation, an activist of Latar Kembang stated that his mass organization has an emblem bearing a stallion and surrounded with rice and cotton. Rice and cotton are symbols of social justice for all people—this is obviously an influence of Pancasila. Therefore, when asked about their view of radicalism and terrorism, two activists of Kembang Latar stated unequivocally that there was no place for both ideologies in their mass organization. While smiling, one of them stated the following:
"We do not want to interfere, if not disturbed. Our slogan is indeed obvious: a thousand friends are still lacking, an enemy is too many … once upon a time, one of our people successfully
managed to capture terrorists in Pamulang, and now he has a position that is quite strategic there (Police) and this was enough to prove that our attitude is in line with the most ...

Similarly, with respect to FBR, although they are frequently reported for their acts of violence, their political attitudes towards race and religion do not point out any understanding of the narratives of radicalism and terrorism. In FBR’s culture and strategy, violence, which can be quite vicious, exists. Nonetheless, their culture and strategy seem far from Islamism. When found guilty, the individuals’ motives for their violent acts are more prone to be ones other than religion and politics. Moreover, the FBR’s current Chairman, Haji Lutfi Hakim, is an alumnus of pesantren and graduated from the Faculty of Da’wa UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. Some activists from Ciputat even testified that Lutfi Hakim was a campus activist and was active in the Student Forum Ciputat (FORMACI), a study group that is widely known for its progressive ideas. After the death of El-Hajj Fudholi Muhir, who is his relative, he was inaugurated as the next Chairman of FBR. One of the FBR activists in South Jakarta said that he was interested in joining FBR because this mass organization would give him the opportunity of mobility that he wanted but still in the realm of ethnicity, nationality and Islam.

Narratives on Islamic Sharia

In the respondents’ narratives, there was a wide diversity of opinion between those who agree and those who disagree, on the need for the enforcement of sharia law in Indonesia. Some respondents did not actually say that they agreed or not, but they were pessimistic about the possibility of sharia law enforcement. This attitude would appear from respondents, such as those in the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Bamus Betawi and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB). The FPI figures stated that for the moment, it was not easy to impose sharia law in Indonesia. The same statement was also expressed by MUI. PKB’s board has even explicitly declared that it is not necessary to impose sharia law. Bamus betawi and FKUB have the same view on this issue. They said that the imposition of sharia law will cause divisions. While the figures of PKS commented that Pancasila has been deemed good and sufficient to serve as a foundational value because it has been widely accepted by society, how these values can be implemented in life remains unclear.

The groups that agreed and provided support for the implementation of Sharia emerged from the group of Rohis respondents in high school, youth organizations and campus da’wah agencies, as well as a number of prominent figures of the mosque youth. Two Rohis respondents from senior high school said that sharia law has to be applied. All groups of Rohis supported having Indonesia as an Islamic state, while all clusters of OKP stated the
opposite. This polarization means many things. Biological lability factors may be important variables influencing the different views. Other factors are related to experiences and engagements in society and in the country. Regardless of the reasons for their views, the Rohis groups seem more prone to accept the spread of radicalization or extreme Islamism. Although most of them agree or encourage the application of sharia law, they have different views on its application. Information indicates that the respondents who agree with sharia law do not reflect radical ideas in their views on the way and the mode of its application. Respondents from Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI), for instance, stated that the shariah actually has been widely applied in a number of rules of law, although it has not been formally labelled as shariah. A similar view was also stated by a member of the board of LDK from UI. He felt that the shariah is good and true and that it should be applied. However, he argued that the application of sharia law should not use a formal label, i.e., shari’ah. The important thing, he said, was that the substantial basis of Islamic values is implemented in the legal process. Regardless of the name of the system and its origin, if the contents are in accordance with Islamic values, it is actually the implementation of Shariah. Therefore, some informants say that shariah implementation does not need a formal channel in the political system in Indonesia, such as political parties, elections, or parliament. They place more emphasis on propaganda (da’wah) activities (movement) as a great media mechanism to build up the rule of shari’ah. One of them comments as follows:

"I am very confident in the shari'ah because it comes from God. It should be applied. (Its application) should not always be labelled as shari'ah, but its substance has to be Islamic. (This is considerably realistic) for now. That means that it does not need to say 'this is the shariah.' The importance is its substance (containing Islamic values).

The respondent further stated:

"The shariah system is the best. The application of the shari'ah system cannot be done instantly. The substance is more important. The process of implementing the Shari'ah system is done through the missionary (da'wah) movement. Do not put forward the symbols of Islam! The importance is its substance (Islamic). The important thing is good content, which includes anything that comes from the West or from Christianity, because it is basically Islamic."

In line with the views on shariah, in different ways of expression, the majority of respondents also tended to show a less positive attitude towards the establishment of an Islamic State. The respondents stated that the application of shariah is the important thing, not the establishment of the Islamic State. The majority of the people already received Pancasila. The issue with Pancasila is how to practice it. According to the respondents, the
issue of establishing the Islamic State could break up Indonesia, resulting in the disintegration of the country. The respondents stated that they just needed to practice Pancasila well. One of the PKB figures explicitly stated that they do not need an Islamic state. Respondents who viewed that Indonesia must turn into an Islamic State were only those from the Rohis of the senior high schools.

Respondents representing religious activists on campus (LDK) reflected a more realistic, rational and flexible view of the Islamic State. Their view is that Shari’ah is a system which is regarded as the best and most ideal. Nevertheless, in their view, the concept of the Islamic state should not always be mentioned with respect to a formal label. In reference to the concept of the Islamic State, they emphasize its substance, which means that although the name may not appear as an Islamic state, the concept that is implemented and managed by the State should in many respects reflect Islamic values. This concept concerns changes in culture, outlook and behaviour. For that reason, it takes time and a long struggle to make it happen. Hence, directional changes of these conditions should use the existing rules or tools in order to avoid the resultant collisions and the radicalism that might be counterproductive. A respondent of the LDK from UI stated the following:

“There is no need to formally label an Islamic state, but the substance should be Islamic. The substance exceeds the form. The realization of (these expectations) requires a long struggle and must follow the process, rules or existing tools.”

The respondents from the UNJ also reflected the same narratives on the Islamic State. A respondent claimed the following:

“Indonesia has not yet been able to do that at this time, as our society is not conducive to that. For now, we cannot formally become an Islamic state. We are not ready. This has to be continuously defended. There is something more significant, i.e., the application of Islamic values (in various aspects of life)”

Narratives on Violence

Narratives about violent behaviour are quite diverse. However, there is a relatively consistent pattern in the narrative of most of the respondents. Most respondents conveyed a critical, realistic and rational narrative with respect to violent behaviour committed by a group of people against another group. Not all acts of violence were considered blameworthy and not all acts of violence were justified. The respondents tended to critically analyse every act of violence. Behaviour involving the raiding of a church was judged as something that cannot be justified, as it violates an individual’s rights to practice their religion. This attitude was reflected by the majority of respondents and was clearly indicative of the moderate attitude of the majority of the respondents towards religious
differences. A member of the LDK Board of UI, for example, stated that he did not agree with raiding churches because it violates the individuals’ right to practice their religion. He stated the following: "I do not agree with raiding places of worship (church) because it violates their rights". The same statement was also delivered by LDK of UNJ. He stated the following: "(raiding the church) It is not justified. It may be done by a person or in the name of Islam."

The respondents from Rohis SMA agree with conducting violent raids against places of vice and evil cult but not against the church. Adni Adzkia of Rohis SMA 59 and Mohamad Aci, Vice Chairman Rohis SMK Negeri 75, stated as follows: "(About the raid on immoral places?) It was good. (If it’s a raid on the church?) No. (Cult?) Yes. (Why) because of conflicts with the Shari’ah. (Right there is the government?) ... Do not understand." (Adni Adzkiah)

"(on raiding) agree with destruction, as the immoral place is forbidden. (Including cult-like Ahmadiyah) .. I do not necessarily agree. (Church?) I do not agree (once looked uncertain, red). An immoral place was destroyed for destroying the young generation. ... because it was a good move. Good, because it’s an immoral place; there is nothing good. Everything is bad." (Mohamad Aci)

Additionally, the respondents from the OKP agreed with conducting raids against immoral places but not against cults and the church. This was disclosed by Didi Setiadi, Chairman KNPI Thousand Islands, who stated as follows:

"(Raiding a maksit?) Agrees, but if related to the church, I do not agree. The time of the Prophet is also not allowed. If a cult, yes; fighting since the time of the Prophet, too. In Indonesia, it should be adjusted in a way so that they can be good. To directly raid the Ahmadiyah is good because they do have an understanding that is considered right by them."

Basically, respondents did not approve of violent behaviour towards the church. According to some respondents, violence or raiding church buildings usually occurs when the establishment of the church is not in accordance with existing rules, thus giving rise to a reaction from the surrounding community. When these reactions are not quickly and adequately settled by the government, it eventually leads to violence. This view is consistent with the narrative of the Governor of the youth mosque in North Jakarta. He stated the following:

"We should refer to the rules. We see laws. The Pendirin church sometimes does not follow the rules, but it is still standing. As a result, the community reacted. Sometimes the church is built on the site (environmental) of a Muslim community. Therefore, you should adjust
the legislation. If the establishment of the church is done by the rules, it does not matter. They also have the right to worship.

Similar feelings were expressed by officials of the LDK UNJ. A respondent stated: “Cases of violence (destruction) against the church occur because the existing rules / obligations are violated or because there is a person who intentionally wants to create a chaotic atmosphere. If the (church establishment) has been permitted (by the rules), there should be no violence. We must respect each other. If there are any problems, the path of deliberation should take precedence.”

The views of the respondents with respect to violence against immoral places seem different than their views on violence against the church. A small portion of respondents agreed with this type of action without any conditions. This attitude was shown by respondents from among the group of Rohis who attended high school. Most respondents agreed with this type of action but with a number of conditions. The respondents who have this view say that the phenomenon of violence against immoral places occurs as a result of the half-heartedness and lack of government enforcement of laws that have established order in the society. The respondents considered the raiding of immoral places a reaction of a group of people to the government’s inability to deal with the rampant immorality in society. The respondents seemed to take a middle position on conducting raids on immoral places. They did not expressly support such behaviour, but they also did not directly blame the perpetrators for the behaviour. A respondent from the LDK UI revealed the following: “Most respondents do not agree with raiding places of worship (church) because it violates the worshippers’ rights. Raiding immoral places disrupts public order because the government is unable to take firm action. This is a form of reaction from the public. We cannot directly blame them.”

The same narrative is also conveyed by the board mosque youth in North Jakarta. He stated the following: “Raiding against immoral places is a phenomenon that is almost the same as conducting violence against the cult. It is a form of forbidding the evil committed by a group of people because law enforcement does not function effectively. Finally, its the community itself that(takes action to close the immoral place).”

Respondents from the FPI and the MUI have very similar views on violent acts against immoral places. Both of these respondents signalled that we cannot blame the people with respect to this case because this is a reaction to law enforcement’s ineffectiveness. FPI leaders said that violence against immoral places occurs because the law is not enforced,
while respondents from the MUI states revealed that they do not blame people if they conduct raids against immoral places.

The respondents’ narratives about violence against cults were similar to those regarding the phenomenon of violence against immoral places. The respondents were not directly and unequivocally blaming the people who committed the acts of violence against a group of people who they considered had gone astray. In the case of a cult, the respondents felt that there have been acts of harassment that have caused unrest or that have been offensive to the religious community (Islam). Here is the actual root of the problem. The respondents highlighted the issue of the government not taking strong actions against individuals in these cases, which has led to people having to overcome their own issues. Related to this view, the respondents from LDK UI revealed the following:

“I see people feel disturbed (by the cult). The government does not (cannot) be trusted to solve this problem. (A cult phenomenon) menimbilkan causes unrest / interference, because of the harassment of things that are considered sacred.

A board teenager from the North Jakarta mosque stated the following:

“In general, raids or acts of violence cannot be justified. We must have orderly law. Governments are supposed to curb cases of cult since this is already considered as a desecration of religion. So, I see law enforcement as ineffective in dealing with this issue. So, violence is a form of reaction from the public. Communities do this as part of efforts to prevent kemungkaran.

Furthermore, LDK of UNJ also said the following:

“We should firmly oppose (the cults), such as the Ahmadiyah or Shia. The problem is that they claim Islam but have deviated from Islamic principles. So, this (is already categorized) as an abuse of Islam. The government should address this issue. If the government effectively addresses this issue, it will not happen (violence against the cult committed by a group of people).”

In addition to the narrative as exposed above, some respondents argued that any form of violence should not happen because it would damage the image of Islam and therefore the perpetrators must be dealt with. Such views emerged from respondents in the FKUB, the PKS and from PKB party figures. On the other hand, two respondents who agreed with raids on immoral place noted that such actions should be done by the government/state, not by a person or group of people. This attitude was reflected by respondents from the KAMMI and the GPI. The views of the last group of respondents are consistent with the rule of law related to the raiding phenomenon and to violence.
Perhaps one of the most vicious and violent cultures in Jakarta is contained in the groups that have felt or perceived that they have experienced discrimination. When all their economic and political mobility is hampered in particular because of the important position occupied by "settlers" in Jakarta, then those of certain ethnicities have no place to which they can return. Therefore, it is in the case of religion.

Thus, in Jakarta, various events in which there are clashes, often involve CBOs' regionalism. Although often covered up with impressive preaching, a number of these events have attracted news media coverage. For example, there have been conflicts of interest between the Betawi and the Madura in Kebayoran Lama Market, the Banten and the Flores in Tanah Abang, and others. Even events in the Kebayoran Lama Market reaction have sparked a reaction from a large number of citizens and Betawi leaders, which has led to the establishment of the Forkabi organizations in Jakarta.

Despite the fact that current conditions tend to be favourable, the infighting among various organizations, such as Latar Kembang and FBR, is still possible because it has been traumatic for both groups. After peace between the two groups was initiated by the police of Jakarta, the two organizations took a defensive stance. As explained earlier, the events did not necessarily eliminate the cultural strategy which asserts that the culture has to "defend itself." The dynamics of the rest of the mass organizations are that they are growing and sometimes growing violently.

**Narrative on Terrorism**

The global terrorism threat has become more decentralised, unpredictable, hard-to-detect and resilient with regenerative capacities. The global jihadist movements, principally the so-called Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda, have glocalised to exploit indigenous grievances, recruit aspiring jihadists and fight for local and global causes. Overall, both IS and Al-Qaeda have become underground terror networks which will allow them to sustain themselves for longer and perpetrate more violent attacks. With a radical Islamist jihadist ideology, multiple wilayat (provinces), sleeper cells, lone -wolves, online radicalisation and skilful exploitation of modern technologies, the terrorism threat remains challenging despite the successful expulsion of IS from its heartlands in Iraq and Syria in 2017. Moving forward, in 2018, the terrorist threat will be characterised by attacks mounted by politico-religious, ethnic-political and left/right wing groups. The major risk to the West, the Middle East, Africa and Asia will come from Islamist extremist groups with radicalised segments of migrant and diaspora communities perpetrating attacks in North America, Europe and Australia. Notwithstanding the operational and military setbacks IS and Al-Qaeda have suffered over the years, their affiliates in the global south will continue to mount attacks against military, diplomatic, political and economic targets. Despite security measures,
 Threat groups will seek to hit aviation, maritime and land transportation targets. In addition, self-radicalised and directed attacks will focus on populated locations for large-scale impact, with suicide attacks as the preferred tactic. The favoured modus operandi of IS-inspired and directed jihadists in the West will be low-end terrorism relying on vehicle-ramming and stabbing as witnessed throughout 2017. Broadly, the world has witnessed the rise of three generations of global terrorist movements. ‘Global Jihad 1.0’ emerged after Al-Qaeda attacked the US in September 2001 and captured the imagination of multiple militant groups in Asia, Africa, Middle East and the Caucasus. The second generation, ‘Global Jihad 2.0’, emerged after al-Baghdadi declared a ‘caliphate’ and announced the formation of the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) on 29 June 2014. The third generation, ‘Global Jihad 3.0’, represents the global expansion of IS outside Iraq and Syria. IS now relies on its wilayat as its operational bases in the Middle East, Africa, Caucasus and Asia. IS and its affiliates control territorial space in varying degrees in countries with active conflict zones, and maintain a presence in cyber space. The group’s strength also lies in affiliated and linked groups, networks, cells and dedicated jihadists who are willing to fight and die for IS. There is an almost a similar narrative from all respondents associated with their views on terrorism. Generally, respondents view that terrorism is not consistent with Islamic teachings. Terrorism is a form of misunderstanding Islam. It became a counterproductive matter for Islam. The respondents provided an ambiguous assessment regarding the perpetrators of terrorism. In addition, there was another narrative pattern that emerged but that was not reflected by all respondents (only on some of the respondents), i.e., a belief that terrorism is a kind of conspiracy coming from outsiders who dislike Islam.

There are important differences, of course, for the other in the war on terror is not as readily knowable (and therefore not as actionable and controllable) as enemies in wars on crime, since the terrorist other represents a global rather than local threat. However, as we will argue in this paper, the war on terrorism can be said to have a similar purpose in the political struggle for order. If wars on terrorism are to be successfully represented in those terms, the terrorist must be ideologically represented as knowable, actionable and controllable in a particular form. The construction of ‘terrorism’ as something that the state can do something about is central to the justification for the expansion of its juridical and military reach.

**Terrorism is not in accordance with Islamic teachings**

All respondents have similar views about terrorism. They tend to say that terrorism is not consistent with the teachings of Islam. Islam is a *rahmatan lilalamin* religion, that is, a mercy for all creatures. This means that Islam provides noble teaching and aims to create a good life in the universe. It is not possible for Islam to teach meanness and cause horrible
damage. The beneficence promoted by Islam is not only for human beings but also for all natural living things that exist in the universe. All respondents coming from the Rohis group in senior high school and youth organizations, such as KAMMI, GPI, and KNPI, agree that terrorism is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam. The same view was also expressed by respondents from the MUI and FPI group. When they were asked about the relationship between terrorism and Islam, the LDK UI figures stated, "Terrorism is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam." Furthermore, the board of the north Jakarta mosque youth association in an interview said that "Islam is a religion rahmatal lilalamin; Islam is a peace religion." This view has been reinforced by a narrative of the other board member of the mosque youth association. He states "... Islam is rahmatal lilalamin. It has never been a war in peaceful circumstances. Terrorism is not in accordance with Islamic teachings. Making terrorism is jihad, but actually it's not ". Therefore, it is impossible for Islam to promote terrorism, an activity that causes damage and or injustice to others. Actions of terrorism are basically not consistent with the teachings and behaviour of Islam. Therefore, even if there are Muslims who commit terrorist actions, they are certainly persons who have a misconception of Islam. When mosque youth respondents are asked who the perpetrators of terrorism are, they said "they could be Muslims, but they have a superficial understanding of Islam. This is a deviation from real Islam." Such conditions have existed for a long time in every religion. A narrative stating that terrorism is not in line with Islamic teachings also has been affirmed by LDK leaders of UNJ. One respondent stated, "(Terrorism) is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam. Islam does not teach terrorism. Islam does not condone terrorism. Islam is a doctrine of affection"

Terrorism cannot be generalized only to Islam. Actually, terrorism exists in any religion. It has appeared as a model of misconception in the interpretation of religious teachings. According to a number of respondents, terrorism is the result of dissatisfaction with conditions or reality, for example, injustices, poverty, slavery, etc. This was conveyed by a prominent figure of the LDK UNJ in the following statement:

"The behaviour of terrorism arises because there is injustice, rampant immorality and some people who use illegal ways to fight for justice; it is not related to Islam. I do not agree that terrorism is related to Islam."

**Terrorism: A Misconception Model in Understanding Islam**

The first narrative emerging from respondents about terrorism is that terrorism is not consistent with Islamic teachings. Islam has a mission of virtue for the universe. If it is acknowledged that a perpetrator of terrorism was a Muslim and that he fought in the name of Islam, then undoubtedly the perpetrator's understanding of Islam is wrong.
Therefore, the terrorists misunderstood the meaning of jihad. This is a summary of the views collected from some respondents. For instance, a respondent from PKB clearly stated that as the terrorists misunderstood their religion, they went the wrong way, and they should be reproached. A young leader of the LDK UI lahiriyah considered that Islam does not have a positive impact on terrorism and that if it is proved that a terrorist is a Muslim, then it is probable that there is a problem in the person’s understanding of Islam. The UI LDK Chairman stated the following:

“I do not know what he (terrorist) is fighting for. There is no proof that Islam affected him. There is a wrong understanding about Islam. There are still other ways.

The same thing is also spoken by a respondent from an association for mosque youth. He stated the following:

Terrorism is a form of simplifying religion. They misinterpret the meaning of jihad ...... it seems like jihad, but it is not ...... This is a deviation from Islam. Such conditions have existed for a long time, and they exist in all religions.

**Terrorism is Counterproductive for Islam**

The next narrative about terrorism conveyed by the respondents was an outlook that terrorism can create a bad image for Muslims. When the perpetrators (terrorists) think that terror is one of the methods that can be used to fight for Islam, their view is precisely opposite from the way Muslim people think. The respondents think that terrorism does not improve the image of Islam. Most of the respondents from Rohis in the senior high school and all the respondents from the youth organizations (KAMMI, GPI, KNPI) agree that terrorism does not improve the condition of Muslims. They assert that there is no correlation between terrorism and improvements in Islam. One young leader of SMA Rohis said that there might be some effects of terrorism that result in the improvement of the conditions of Muslims, but he still does not agree with the terrorists’ actions.

The view that terrorism does not produce a positive impact on Islam was also delivered by a respondent of the mosque youth in northern Jakarta. He stated that terrorism could not produce good improvements for Muslims and could even worsen the image of Islam. In an interview, he said the following: "It (terrorism does not fix the Muslims). It will only worsen the image of Muslims in the eyes of the world."

The same response was delivered by a young leader of the LDK UI. He said the following: "It is an ideological question (it depends on who answers the question). In my opinion, (terrorism does not improve the condition of Muslims)."
**Ambiguous attitude in Assessing Terrorists**

There are two narrative patterns reflected by the respondents with respect to terrorists, such as Amrozi, Imam Samudra, and Noordin M. Top. First, from a negative viewpoint, there was disapproval for the lack of investigation with respect to the mareka terrorists. This view emerged from most of the leaders of the Rohis in the high school and all respondents of youth organizations, such as the GPI, the KAMMI AND the KNPI. The following comment was given by Mohamad Ali from SMA PKP JIS: "(Regarding the bombers, such as Amrozi, Nordin M Top. Do you agree with them?) ... well I agree. (what’s the reason?) ... because they are Muslims. (or maybe because the victims are infidels?) Not really, because there are Muslim victims. (Then why do you agree?) ... I do not know .... (the bombers admitted that they desired martyrdom. do you agree with them?) ... No, since their reasons are not based on a fight for Islam. (They said they did it on the name of Islam?) ... They did not fight for the sake of Allah. (So where are they?) Ehhh .. (silence, red). (do they only look for sensation/attention?) ..yes, they do."

The second view is one of disagreement with the actions of terrorists but of appreciation for certain cases, for example, for the fighting spirit with respect to Islamic preaching. However, these respondents still considered that the terrorists misunderstood Islam and the jihad concept and had taken a wrong direction. The respondents who took this view could not say what the fate of the terrorists would be when judged in front of God. A respondent from the LDK UI, for example, said that she could not assess how the terrorists’ actions would be viewed by God. Let it be the Lord’s business. In an interview, he said the following: "I do not think about it too much. It’s God’s business. I do not take into account God’s business". Similar views were also expressed by the respondents of the OKP. A chairman of the KNPI of Thousand Islands states that he does not agree with terrorism but that he also agrees with certain issues. Didi stated the following: "Actually, terrorism is an attitude of dissatisfaction with a society that tolerates injustice. In certain matters, it is in accordance with Islam, but the implementation is not appropriate .... (An appropriate thing is like developing the community?) Yes, it is. In the case of shari’ah enforcement, it would be better if it had been done using hands. It amounted to a situation that was fought at any cost... (is it similar with what Amrozi has done?) I don’t think so. In that case, Amrozi had the wrong understanding, because what he did cause a lot of people to suffer, even innocent people"
Another respondent coming from the mosque youth gave the same view. He stated the following: "The assessment of Amrozi and his friends is very dependent on what point of view is used. I cannot judge (assess) him as an infidel or martyr. It was the authority of God; even though apparently it was wrong, I cannot judge."

Unlike the mosque youth, respondents from the Rohis in senior high school and all youth organizations openly said that they did not agree with the terrorists and that they object to labelling terrorists as martyrs. This means that they believe terrorists are wrong and that the terrorists are valued negatively before God, the Almighty.

**Terrorism is a Conspiracy**

A small portion of respondents believes that terrorism is a conspiracy of certain parties to intervene in Indonesia to impose Islam. This view appears only in a minority of respondents, i.e., one respondent from LDK and one respondent from the mosque youth. They judge that it is not clear who the real perpetrators of terror are, and they think the terrorists require a large amount of funds and high technology to carry out their large bombing missions, which would not be possible if done by a small group of people. They suspect that there is a strong party who has sponsored terrorism. A figure of LDK UNJ indicated this allegation. He stated the following: "I see that there are (some) irregularities in the arrests of terrorism. Perhaps this is a conspiracy to discredit Islam. Terrorism is everywhere and in any groups and religions. Terrorism cannot be generalized (to Muslims). Many cases are claimed to be acts of terrorism but are not openly and clearly processed at the court (they were killed in an ambush, so we cannot know who really they are). Perhaps this is part of a conspiracy (to give a bad image of Islam and or to control the development of Islam)."

The same view was also delivered by a prominent mosque youth in North Jakarta. He said the following: "Who is Amrozi. He is nothing. It was deliberately created by the Americans in order to control Indonesia. Indonesia is an easy country to control. There are people who provide funds and the amount is very large. The price of bombs is expensive, and an ojek rider may not be able to purchase a bomb. It has been financed by the United States. It is the American effort to control Indonesia, as it did to Iraq and other countries."

What can be concluded is that, in general, research on this topic has been conducted, and the majority of the respondents' views are generally moderate. The theme of the
respondents’ narratives resembles that of the "polarized radical", covering topics such as, who is the enemy of Islam, Western products, the church, and raids. In analysing sample responses consistent with this radical narrative, we found that the Rohis cluster exhibited a relatively strong correspondence. However, note the emphasis on the vulnerable, not on who was born in Jakarta. This could mean that the narrative of radicalism is not one of a radical who is a native of Jakarta or of radicalism carried out by residents of Jakarta just because the conditions giving rise to radicalism began in Jakarta.

The research shows that, generally, the narrative map of respondents in Jakarta with respect to violence and terrorism incline into certain groups. Most respondents do not indicate radical responses in their views about the state, sharia law, political system, violence, non-Muslim groups (the other), etc. This map shows that the narrative of respondents does not reflect any condition that is worrisome and shows no significant potential for radicalism and terrorism.

**Patterns of Narrative Deployment**

Theoretically, the narrative deployment of radicalism and terrorism is based on certain patterns. A narrative map, displayed in Table 1 (Appendix 1), does not occur in the same pattern. In other words, the construction of the narratives is not the same for all the characters and all the clusters. The spread of the radicalism and terrorism narratives are due to several factors with respect to patterns and mechanisms:

1. Electronic and printed media, such as TV, radio, movies, newspapers, newsletters, flyers, internet, social media and others;
2. Teaching, meeting (*khalaqah*), and others;
3. Demonstration, humanitarian action and others;
4. Interpersonal relations through family, friendship, organization; and
5. Teaching through schools curriculum, boarding schools, and others.

We can see five patterns and means for the deployment of radicalism and terrorism narratives; the easiest and most far-reaching deployment is through TV, radio, Internet and social media. The most difficult to control is the narrative deployed through social media because everyone can spread the narrative at any time and from wherever they are located. The deployment of radicalism and terrorism narratives is still done through the old pattern of *halaqah*, that is, through recitals by sitting in a circle and though *liqa'*, that is, a meeting to recite. In addition, the massive deployment has been accomplished through the media (TV, newspapers, internet, social media, etc.). The pattern of the spread of the radicalism and terrorism narrative which is the most difficult to control is through social media because everyone is capable of this type of deployment and can become easy targets of social media users around the world, the majority of which are the young generation.
In the context of the mosque, the religious narrative and political identity can be spread through various mediums also. Because some groups are closely related to the community and places of a religious nature, most of the distribution pattern is conducted traditionally. Here, routine activities, such as Friday sermons, weekly or monthly lectures, or other religious events, are important.

For example, at Masjid Baitur Rohim, the Friday sermon is given by dozens of different preachers. This practice corresponds to the mosque Takmir policy that only provides each preacher the opportunity to deliver a sermon once a year (khatib). Khatib is more reliable and preferably could afford each preacher the opportunity to give a sermon twice or maybe three times a year. Nonetheless, for the mosque, a system in which a sermon is given once a week, as in other areas, is not customary.

Thus, it is somewhat difficult to determine where and how the pattern of the narrative spreads. However, as explained by Mr. Sonih, a mosque Takmir, there is an evaluation delivered every week by the coordinator for the observance of religious duties. Sometimes, the congregation members themselves will contact the mosque committee by phone or SMS when there are some less suitable or difficult matters to discuss. Periodically, mosque officials gather to discuss different issues, ranging from the condition of the mosque, the income from donations and kencleng (charity box), the content of speech and the style of the preachers and propagators when delivering a lecture at the mosque.

Kebon Jeruk Mosque, one of the historic mosques in Jakarta, has long been recognized as one of the centres reflecting the spread of the Islamic missionary Jama’ah Tabliq movement models. According to Ustadz Hanif, one of the activists of Jama’ah Tabliq Pondok Ranji, the mosque is open to anyone.

The communication of teachings and understanding is accomplished by regular meetings in this mosque. There are congregants who come once a week, twice a week, or only at certain times. They come from all over the Greater Jakarta area (Jabodetabek) and include those who come from other regions in Indonesia. In addition, any group that has a strong commitment to the Jamaah Tablig movement will be given an opportunity to gather in small groups and then to do itinerant preaching—a practice called khuruj—with a well-planned time schedule, travelling around the village, town or outside the city. When I met Ustadz Hanif, he claimed that he was planning a preaching tour to Papua. Several years ago, he had been preaching in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The spreading of narratives and teachings among Tablig members has been accomplished by calling people to worship in the mosque. The more people there are who move back to the mosque, the more they can spread their narrative. For that reason, Jamaah Tablig is called a non-political Islamic movement. Some people are interested in joining the mosque in this way. After joining, they usually meet with other people who are newcomers in
Jamaah Tablig and begin their journey in preaching. Ustadz Hanif is very happy with this method of spreading his teaching. Moreover, he can meet with some people who he has never known before, in a situation that is very friendly, warm and dignified and in a place of worship. Ustadz Hanif revealed that this method and pattern of spreading his teaching attracted a number of members of the Muslim community to join Jamaah Tablig and stated one other fact: former military and police officials, artists and well-known musicians, as well as ordinary people, are some of his congregants. Bang Sonih, who is now serving as chairman of mosque takmir in Bintaro, admitted that he repeatedly follows itinerant missionary activities together with Jamaah Tablig activists who come to his place. Therefore, he welcomes the members of the Jamaah Tablig to stay and to preach in his mosques and territory.

At the As-Sakinah mosque, located in a residential complex in the border area of Jakarta and Banten, the pattern of the spread of the Islamic narrative has been one of a deployment conducted intensively to children and mothers. The reason for this is because gentlemen usually were busy serving in the office when Islamic teaching was occurring. Ustadz Anwar, who served there, was a young indigenous Betawi man staying in the local village. When he was asked from where he received his religious education, he said that he only learned from experience because he diligently attended the teachings of the youth in his village. Ustadz Anwar is a graduate of a private high school in Tangerang city but was active in Islamic activities in that region.

When asked to name the preachers that regularly delivered sermons, he mentioned several names, and one of them was Ustadz Abu Jibril. According to him, he is a very deeply religious, so he and his friends like to come to Ustadz Abu Jibril’s sermons in South Tangerang, although his sermons are not scheduled. When recently, Ustadz Abu Jibril was accused of being involved with extreme Islamic groups, he shrugged. He did not know if Ustadz was dealing with police and other authoritative institutions because of his religious teachings and understandings. What he knows is that he and his friends liked his speech style and feel satisfied with the religious explanations given by him.

At this point, the pattern of narrative deployment is not simple. Some are regular and periodic, while some are not fixed. In terms of the method, the deployment of the narrative is done in many ways depending on the giver and the receiver parties.

**Pattern of Narrative Reception**

The radicalism and terrorism narrative has not been accepted by the people of Jakarta, but it has not been absolutely rejected. The narrative has undergone a process of maximum transformation, but the acceptance of this narrative has not substantively succeeded. Based on a pick-test sample in Table 2, it can be seen that the pattern of narrative reception can
occur in the following ways: by accepting the substance of the narrative (thesis) offered by a radical/terrorist group; by opposing the narrative (antithesis) offered by a radical/terrorist group; and by improving the narrative (improver / synthesis) offered by a radical/terrorist group.

Based on the findings in Table 2, a total of 62 of 96 respondents reflected attitudes that refused to embrace the negative narrative in the theme of radicalism and terrorism, which means that 64.58 percent of the respondents would act in a way that would be the antithesis to the narrative. The rest of the responses are divided as follows: attitudes accepting the narrative, 14 respondents (14.58%); accepting attitude for the narrative but with improvements, 5 respondents (5.20%); and taking a neutral position, while improving it, 15 respondents (15.62%). Based on the findings data, it can be concluded that the majority of the research respondents reject radicalism and terrorism.

Even though the percentage of respondents accepting the radicalism and terrorism idea is 14% to 19%, this does not mean that there is a potential threat in Jakarta. Because radicalism and terrorism activities generally are not conducted by many people, these concepts are not contemplated in the minds of the majority of the public. The terrorists are usually more of a militant, controlling minority.

The balance between the percentage of the group who accepted the narrative and the group who would have improved it indicated a balanced view in the society of the activists and negative narratives. This means there is a socio-political tendency to stem the tide of radicalism and terrorism. In other words, the people of Jakarta are smart enough to see what is good and bad relating to life and society, despite the use of the label of religion (Islam) linked with terrorism as a provocative issue.

Some sensitive narratives, for example, narratives concerning "the other" and non-Muslims, reflect the refusal of the respondents to accept narratives that are diametrically opposed to their view of Islamization. This indicates that there is a religious and social maturity. A somewhat risky issue concerns raids against immoral places and misleading Islamic sects and churches. Although the church is considered a safe place that should not be raided, immoral places are considered as objects that deserve to be destroyed by force. This can be seen positively as a degree of participation by the religious communities in rejecting the existence of a place that is going to demoralize their moral and social order. Therefore, the role and presence of the government in quickly responding to the existence of these immoral places is important.

The pattern of the spread and acceptance of narratives is also very closely related to the presented content and material. At a mosque in Bintaro, South Jakarta, a terrace board member of the mosque said that sometimes there is a Friday preacher or speaker with a rather "hard" manner of speaking. Hard here certainly does not refer to volume but rather
refers to the content of the speech. According to the board member, there are some preachers or speakers talking loudly, indiscriminately and uncompromisingly—especially when it is about religious teachings. If something is true, they say that is true; if wrong, they say that is wrong. There is no grey area in religion. During the New Order, Betawi people often termed such kind of speech as sedep or savory, meaning that it was pleasing, such as in a taste on the tongue. This type of speaker received a great deal of attention from the people since, in the New Order era, political openness was taboo and partly because of the particular communication medium, such as recitation.

The contents and teaching materials or sermons that are considered to be quite hard are approved by the mosque committee because to be religious, it is important to be assertive, straightforward and not hypocritical. For example, having a certain attitude in issues, such as halal and haram, heaven and hell, is necessary. Nevertheless, the terrace board member was not very happy with the content of sermons or lectures that carry a political issue, or, moreover, that criticized other persons or parties personally. For such a preacher or speaker, he said he would make a note to be delivered in a meeting of the mosque board or to be submitted, spoken or written to the person in the section of worship who invited him. In this context, the type of religious ideology plays an important role in terms of to what extent a narrative is accepted or rejected.

In addition to showing the pattern of the spread of the radicalism and terrorism narrative, we also expose the reception pattern of the radicalism and terrorism narrative. For more detailed information, a reception pattern of the radicalism and terrorism narrative is shown in Table 3 (appendix).

The reception pattern of the radicalism and terrorism narrative is similar in all groups and in various clusters, as seen in the responses about the enemy of Islam discourse. All groups understand narratives relating to enemies of Islam because it has been already stated in the Koran that Jews and Christians will never willingly follow Islam unless you follow them (al Baqarah (2): 120).

This is similar to the situation with respect to democracy issues, as religious leaders saw that indeed democracy is not compatible with Islam. The religious leaders felt that narratives relating to democracy had been “exaggerated”. Some groups firmly reject democracy. While others may accept democracy, its acceptance is not considered by people as being morally correct.

**Factors of Narrative deployment and Reception**

However, if this assumption is accurate, note that some regions or areas in Jakarta often become "targeted operation" zones. These areas are the strategic business centre, government, police, and diplomatic offices in Jakarta. Several bombings tragedies have
occurred in those places, such as the bombings in the Hotel Marriott, the Australian Embassy, and so on.

The interesting point is that the targeting devices used in the operation were apparently often prepared in other areas, particularly in the outskirts of Jakarta. The Book Bomb, for example, was prepared by former Islamic activists who lived in Aceh Province (outside of Java) for years and had also lived in Ciputat. The zone targeted-operation is also spreading, from Serpong and Tangerang to Utan Kayu and East Jakarta. In recent years, these terrorist groups also have scrutinized the outskirts of Jakarta as if they were looking for a new "hideaway". Usually, it has been located or adjacent to the Muslim community in Jakarta and its neighbourhood, which is considered an ordinary neighbourhood, such as Bekasi, Bogor, Tangerang Selatan. Pamulang and Ciputat—which have become terrorist ambush sites several times—are even situated near Islamic higher education institutions.

In this study, changes in the demographic map made us give special note to the importance of the peripheral areas of Jakarta. Although no specific factors have yet been found with respect to the strengthening of Islamism, especially radicalism and terrorism, in a suburb of Jakarta, or in areas bordering Jakarta, there may be a social impact or a particular psychological effect on the citizens who are in this region and surrounding areas.

Radicalism and terrorism narratives have been deployed in the public curriculum. Unfortunately, the substance of the narrative is generally rejected because it is counterproductive to the community and not in accordance with Islam. How can the narrative spread and be accepted by 14.58% of the respondents’ attitude? Several factors can be behind this.

First, consider the success factors of the narrative’s dispersal. As seen in Table 2, there are six patterns for the spread of narration, either in a single or a collaborative way. Among the six patterns, the patterns of interpersonal relations are dominant. This indicates that the successful deployment of the narrative occurs because our society is content to socialize and to interact cohesively, both among citizens and within the family relationship. The strong public opposition and the attitude of the need for improvement of the community towards the radicalism narrative indicate that the people of Jakarta are not producers or constructors of such negative narratives that have spread to the people. The pattern of interpersonal relationships is the medium used to spread the secondary narrative. Therefore, it is important to look at the learning model (curriculum) and the patterns of the social setting as the media used to produce the primary narrative of radicalism and terrorism.

Second, consider the success factors of the narrative’s reception. The spread of the narrative is also most often caused by the respondents’ attitudes towards accepting it. Several important reasons show success factors are due to not understanding Islam as a rahmatan lil’ alamiin (peaceful) doctrine. The acceptance attitude in this study was reflected primarily in
the Rohis group, which in terms of education, is still on a long learning curve or, in other words, they are still unstable or have an incomplete and unfinished understanding of religion. Therefore, their attitude can be understood as a natural matter and a necessary protective action for them. The social setting factors, such as economic conditions, perceived injustices, corruption and despotic leaders, may be factors triggering a successful reception of the narratives. Third, consider the factors of the narratives’ rejection. It’s interesting that the people of Jakarta have "an active antibiotic" when the radicalism and terrorism virus presents and infiltrates the Jakarta community. The opposition to the radicalism narrative generally comes from the OKP activists who have a counter-narrative based on their organization located in the area in which the narrative has spread. In addition, the internalization of nationalism spirit and awareness factor of the Indonesian Islam model is considered a strong influence. Similar to KAMMI and GPI. Ahmad Zainudin stated the following:

"(is uncle salafi jihadis similar with GPI?) No, actually I am more open after joining the GPI. I used to say bid'ah (heresy) to people who had a different belief. While after joining the GPI, I became more tolerant in seeing a different paradigm."

The KAMMI and KNPI members have had similar experiences. Generally, they are activists who understand public policy. Therefore, the regulatory factors that apply to safety and law enforcement could also be a factor that helps them to refuse the narrative.

The five factors influencing the deployment and acceptance of the radicalism and terrorism narrative are as follows:

1. The social protests of economic and legal injustice
2. Ideological encouragement to make changes
3. The influence of the social environment and social association
4. The effect of the global environment
5. A minimal and incorrect understanding of religion

These five factors could be driving factors in the spread and acceptance of radicalism and terrorism narratives. Therefore, religious leaders who are respondents of this study emphasize the importance of justice implementation, even justice with respect to the press. Fairness in the economic sector becomes a major issue in the deployment and acceptance of radicalism and terrorism. Other issues in deployment and acceptance include ideology factors, legitimacy, passion, determination and even the spirit of struggle (jihad) to correct injustice. Justice factors are contained in the second and fifth principles of Pancasila.

The deployment and reception of radicalism and terrorism can be imported from areas in the Middle East, which continuously fuel the flames of radicalism and terrorism that are
responded to by those who misunderstand Islam, have a lack of education and who are poor. Through the media, they accept and spread the narrative of radicalism and terrorism.

CONCLUSION
Research on the narrative and the identity of politics, which we have conducted in Jakarta Province, has given us a wide perspective on the pattern of, and what, how and to what extent radicalism and terrorism have spread and been accepted in this region. Based on the findings in the field, the research concluded the following:

1. The respondents of Jakarta have a diversity of narratives of radicalism and terrorism, but the majority of respondents have negative attitudes towards any violence and terrorism acts. Most of the respondents rejected the substance of the narrative offered by radicalism and terrorism narrative creators.

2. This study confirms that respondents of Jakarta are not the perpetrators of radicalism and terrorism. There is a diverse pattern in the spread and acceptance of these narratives. In general, it can be said that the people have a more moderate understanding. There are some views that tend to be militant; their views cannot be separated from the context of religious life, which is conservative but not necessarily radical, extreme or even terroristic.

3. Even though there are a small proportion of respondents who tend to accept the narrative, there is at least an ambiguous attitude towards the issue of radicalism and terrorism; however, the respondents’ attitudes need to be explained further, accompanied with a strong reason relating to their attitude of reception. This acceptance may be merely a part of individual piety which—according to these respondents—must be showed in their religion. However, in general, they exhibit social piety in order to realize a peaceful social life.

4. Note that there is a pattern in the spread of radicalism and terrorism in the history of activism, but there are several factors that do not increase radicalism or terrorism in activism movements. For example, educational and organizational maturity factors existing in the areas in which the activists are located, as well as in the social setting in Jakarta, actually result in some of them being opponents of the "attack" narrative. This explains why the radicalism and terrorism narrative is an "imported narrative" in which the actors are by far the people who are culturally "strangers" or—quoting one respondent's term—"the foreigners" who come from outside Jakarta.

5. The electronic-printed media and social media have been used to spread the narrative of radicalism and terrorism in the midst of the Jakarta community. However, so far, the people of Jakarta have resisted all forms of radicalism and terrorism, which is proof that the perpetrators of radicalism and terrorism in Jakarta are not citizens of Jakarta.
However, the news spreading about the injustice in the life of the nation, including in Jakarta, the ambiguous treatment by the authorities of suspected terrorists, as well as the amount of radicalism and terrorism imported from the outside (for example, the Middle East), can potentially affect and change the mindset and behaviour of people of Jakarta from people, who actually tend to support anti-violence, anti-radicalism and anti-terrorism, to people who are permissive with respect to all forms of violence and may even result in them becoming perpetrators of radicalism and terrorism for implementing change. If this is allowed, there will be a rallying point (intersection) consistent with the themes of other radical movements, such as DII / TII, in various parts of Indonesia, who have their own political agenda.

To end the acts of radicalism and terrorism, the majority of respondents state that it is impossible to resolve the problems of violence with violence. Thus, in this perspective, the "violence vis a vis violence" model is considered highly improper. For the majority of the respondents, violence hereditarily propagates revenge and it can actually create the seeds of a new radicalism and terrorism.

REFERENCE


