CORRUPTION ERADICATION POLICY IN CHINA DURING XI JINPING ERA

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Abstract: The anti-corruption campaign launched by Xi Jinping since the beginning of his tenure as president of China has experienced pros and cons according to some experts in the fields of politics, economics, and law, ranging from a decline in short-term local economic growth, a decline in domestic investment, a camouflage for power struggles, and recovery, public confidence in the Chinese Communist Party. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the anti-corruption campaign has expanded in scope, from central officials, regional officials, the military, to retirees who previously held certain positions in the Chinese Communist Party. With the descriptive analysis method and elite and power theory, this study focuses on efforts to eradicate corruption in China during the Xi Jinping era, whose implementation is much different from that of previous Chinese leaders.

Keywords: corruption eradication, China, Xi Jinping

INTRODUCTION
At the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2017, Xi Jinping made a speech and said that he should “ensure and improve living standards through sustainable development of gaige kaifang (reform and opening-up) and encourage domestic enterprises to expand overseas. His speech was formalized as “Xi Jinping Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” into the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party. This view contains the Four Branches of Comprehensive Strategy, hereinafter referred to as the Four Comprehensives. The Four Comprehensives are: (1) Building a prosperous society; (2) Deepening reforms; (3) Ruling the country according to law; and (4) Tightening party discipline. The Comprehensive Four aim to continue the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Early in his term as president, Xi Jinping committed to efforts to clean up and strengthen the leadership and building of the CCP (Garrick & Bennett, 2018).
Xi Jinping said, “committed to checking ourselves in the mirror, tidying up our clothes, taking a shower, and treating our ailments”. In this fourth branch, there is its campaign, namely “Three Strictly, Tiga Ketulusan” which aims to increase party discipline and efforts to get cadres to promote elements of core socialist values. Socialist core values reflect normative concepts as defined by the Chinese Communist Party. By building a normative consensus around socialist values, the Chinese Communist Party seeks to strengthen its dominant position, and the law is used to generate this consensus. To discipline the party, Xi Jinping since the beginning of his term in 2013 paid attention to handling corruption cases and then embodied it at the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress (Yuen, 2014).

Under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party, the anti-corruption campaign emerged not only to remove corrupt officials but also those deemed politically unreliable or damaging to the Party. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the broader anti-corruption campaign has included targeting corruption within the military and emphasizing "absolute leadership" over the Chinese Communist Party. As previously noted, the handling of corruption cases in China has existed since the days of Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao. However, Xi Jinping took a big step and tends to be controversial in his attention to handling corruption cases compared to previous leaders. This is what makes the writer interested in analyzing what Xi Jinping’s goals are in dealing with the eradication of corruption in China and why Xi Jinping has taken big steps and tends to be controversial in his attention to handling corruption cases compared to previous leaders. In addition, Xi Jinping’s steps in dealing with corruption eradication in China are quite different from those of his predecessors such as Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The Group Model and the Strategic Role of Political Elites
In analyzing the government policies of the Xi Jinping era in eradicating corruption in China, the author uses the theory of political elites and power. The political elite is a reality. There is a small group of people who have power in controlling wealth and political power in society. Their position is higher than the common people and the rights they have are greater. They can also control the political system. This group is called the political elite. This political elite theory originated from discussions of American social scientists in the 1950s, including Schumpeter, an economist, Lasswell, a political scientist, and C. Wright Mills, a sociologist (Varma, 2016).

The elite theory asserts that every society is divided into 2 (two) broad categories. The first is a small group of people who have and deserve to be in positions to govern.
The second is a large number of people/masses/publics who are destined to be ruled. Mosca (1858 – 1941), a law scholar, politician, and journalist and very dissatisfied with democracy although not a fascist, expressed his opinion that in society there are 2 (two) classes, namely the ruling class and the ruled. The first class is the ruling class, they are small, but very influential, holding all political functions, monopolizing power, and enjoying the benefits of power. While the second class group, namely the ruled class, they are the people/masses/public which is larger in number, governed, and controlled by the first class (Varma, 2016).

Mosca is a bit subtle and doesn't have a cynical view of idealism and humanism like Pareto. Mosca understands the existence of an instrument of moral cohesion. Mosca also argues that people in power are always richer than just brave (Hartmann, 2007). It was proven at the beginning of the emergence of the national debt during the English Revolution in 1689. Those who were richer, namely the owners of capital, gave debt to King William on one of their conditions that the owners of the capital governed the English financial system.

The general description of the elite or the characteristics of the elite are homogeneous, united, have cohesion, group awareness, have ways to survive, strive to be in power for life even though they have the principle of not believing one hundred percent in power.

In this case, the theory of the political elite is a political theory that views the elite as a political actor and has a core role in every hierarchically structured society. Undeniably, elite relations with the masses/public/people are not always harmonious but can be colored by conflict. The trigger for conflict is due to the lack of common goals and interests. People tend to conflict/different opinions. The conflict itself at some point can turn into a consensus. In politics, there is room for conflict as well as consensus, so there is a balance. The concern that arises is how does this political system work? With the emergence of this question, we must give a new, more specific/microfocus with the emergence of key questions such as: Who rules? What formally governs? Which elite group rules? Do all elite groups rule? How does it affect the political system? Therefore we must understand the framework of the political system.

With this theory of political elites, it is useful for the political system to work. Communities that can reach the center of power are the best small groups. Every society is ruled by a small group of qualified political actors known as elites. Elite is a group of people who are successful and can occupy high positions in society. Seen from a geopolitical perspective, the theory of political elites has a concept of interests which explains that every society has an interest. The difference is, is the ruler moral or not? The concept of interest focuses on goals and interests. There are also the same goals but different interests. The emergence of different interests can
give rise to new groups, and this causes symptoms of fragmentation (split). The elite perspective creates a state of separation, which seems to separate society into groups that are powerful and controlled, which regulate and are governed. The object of politics is also very broad and can be directly seen in the group. The political elite is a small but very influential group. In general, they can hold all political functions, not only that, they can monopolize power and enjoy the benefits of being in office. In political science, there are several models of elite groups that can be known. This elite group model offers different ideas, ideas, and understandings in society. There are 3 (three) group models that can be identified. The three models are elitist, pluralist, and populist models (Haryanto, 2017). The first is the elitist model, which is a model that gives the idea that the distribution of power is carried out unequally, giving rise to elite groups and mass/public/people groups. The elitist model gives rise to the stratification of society. In this case, the ruler is limited by the period, there is a process of replacing the ruler that does not only exist within the elite group but outside the elite group. This model was introduced by Gaetano Mosca in his book entitled "The Ruling Class". In the book, he argues that in every society there will always be two classes of people, namely the ruling class and the ruled class. He said, “The first class, always fewer in number, performs all political functions, monopolizes power, and enjoys some of the advantages that power brings; while the second, which is more numerous, is directed and controlled by the former through ways that are sometimes more or less legal, sometimes arbitrary and harsh” (Haryanto, 2017).

Next is the pluralist model that puts forward different ideas. Power with this pluralist model is not divided unequally, but power is distributed among groups in society. According to the pluralist model, several existing social groups seek to maintain their autonomy from the influence of other groups and the government. Examples of these groups include religious organizations, business associations, labor unions, peasant organizations, and so on. This group places itself between citizens and the government to balance the division of power and assist in meeting the needs of its members (Haryanto, 2017).

Then there is the populist model, which sees power based on assumptions, in which each individual in society has the right and must participate in implementing and implementing policies, so that power must be distributed to each individual. The role of political elites in playing their strategic roles can be seen from how important they are in occupying political positions. Regarding the distribution of power, the populist model is based on the assumption that every individual has the right and must be involved in the process of making and implementing political policies. Therefore, the existing power structure in society must be highly decentralized. Citizens mostly have to play the biggest role in decision-making. Because, they also
feel the need to be able to supervise the government and social groups (Haryanto, 2017).

There are two parts of the political elite, namely the local political elite and the non-local (non-political) elite. The local political elite means someone who occupies political positions (power) in the executive and legislative branches, who are elected through general elections and elected in a democratic political process at the local level (Varma, 2016). Meanwhile, local non-political elites are people who occupy strategic positions and have the influence to govern others in the community. These non-political elites are professional elites, religious elites, social organization elites, youth, and so on.

Karl Marx argues, there are 3 (three) types of political elites, which elites can change through revolution. The first type is the position method, namely those who occupy strategic positions in the political system. This strategic position is certain to be able to make decisions and determine policies to be declared on behalf of the country. This elite can number in the hundreds, as it includes high-ranking government officials, interest groups, and political parties. They are required to make important decisions every day to serve millions of people. The second type, namely the reputation method, is determined based on reputation, the ability to process various issues, then formulate them into political decisions that have an impact on people’s lives. The third type, namely the method of influence, this method is related to a group of people who influence various levels of power. In addition, they can control society, so that people will spontaneously obey the political elite.

In a sociological and political sense, the elite is the ruling class, a group that holds power both formally and informally within social strata. With that position, they can influence the development of society in a reciprocal relationship. Thus, it can also be said that the elite is a product of the people. And, the relationship between elites is always in communication so that the creation and spirit of one generation are continued or translated into a new form by the next generation (Anshoriy, 2008).

**Political Elites and Rulers in China**

In the context of China, the highest political power is held by the Chinese Communist Party as the face of the Chinese government itself. China’s political elites are those who occupy positions in the party and government who then have the power and privilege to bring their relatives and colleagues to gain economic and business hegemony in various business fields. This is what later became the practice of oligarchy within the Chinese party and government. China, even though it adheres to a socialist-communist notion, is also unavoidable in the category differences in society between the political elite and the ordinary people who are controlled and governed. One of the reasons is because of the gaige kaifang (reform and openness)
which was launched in the era of Deng Xiaoping to improve the Chinese economy while remaining on the socialist path.

It is undeniable that the relationship between the Chinese political elite and its people is not always harmonious. Even though the PRC’s communist government system repressed the freedom of speech and opinion of its citizens, the protests did not stop during the gaige kaifang policy in which the Chinese Communist Party began to allow private and foreign investment. Leader Deng Xiaoping hopes the policy will revive the economy and raise living standards. However, this effort has been hurt by corrupt practices, while at the same time raising hopes of greater political openness. The Communist Party is torn between those pushing for faster change and hardliners who want to maintain tight control of the state. In the mid-1980s, student-led protests began. Those who joined the ranks of protesters included those who had lived abroad and were exposed to new ideas and a higher standard of living. Initially, the government did not take direct action against the protesters. Party leaders disagreed on how to respond, some in favor of compromise, but others wanting tougher action. The hardliners eventually won the debate, and in the last two weeks of May, martial law was imposed in Beijing. From June 3 to 4, troops began moving toward Tiananmen Square, opening fire, crushing, and arresting protesters to control the situation in the area.

No one knows for sure how many people were killed. In late June 1989, the Chinese government said 200 civilians and several dozen members of the security forces had died. Other estimates put the dead in the hundreds to thousands. In 2017, a newly released batch of British documents revealed that a diplomatic cable from the then British Ambassador to China, Sir Alan Donald, said that 10,000 people had died (BBC News, 2019).

China is a one-party state where the Chinese Communist Party has a monopoly on power. However, the party leadership is not a monolithic group. Its members do not all share the same ideology, political associations, socioeconomic background, or policy preferences. The two main political factions or coalitions within the current leadership of the Chinese Communist Party are vying for power, influence, and control over policy initiatives. This bifurcation has created something in China’s one-party government that is closer to a checks and balances mechanism in the decision-making process. This mechanism, of course, is not an institutionalized system of checks and balances operating between the executive, legislature, and judiciary in a democratic system. But this new structure – sometimes referred to in China as “one party, two coalitions” – does represent a major departure from the model of the “very powerful strongman” that characterized politics in the Mao and Deng era (Li, 2012).
After Hu Jintao's leadership, the Chinese Communist Party faced a succession crisis. Reform programs based on economic liberalization to generate wealth efficiently faced resistance from forces inside and outside the party who both defended wealth redistribution to ensure social justice and state-centered political and economic control. The power struggle that took place in the lead-up to the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2012 was inevitable and gave rise to new names from the “fifth generation” such as Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. Succession is one of the oldest and most fundamental puzzles of Chinese political thought and practice. The Confucian tradition praises ancient sage kings who bequeathed their sons to appoint morally good people to succeed them and criticizes the practice of maintaining control of power in the family. This principle is enshrined in an imperial examination meritocracy system that co-opts the best minds of each generation into a centralized bureaucracy (Golden, 2012).

Within the Chinese Communist Party, there are at least two factions called the Tuanpai faction and the Taizidang faction. The Tuanpai faction consists of an intra-party group called the “populist coalition”. The Tuanpai members generally had humble origins like Hu Jintao who rose through the ranks slowly. The Taizidang faction is known as the “princes” faction led by former president Jiang Zemin and later led by Xi Jinping. This faction’s members came from prominent and wealthy families thanks to the gaige kaifang Deng Xiaoping. Many figures in Taizidang can be attributed to their fathers and grandfathers, who were also revolutionary veterans or high-ranking officials under Mao. President Xi Jinping is a prime example. Unlike Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping was born into the privilege of being the son of an influential family in the Chinese Communist Party. His father Xi Zhongxun remains a highly respected figure in the party hierarchy. Xi Zhongxun fought Japan in the 1930s, served as Mao's deputy in the 1960s, and was instrumental in the 1980s in opening the Shenzhen Economic Zone (Pollock, 2015). The princes had enjoyed privileged access to power and wealth because of their family ties. Cadres who rose through the Communist Youth League had achieved their current status through a screening process based on their performance record (as well as their access to patronage). Some leaders combine these two characteristics. The fifth-generation leader candidate, Xi Jinping, is the taizidang, while the possible number two, Li Keqiang, is the Tuanpai (Golden, 2012).

**METHOD**

To answer these questions, the writer uses the descriptive analysis method or descriptive research. With this method, the author will explain based on the results of case studies regarding the handling of corruption in the Xi Jinping era which is different from previous Chinese leaders.
Descriptive research describes the attitudes and behaviors observed during the investigation. This research approach is in many ways the opposite of experimental research in terms of its advantages and disadvantages. Whereas experimental research shows a great deal of control over the setting in which participant behavior is observed, descriptive research takes place in natural, real-life settings. A common descriptive research technique is naturalistic observation, which involves collecting data where people are usually found (Vanderstoep & Johnston, 2009).

Descriptive research is useful because it can provide important information about the average member of a group. Specifically, by collecting data on a sufficiently large group of people, a researcher can describe the member average, or average performance of a member, of the particular group being studied (Marczyk, DeMatteo, & Festinger, 2005).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION
PRC Government Policies in Combating Corruption before the Xi Jinping Era

PRC rule began in 1954 when the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) was repulsed by the People’s Liberation Army in capturing China as a whole. The government of China is divided into three, namely the First Constitution (1954-1975), the Second and Third Constitutions (1975-1982), and the Fourth Constitution (1983-present). The First Constitution was led by Mao Zedong (1893-1976), Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969), and Dong Biwu (1886-1975). The Second and Third Constitutions were presided over by Zhu De (1886-1976), Soong Ching-ling (1893-1981), and Ye Jianying (1897-1986). The Fourth Constitution was presided over by Li Xiannian (1909-1991), Yang Shangkun (1907-1993), Jiang Zemin (1993-2003), Hu Jintao (2003-2013), and Xi Jinping (2013-present). However, since the founding of the PRC more than 70 years ago, five important leaders have shaped the fate and destiny of the nation and the ruling Chinese Communist Party: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. Under their leadership, China has undergone a remarkable transformation from an underdeveloped and insular country into a comprehensive world power (Shambaugh, 2021).

Below is an explanation of the Chinese government’s policies in eradicating corruption before the Xi Jinping era: the era of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.

Corruption in China dates back thousands of years as a fact of life in various imperial dynasties. In 1949, the year Mao Zedong and the Communists took power, Mao waged a war on free speech, crippling citizens’ ability to speak out against the faults of party officials. It instituted a command economy that put trade and property in the hands of the government, and centralized authority, investing more power in the states than ever before. Mao and his policies made life in China at that time so
difficult that people had no choice but to turn to corruption to survive, during the food shortages of the Great Leap Forward and the political hunt for the Cultural Revolution (Klippe, 2014).

In dealing with corruption cases during his leadership, Mao Zedong included anti-corruption thinking as part of Mao Zedong’s Thought (Maoism). Mao Zedong’s thinking is the result of the combination of the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism and Chinese revolutionary practice, is the performance of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics and the best ideas of the Chinese Communist Party. Anti-corruption thinking is not only an important part of Mao Zedong Thought but also an important thought for guiding the development of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong’s anti-corruption thinking has had important guiding significance in anti-corruption work to date (Shi, 2014).

During Mao’s leadership, the handling of corruption cases was not too strict and only limited to the realm of thought as evidenced by the existence of anti-corruption thoughts in Mao Zedong’s Thought. Unfortunately, this thought was not implemented into a clear law because at that time Mao and the Chinese Communist Party had just succeeded in seizing power from the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party). Because it is a new country, the formulation of laws regarding the handling of corruption cases is still unclear.

In the era of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, corruption cases were very prominent along with gaige kaifang in China. Around 1980, Deng began to open up the Chinese economy, paving the way for a hybrid socialist market economy. The economy is particularly vulnerable to corruption during such a transition. Deng’s purportedly famous adage that "to be rich is noble" dispels moral doubts about making money legally or illegally. The creation of a “dual-track economy” with parallel markets and state-driven activities creates incentives for corrupt interactions among three key players, namely private entrepreneurs, representatives of state-owned enterprises, and local party officials (Huang, 2015). In Deng’s era, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was formed for the first time at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. The CCDI is the highest internal control institution within the Chinese Communist Party in charge of enforcing internal rules and regulations. and eradicate corruption and irregularities in the party. Previously CCDI was named CCC (Central Control Commission) which had existed since 1927 long before Mao and then underwent a vacuum and disbandment during the Cultural Revolution in 1969. However, CCDI experienced a reduction in power at the 13th National Congress in 1987 by ending its interference in China’s legal system and reducing its scope to a matter of party discipline alone. The number of CCDI inspection groups was reduced to 75 percent. After the demonstration at Tiananmen Square in 1989, CCDI finally returned to its original format and issued
the “5 Prohibitions”, i.e. party members are not allowed to: (1) run a business, (2) work in an economic entity, (3) trade stocks, (4) receiving gifts, or (5) using public funds for luxurious entertainment (Guo, 2014). After the Tiananmen incident, Jiang Zemin rose to power as president of the PRC in 1989 and then campaigned for the acceleration of anti-corruption with the 5 CCDi Prohibitions until 2002. Meanwhile, in the era of Hu Jintao, the policy of handling corruption cases in China finally experienced a bright spot. Hu reformed the CCDI in conjunction with the 16th National Congress in 2002. The CCDI jargon of “fighting corruption” was changed to “fighting and preventing corruption”. In addition, the dual leadership system within the CCDI was also abolished where the CCDI leaders in each municipality and province came from different provinces and municipalities to avoid conflicts of interest. During the Hu Jintao era, CCDI experienced significant progress and changes, thereby improving performance in handling and eradicating corruption (Gong, 2008).

**Policies of the PRC Government in Combating Corruption in the Xi Jinping Era**

Xi Jinping’s struggles in campaigning for corruption were echoed during the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012 when he served as Secretary-General of the party and is touted as the largest organized anti-corruption effort in the history of the Chinese Communist Party government. Then after taking office as president in 2013, Xi Jinping vowed to crack down on “tigers and flies”, namely high-ranking officials to local civil servants who commit acts of corruption. From 2012 to 2016, more than 100,000 officials at various levels have been indicted in the corruption campaign. For economic crime, there was an increase of nine percent annually in 2013, and ten percent the following year. What is most impressive, however, is how senior officials from lower levels of government and above are targeted. There was an increase of 46 percent in 2013, with a staggering 126 percent the following year, and 27 percent in 2015. In 2012, 179 senior-level officials were charged. In 2015, it jumped to 747. No one seems immune. Even a former member of the politburo’s standing committee, Zhou Yongkang, was charged and imprisoned – the first time since 1949 that someone at this level was treated like that. Bo Xilai, General Xu Caihou, and Ling Jihua, from the Politburo, were also arrested (Brown, 2018). To discuss the handling of corruption cases in China during the Xi Jinping era, first, we will discuss the anti-corruption campaign that Xi Jinping has promoted since the beginning of his term in 2013 and how Xi Jinping has disciplined the Chinese Communist Party.
a. CCDI Reform and Party Discipline

China has the highest internal control agency tasked with enforcing internal rules and regulations as well as fighting corruption and irregularities within the Chinese Communist Party called the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). Since most officials at all levels of government are also members of the Communist Party, the commission is in practice the top anti-corruption body in China. Previously CCDI experienced ups and downs, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Re-started active under Hu Jintao in November 2002 and then further strengthened by significant and independent reforms under Xi Jinping in November 2012 together with CCDI Secretary, Wang Qishan. Before the reform, CCDI as part of the party was considered less independent and pure because many CCDI personnel also held government positions such as mayors and heads of departments. After the reforms in Xi’s time, CCDI personnel began to separate themselves from government elites and prominent figures to free up CCDI resources to focus on the work of enforcing party discipline.

It should first be noted that anti-corruption is not something new for Party leaders. Anti-corruption efforts accelerated in the late 1990s under Jiang Zemin and also from 2009 onwards under Hu Jintao. Despite the significant increase in Party disciplinary investigations, it could be argued that Xi Jinping is only continuing what Hu had started towards the end of his term. However, one distinctly distinguishing feature of Xi Jinping’s campaign is the many senior officials vetted during the anti-corruption campaign who have direct or indirect ties to retired Party leaders. A key figure was retired head of public security and former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, who was later detained. Li Chuncheng, one of the earliest officials to be detained under Xi’s campaign, was a protégé of Zhou who was an official from Sichuan Province in the late 1990s (Yuen, 2014).

In the months that followed, several Sichuan leaders with ties to Zhou were investigated one after another, including former deputy governor Guo Yongxian and former chairman of the CPPCC provincial committee, Li Chongxi. The purge of Zhou’s comrades soon spread from the Sichuan clique to other political circles, with the Party announcing investigations into the former deputy minister of public security, Li Dongsheng, and the former chief regulator of state-owned enterprises, Jiang Jimin. Foreign media have reported that more than 300 people with ties to Zhou (including relatives and those who work with Zhou) have been interrogated or arrested. Zhou’s long-awaited investigation was finally announced by state authorities on July 29, 2014, the day the Politburo set the theme of the forthcoming Fourth Plenary to be "ruling the country according to law." The announcement violates the unwritten rule that retired members of the Politburo Standing Committee will not be investigated. Zhou, who is suspected of a "serious breach of discipline," is the most
senior Chinese official to be investigated since the infamous Gang of Four (Yuen, 2014).

Another feature that distinguishes the current anti-corruption movement from previous ones is the ever-expanding scope of the investigation. The campaign so far has involved not only disparate ranks of officials spanning the provincial and central state-Party bureaucracies but has also penetrated various sectors of the economy, many of which are heavily dominated by state-owned enterprises, as well as state-Party units that have remained intact from the investigation. previous corruption. Nonetheless, the campaign’s unprecedented scope, depth and intensity, and target selectivity have led to speculation that the effort is camouflage for a power struggle – a tool for President Xi Jinping to oust political opponents. The politically ambitious Bo Xilai, for example, is known as a rival to Xi Jinping who is said to be competing with him for the top leadership position. As observers have further pointed out, most of the officials removed from office had ties to ruling Party leaders (Yuen, 2014).

Corruption is generally considered a crime, regardless of the context. However, the findings in the case of China show that corruption at a significant level contributes positively to the macroeconomy. This makes China’s current anti-corruption measures have negative consequences for the performance of the national economy. Nonetheless, Xi Jinping’s administration continues to enforce its anti-corruption campaign, which began in 2013 by staking economic progress as the most important source of legitimacy for the Chinese communist party. It can be said that China’s anti-corruption program in the Xi Jinping era was a form of rational populist policy. The populism aspect relates to the regime’s need to respond to people’s demands for a clean government, while the rationality aspect is based on the consideration that the policy fulfills the regime’s interests to secure the legitimacy of cleaning up political rivals and prepare a friendly environment for a more liberal Chinese economy in the future.

Given its unprecedented scope and intensity, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is expected to rein in corrupt practices by preventing excessive official spending and flagrant abuse of power. On the other hand, by involving several high-ranking officials and extending to various sectors, the campaign has sent a clear signal that Xi Jinping and his allies have now consolidated political power against rival factions and that any political opposition to Xi Jinping personally or reforms economy can generally be ruthlessly erased. It must be remembered, however, that the anti-corruption movement, despite its promising rhetoric, is about saving the Party and restoring public confidence more than fighting corruption. After all, corruption has been intricately intertwined with China’s economic development. And according to observers, the anti-corruption movement is only meant as a means to pave the way
for economic reform. With this in mind, the anti-corruption campaign will only go so far as to pave the way for reform – without relegating too many high-ranking officials to levels that threaten the lifeline of the Chinese Communist Party. That explains why anti-corruption campaigns rely so heavily on centralizing power in party disciplinary mechanisms rather than using the legal system or installing institutional checks and balances because disciplinary strategies allow the scope of campaigns to be carefully written and controlled. In the long run, however, this continued expansion of government power in the absence of institutional checks and balances and the rule of law carries the risk of backlash, as it could give rise to a new set of corruption problems that may be much more difficult to resolve.

b. Experts Opinion

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign since the beginning of his tenure as president of China has experienced pros and cons according to experts in the fields of politics, economics, and law. The author finds 4 things that can be highlighted regarding anti-corruption policies in the Xi Jinping era through the views of several experts.

**The firing of Officials Leads to Short-Term Local Economic Growth Decrease**

Every five years after the change of leadership and government officials in China, the import of luxury watches triples and is suspected as a means of bribery to officials (Lan & Li, 2013). Previously, turnover and consumption of luxury goods among Chinese government officials were quite high. China’s consumption of luxury goods (including purchases of deposits abroad, purchases of deposits, and consumption of the domestic market) accounts for about 1.4% of total aggregate consumption, and the proportion of domestic consumption of luxury goods is even lower. However, after Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, imports of luxury goods such as high-quality jewelry and watches fell by about 55% but did not have an impact on the consumption of hidden luxury goods imports, such as high-quality liquor and food (Qian & Wen, 2015).

The act of bribery usually involves the purchase of luxury goods, most of the corruption funds are usually spent on some luxury goods; therefore, the surveillance of bribery by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party will inevitably weaken the consumption of these luxury goods. The promotion of anti-corruption programs and the expansion of the scope of CCDI investigations from the center to the provinces, leading to increased dismissals of officials due to corruption will result in a decline in economic growth, and this illustrates the feasibility of the central government at the economic level in the overall selection of anti-corruption work (Wang, 2016).
Disrupting Economic Growth by Affecting Domestic Investment

Luyao Wang, an economist from China said that corruption has a significant negative effect on increasing investment, while investment is a direct dynamic of economic growth in China. From the data he presented, it is known that the number of dismissed officials has a significant inhibitory effect on investment, and on average, the addition of one dismissed official above the Deputy Department level results in a 0.2% reduction in the investment figure. Since acts of bribery usually involve the purchase of luxury goods, most of the corruption funds are usually spent on a few luxuries; therefore, the surveillance of bribery by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party will inevitably weaken the consumption of these luxury goods. Therefore, we can conclude that anti-corruption will lead to a decline in economic growth in recent years by affecting investment. So it can be said that the anti-corruption campaign made the local investment, consumption, and export-import decline.

Power struggle camouflage

According to Samson Yuen, a political scientist from Hong Kong University, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has led to speculation that it is a camouflage for a power struggle and a tool to get rid of his political opponents. The politically ambitious Bo Xilai, for example, is known as a rival to Xi Jinping who is said to be competing with him for the top leadership position. As observers have further pointed out, most of the officials removed from office had ties to ruling party leaders. Apart from Bo Xilai, there were also names such as Zhou Yongkang, Zheng Qinghong, Li Peng, He Guoqiang, and even cadres from the Youth League faction or Tuanpai. (Yuen, 2014).

Bo Xilai and Zhong Yongkang (retired Head of Public Security and former members of the Politburo Standing Committee) were charged with “serious disciplinary offenses” and sentenced to life in prison for bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of power. Later the case published the name of Zheng Qinghong, a retired Party leader and close ally of Jiang Zemin, who allegedly played a key role in bringing Zhou to the top of the rankings. After Zheng Qinghong, came the names Li Peng and He Guoqiang, as indicated by their respective investigations into corruption in China’s energy and resources sector.

On the other hand, the Tuanpai faction currently led by Hu Jintao, the opponent of the Taizidang faction, the faction that oversees Xi Jinping, also did not escape the purge and discipline. Ling Zhengche, Vice Chairman of the Shanxi Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the brother of Ling Jihua (a former aide to Hu Jintao) was charged with corruption, bribery, and bribery and sentenced to 12 years and 6 months in prison.
**Restoration of public trust**

A survey conducted by the University of California's China Data Lab found that support for the government among the Chinese public has increased, with the average level of trust in the central government increasing from 8.23% in June 2019 to 8.87% in May 2020, measured on a scale from 1-10 (Guang, Roberts, Xu, & Zhao, 2020). Reinforcing this, a 2020 survey from the ASH Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School, found that Chinese citizens' satisfaction with the Chinese Communist Party and the government has increased overall, with the central government receiving a strong approval rate of 93% in 2008-2016, the end of the survey period. From the broad impact of national policies to the behavior of local city officials, Chinese citizens view the government as more capable and effective than previous leaders (Cunningham, Saich, & Turiel, 2020).

On the other hand, according to John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett, observers of legal politics in China, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption movement targets corruption cases within the military and retired senior officials whose influence is still strong and overshadows the party. Moreover, the domestic anti-corruption campaign may not yet have international implications, as China is relentlessly pursuing fugitive corruptors who have fled abroad to avoid accusations at home. Corruption is closely correlated with legitimacy, and political leaders in China have found that anti-corruption campaigns can be used to get rid of their political enemies and control the bureaucracy while increasing their legitimacy in the eyes of the general public.

The party's anti-corruption campaign is a tool for the concentration of political power. Against the backdrop of China’s anti-corruption campaign and the push to tighten Party discipline, there is hope that improvements in a judicial capacity, procedural justice, and the legal system across China, in general, can be built (Garrick & Bennett, 2018). So to say, despite his promising rhetoric, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and policies are about saving the party and restoring public confidence more than fighting corruption. This is Xi Jinping’s means to pave the way for political and economic reform within the party.

**CONCLUSION**

The handling of corruption in the People's Republic of China in the Xi Jinping era since 2013 until now can be said to be much better, firm, and massive compared to previous great Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Policies for handling corruption cases in the era before Xi Jinping can be said to be still not firm and only revolve around the realm of thoughts, jargon, and small but not comprehensive reforms, especially within the CCDI body. This
indecision has resulted in unclear laws and still allows for major corruption cases committed by party members, both from the Tuanpai and Taizidang factions. When he was sworn in as President of the PRC in 2013, Xi Jinping vowed to crack down on tigers and flies as a metaphor for senior Chinese Communist Party officials (tigers) and government employees (flies). In this era, the death penalty began to be enforced as an anti-corruption drive in China. The death penalty threshold for corruption is at least 100,000 yuan (Rp. 214 million). The Xi Jinping government’s policy in Combating Corruption in China involves two things, namely (1) CCDI Reform; and (2) Party Discipline. In reforming CCDI, Xi Jinping abolished the dual function of CCDI personnel. The separation of CCDI from government elite groups and prominent figures was carried out to maintain the independence of CCDI. In addition to separating from the elite, CCDI also received an expansion of the scope of the investigation, from cases at the center to the provinces, and also penetrated the economic, business, and military sectors. In disciplining the party, Xi Jinping instituted the “Three Strict, Three Honests” campaign to increase party discipline and efforts for cadres to promote elements of core socialist values. In killing tigers, Xi Jinping takes action against corruptors in the party regardless of position, whether the person is in office or retired. This anti-corruption campaign has produced surprising findings. From 2012-to 2016, around 100,000 more national and provincial officials were accused of being corrupt. Economic crime cases are found to increase 9% to 10% every year until now. In addition, from 2012 until now, many senior officials to retired party members have been indicted and imprisoned for corruption cases.

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign since the beginning of his tenure as president of China has experienced pros and cons according to experts in the fields of politics, economics, and law. The author finds 4 things that can be highlighted regarding anti-corruption policies in the Xi Jinping era from the views of several experts: (1) the dismissal of officials resulted in a short-term decline in local economic growth; (2) disrupting economic growth by affecting domestic investment; (3) power struggle camouflage; and (4) restoration of public trust.

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