
THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A STUDY ON LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIARY RELATIONS

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Abstract: The beauty of democracy is freedom of expression that promotes growth and development in the country. Cooperation among the various arms of government is vital to sustainable development of democracy. Governance process will be in total chaos if the arms of government are totally independent of one another. The extent of interdependency is the extent of unity and progress. The collaboration however must have basic limitations so as to prevent the fusion of governmental powers into one hand. If these roles are jeopardised the political system might relapse into anarchy. In developing countries, the extent of cooperation or distinction is not certain if they are present at all. Therefore the research questions posed are; what are the areas of collaborations of legislative-judicial relations in developing countries and how can they be improved. Institutionalism theoretical framework analysis is adopted. The study concludes on the premise that good governance, accountability and transparency in the daily operations of the two arms of government are inevitable to national development in developing countries.

Keywords: Democracy, Development, Good governance, Judiciary, Legislature and Rule of law

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INTRODUCTION

The whole essence of government is to provide basic amenities to the people, make life secure and easy to live for the citizenry. Government all over the world organise their states in such a way so as to ensure and enhance the greatest happiness and satisfaction of the greatest number of the people. This is achieved through the interrelations of the various arms of government –executive, legislature and the judiciary. Intergovernmental relation is a key factor of promoting peace, checks and balances, harmonious relations and sustainable development in any country (Aluko, 2019). Governance process will be in total chaos if the arms of government are totally independent of one another. The extent of collaboration and interdependency is the extent of unity and progress.

The collaboration however must have basic limitations so as to prevent the fusion of governmental powers into one hand. This is because power corrupt and absolute power corrupt absolutely. This implies that if the same person or group functions as the legislatures, judiciary and or as the executives, they will misuse power. The legislative and the judiciary however have major roles to play in the political system (Jellum, 2008; Murana and Bakare, 2019; Uwakwe, 2019). If these roles are jeopardised the political system might relapse into anarchy. They have to collaborate to some extent and at the same time be distinct in their functions.

Governments across the world permit some uniformity in the role play by the legislatures and the judicial arms of government. This centres on law or constitution of the country. The role of the legislative arm of government is basically law making and provide the pathway for governance. They also have oversight functions on other arms of government such as on the judiciary and the executive to some degree. The judiciary arm of government on the other hand has the mandate to interpret the laws. They are the custodian of the constitution. They also have the mandate of law making through adjudication (Kambhampati, 2020).

In Nigeria as a typical example of a developing country (Aluko and Ogunubi, 2018), the legislative powers, duties and roles are confined in the part two sections 4 of the 1999 constitution as amended. It is vested in a National Assembly of the Federation, which consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The National Assembly have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution as amended. Also within their powers is the mandate to legislate on any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first column of Part II of the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution as amended.

The judicial powers duties and roles on the other hand are enclosed in the part two sections 6 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. The judicial powers of the Federation are vested in the courts being courts established for the Federation. These include the Supreme Court of Nigeria; the Court of Appeal; the Federal High Court; the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; a High Court of a State; the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; a Sharia Court of Appeal of a State; the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; a Customary Court of Appeal of a State; as provided in the section six subsections 5 a-j of the 1999 Constitution as amended.

However, in the principles of separation of power, the section four subsections (8) of the 1999 Constitution as amended provided some limitations to the powers of the legislatures not to impede on the powers of the judiciary arm of government. The exercise of legislative

powers by the National Assembly or by a House of Assembly shall be subject to the jurisdiction of courts of law and of judicial tribunals established by law, and accordingly. The National Assembly or a House of Assembly shall not enact any law that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law or of a judicial tribunal established by law. Section six and subsection 4 a and b also restricted the legislative arm of government from establishing courts, other than those to which relates with subordinate jurisdiction to that of a High Court. Also, the National Assembly or any House of Assembly, which cannot abolish any court which it has power to establish or which it has brought into being (Nwoye, 2019; Ali, Abubakar and Ali 2019).

Therefore the research questions this study tends to proffer answers to are; what are the areas of collaborations of legislative-judicial relations in developing countries and how can they be improved? The institutional approach theoretical framework of analysis is adopted to explain the legislative-judiciary relationship in developing countries. The methodology utilises data from Afrobarometer to analyse the performance of the legislative and judiciary arms of government and the level of trust the citizens have on the two institutions. These data collected will be descriptively analysed.

The study is organised to clarify the concepts of Judiciary, Legislature and Legislative-Judiciary. The theoretical framework of analysis of Institutional Approach is used to explain the importance of collaboration among arms of government, literatures reviews on the nature and issues on legislative-judiciary relations in developing countries (Nigeria), data presentations on performance of the legislative and judicial arms, strengthening legislative-judiciary relations in Nigeria and conclusion which is premised on the inevitability of good governance, accountability and transparency in the daily operations of the two arms of government so as to enhance national development in developing countries.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Judiciary, Legislature, Legislative-Judiciary

The judiciary is the arm of government that utilises the operational system of courts to interpret and applies the law for the state. The judiciary also provides a mechanism for the resolution of disputes. The term judiciary is also used to refer collectively to the personnel, such as judges, magistrates and other adjudicators, who form the core of a judiciary – bench, as well as the staffs who keep the system running smoothly (Egheosase and Okeke, 2018). The judiciary does make common law; they interpret law and apply it to the facts of each case by setting precedent for other courts to follow. Das (2018) as well opined that the judiciary generally does not make statutory law which is the responsibility of the legislature or enforce law which is the responsibility of the executive. They have the power

to change laws through the process of judicial review. Courts with judicial review power may annul the laws and rules of the state when it finds them incompatible with general norms and good governance.

In the opinion of Diescho (2003) and Chinwuba (2015) the judiciary is that part of the government system which encompasses –the structure and jurisdiction of the courts and the officers of the courts, the judges and their tenure, and judicial processes, by means of which the constitution and the laws of the country are interpreted, their implications adjudicated, and disputes between citizens scrutinised and mitigated under accepted rules and by duly qualified people, whose findings are respected by all concerned. Saliyu and Gholami (2018) also posited that they use the courts to apply the law, settle disputes and punish law-breakers according to the law. Encyclopædia Britannica (2019a) Hibbitts, (2020) and Jones, (2020) affirmed that the judicial system is a key aspect of democratic way of life. It upholds peace, order and good governance. Citizens look up to the judiciary to uphold their rights and governments look to the courts to interpret laws. To ensure this, the judiciary must act without fear of powerful interests, and without favouring individual parties.

However, only a court of appeal can overturn the ruling of a lower court. Therefore, a court's ability to deliver justice depends on its power to enforce its rulings. For the judiciary to be able to enforce its rulings, it must be independent. Some basic principles as proclaimed by the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 10 December 1948 include; Judges are free to evaluate objectively the facts of the disputes placed before them by applying the constitution existing laws and ordinances objectively and without duress from other organs of government. The judicial arm of the state operates independently vis-à-vis the legislative and executive spheres of the same socio-political system which created them all. Officers of the courts are independent from one another, and seniority in terms of the judicial hierarchy does not affect their judgement in relation to one another.

It is noteworthy to say that all matters of a judicial nature are attended to by competent members of the legal commission. Assignment of judges to handle cases is undertaken by senior officials of the court solely on clear and convincing evidence of their ability to perform the required tasks. For national integration and development, Bakari, (2017), Yusuf, Yusoff, and Zengeni, (2018) opined that the tenure of judges lasts until retirement in terms of conditions established by appointed members of the legal enterprise. The state allocates sufficient financial and other resources to the judiciary to obviate temptations that arise as a result of financial insecurity. Disciplinary action against judges is taken

solely on convincing grounds of inability to perform and the selection and appointment of judges is purely on selective criteria in accordance with the merit system.

The legislature on the other hand is the lawmaking arm of a government. Legislative houses may be unicameral or bicameral system. Their powers in some climes may include passing laws, establishing the government's budget, confirming executive appointments, ratifying treaties, investigating the executive branch, impeaching and removing from office members of the executive and judiciary, and redressing constituents' grievances. Members may be appointed or directly or indirectly elected; they may represent an entire population, particular groups, or territorial sub districts. In presidential systems, the executive and legislative branches are clearly separated; in parliamentary systems, members of the executive branch are chosen from the legislative membership (Ijaiya, 2018; Encyclopædia Britannica, 2019b; Jhaveri, 2019; Weis, 2020).

Loewenberg (1995) corroborated by Oni, Olanrewaju and Deinde-Adedeji (2019) conceptualizes legislatures as assemblies of elected representatives from geographically defined constituencies, with lawmaking functions in the governmental process. In the same vein, Jewell (1997) identified two features that distinguish legislatures from other branches of government. According to him, legislatures have formal authority to pass laws, which are implemented and interpreted by the executive and judicial branches and their members normally are elected to represent various elements in the population.

Legislative-Judicial relations are therefore the conglomerations of events that bring together the duo of the legislative arm of government and the judicial arm of government. Also, it is the mode of operations that link together both the legislatures and the judiciary in the business of the state. However, it is also the harmonious or disharmonious events that make the legislatures to relate or react to the judiciary's advances in a political system. This implies that the relationship can be harmonious or in acrimony.

Whenever the relationship between the Legislative and the Judicial is in harmony, it will propel peace and rapid development in the political system. On the other hand, if the relationship is in disharmony, acrimony, rancour and personal aggrandisements will be promoted which will not lead to rapid development in the political system. It is impossible for some gray areas not to occur in the pursuance of the Legislative-Judicial relationships. However, this must be kept in the lowest ebb so as to attain smooth running of the day to day activities of the government.

Institutional Approach

The study of institutions or institutionalism is well-developed as one of the principal approaches to the study of political science. According to North (1990) institutions are a

set of rules, compliance procedures, moral and ethical behavioural norms designed to constrain behaviour of individuals in the interests of maximizing wealth or utility of principles. Guy (1999) examines the development of institutional study within the discipline. In particular, he identifies four attributes that distinguish the study of institutions from other approaches. These include; i. the study of institutions must involve some form of structure, which can either be formal (such as legislature or judiciary) or informal (such as a network). This structure must transcend individual actors; it cannot simply be broken down into its individual components. ii. It must be enduring over time; the structure must outlast the individuals who comprise it. iii. Institutions must affect individual behaviour, or more specifically, they must constrain behaviour. iv. Finally, there must be some sense of shared meaning or norms for a structure to be classified as an institution. Without a level of common understanding, an institution cannot function effectively

Atkinson (1993) elaborates on the informal qualities of institutions, arguing that their salient quality is the 'networks of organizational capacity', and the connections between individuals and groups which present a sense of structure. Weaver and Rockman (1993) see institutions as important frameworks of rules, capabilities and constraints which determine the behaviour of actors. This includes the constitution of a country. These create explicit boundaries that strongly affect any participants such as the legislatures, executive and the judiciary or their activities, including policy outcomes in government.

There are various reasons for institutionalization in governance. It provides the basis for the initial interaction from which institutionalization may arise. To address common concerns facing multiple governments and a movement to harmonize policy across boundaries in order to limit potentially detrimental effects of competition. Beyond basic interactions, Parker (2010) posited that there are several reasons can be identified for governments choosing to form institutions. Firstly, governments may seek to construct an enduring relationship among the various arms of government. Secondly, governments may seek to codify existing norms, strengthening them through an institution. Institutionalization may strengthen norms by providing clarity – judicial interpretations by creating explicit rules – legislations and providing a means of enforcement – executive.

Thirdly, governments may attempt to institutionalize in order to create more effective cooperation through a number of qualities that an institution may possess and they can clarify rules and procedures whose ambiguity may have impeded cooperation. This includes the cooperation of legislative-judiciary or including the executive arm of government. Fourth, governments may create agreements and interactions as a means of resolving previous conflicts. They may be a solution to existing disputes or simply as a

means of preventing or reducing the incidence of future conflicts. This implies that the arms of government cooperate because areas of conflicts must be suppressed before they emerge. Finally, agreements may be used for political reasons, specifically making an explicit statement or action on a particular issue. Different arms of government and policymakers can use them to demonstrate that they are addressing topics of concern to citizens and interest groups.

There are a number of possible variables that could impede the creation of an institutionalism. The simplest reason why institutionalization may not occur is that participants may not agree on the existence of a problem or a common solution in negotiations. There is no guarantee that an agreement can be reached on a common course of action even in the existence of an issue of common concern among participants. A failure to institutionalism is the lack of fiscal resources necessary to enact an agreement. Political factors and pressures can impede the formation of an agreement. Another factor is the degree of constitutional overlap and shared responsibilities that exist among the institutions and the extent of how centralized or decentralized the constitutional division of powers is between governments.

Another factor that may affect the institutional collaborations is the scope of the welfare state and the level of government intervention in the economy. The more the level of government intervention in the economy, the greater the number of potential interaction, cooperate, and conflict. In theory, this could lead to the hypothesis that the larger the scope of government activity, the greater the degree of institutionalization that should occur. In essence, government arms such as the legislative, executive and the judiciary can interact effectively whenever there are constitutionally provided areas of collaboration and the extents spelt out so as to prevent fusion of functions and duplication of roles.

PERFORMANCE OF LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIARY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (NIGERIA)

The performance of the legislatures as opined by Nigerians in Afrobarometer time series 2002 to 2018 survey is presented and analysed in this section. The performance of the judiciary is also measured using Afrobarometer 2018 survey data. Finally, the extent of relationship or separation of powers of the institutions is considered using Afrobarometer 2018 survey.

Table 1

Presentation and analysis of data on trust on the legislatures

		Round					
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Category	Total	R2 2002/20 03	R3 2005/20 06	R4 2008/20 09	R5 2011/20 12	R6 2014/20 15	R7 2017/20 18
Not at all	36.4%	44.1%	42.0%	25.3%	30.6%	35.8%	43.1%
Just a little	37.0%	40.0%	32.7%	36.8%	41.9%	36.7%	32.0%
Somewhat	19.3%	10.2%	18.0%	26.1%	22.7%	21.9%	16.3%
A lot	4.2%	0.7%	3.8%	6.8%	3.5%	4.3%	7.5%
Don't know/Haven't heard enough	2.9%	5.0%	3.4%	5.0%	1.3%	1.3%	1.0%

Source: Afrobarometer 2020




Figure 1

The performance of the national assembly from 2002 to 2018 is seen as transient from the data in the table 1. The number of Nigerians that opined that they did not trust the national assembly in 2002, 2005 and 2018 surveys are at the high ebb with the percentage average of about forty three percent (43.0%) of Nigerian affirming that the legislatures performances is not good enough to be trusted. In the same period of years, the percentage average of Nigerians that opined that by the legislators' performances, they can be 'trusted just a little' was about thirty five percent (35%).

The survey also showed that in 2008, 2011 and 2015 the percentage average of Nigerians that affirmed that the performance of the legislators can be rated and trusted in just a little mood is about thirty nine percent (39%) while the percentage of Nigerians that opined that they cannot be trusted at all in the same survey period is thirty one percent (31%). The total percentage average of Nigerians that has 'total trust' on the performance of the legislators is below five percent (5%). This implies that the legislatures have not performed up to the expectations in the developing countries in terms of law making and other oversight functions. The study of Murana and Bakare, (2019) and Fashagba and Mu'awiyya, (2019) corroborate this finding that the legislatures are suffering from the problem of trust.

The table 2 and figure 2 below shows the performance level of the judiciary in Nigeria.

Table 2

Judiciary is neutral or favours particular people or parties

		Round
Category	Total	R7 2017/2018
Agree Very Strongly with Statement 1	31.4%	31.4%
Agree with Statement 1	25.5%	25.5%
Agree with Statement 2	12.6%	12.6%
Agree Very Strongly with Statement 2	21.7%	21.7%
Agree with Neither	1.1%	1.1%
Don't know	7.6%	7.6%

Source: Afrobarometer 2020




Figure 2

It is observed that the performance of the judiciary in Nigeria shows a lopsided outcome. The survey revealed that fifty seven percent (57%), a combination of strongly agreed and agreed respectively affirmed that the judiciary are neutral in the discharge of their duties. This was opposed by thirty six percent (36%) a combination of strongly agreed and agreed respectively of Nigerian that affirmed that the judiciary favours some people or parties in the discharge of their duties. This shows that the judiciary have not gotten a clear cut performance in the discharge of their adjudication and oversight duties in the developing countries (Nigerian).

Table 3

Independence of executive, legislative and judiciary

		Round
Category	Total	R7 2017/2018
Strongly disagree	7.7%	7.7%
Disagree	15.9%	15.9%
Neither agree nor disagree	12.3%	12.3%
Agree or strongly agree	56.8%	56.8%
Don't know	7.3%	7.3%

Source: Afrobarometer 2020




Figure 3

This section shows the extent of cordiality, relationship, and collaboration of the various arms of governments in Nigeria. The logic is that the higher the level of independence, the lower the tendency of interrelations and cordiality between the institutions. The survey revealed that the level of independence or non interrelationship is about fifty seven percent (57%). The extent of lack of dependency or extent of collaborations is about twenty four percent (24%). This implies that the level of harmony among the arms of government in Nigeria is not very significant and more clashes and disunity is inevitable in such regards. The submission from the studies of Egheosase, and Okeke, (2018), Uwakwe (2019) and Aluko, (2021) supports these findings that intergovernmental collaboration is weak and it seldom leads to rivalry and conflict in Nigeria and other developing countries.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

In the Nigeria constitutional contest as a yardstick for other developing countries, legislatures are expected to make laws through a given procedure in the national assembly. The judiciary are expected to interpret the laws in accordance to the legal framework. There are seven major areas of relationship through which the legislatures and the judiciary relates. These include; i. Constitutional review session ii. Court cases involve procedure of the house (illegal impeachment) iii. Chief Judge nominee approval iv. Advisory roles- (advising the judiciary to take up an action) v. Oversight functions of the legislatures on legal matters- (legislative investigation of courts and vice versa) vi. Judicial law making and vii. Inauguration of a new political year.

The legislatures and the judiciary relates on constitutional review sessions. In this context both the judicial officers and the legislators discuss issues in a joint session to be able to fine tune some constitutional matters (Tejuoso, Alawode and Baruwa, 2018). This matter easily becomes a bill sponsored to correct some constitutional anomalies which will eventually become a law when passed by the legislatures. Constitutional review session is also an avenue of cross fertilising ideas on the salient matters affecting the constitution and the entire body of law of the country. It is also an informal avenue for legislators to inquire some legal principles from the judiciary based on official or unofficial matters.

Another areas of relationship is in the court cases involve procedure of the house. Whenever a course is unlawfully carried out by the legislatures against a member, he has the right to seek judicial redress if the house refuses to reverse the illegal trend. This was seen in the case of illegal suspension of a member of the eighth senate but he sought for judicial redress. This shows that the legislatures are independent but must follow their own rules so as to promote unity. In cases of illegal impeachment or suspensions the judiciary intervene to correct the anomalies through court redress.

It is expedient to note that the procedure of enthroning the chief justice of Nigeria is not complete without the cross-examination and approval by the national assembly. The national judicial council recommends a qualified legal luminary to the chief executive –the president, he examines his credibility base on the recommendation and if suitable base on his judgement, he will then second him to the national assembly for confirmation. At this point, the nominated chief judge may be dismissed base on the cross examination of the legislators or confirmed for the office. The interplay of politics and negotiations goes into play at this stage of legislature-judiciary relations.

However, the legislator freely relates with the judiciary on advisory roles. They advise the judiciary to take up an action or to speed up an action for the good of the country. The national assembly in Nigeria had advised the judiciary to find a lasting solution to the backlog of cases pending in the various courts of law. This was a reaction to the large number of cases of inmates in the prisons who are awaiting trials. In de facto, some of the inmates had spent a long number of years which could have exceeded the years they would have been jailed if found guilty. They had also advised the judiciary to ensure speedy trail of cases especially election matters so as to prevent lopsided general elections dates in which some states elections date became different from the general election year. This was a result of excessively prolong election litigations which saw states like Kogi, Ekiti, Ondo and Ogun states having different election periods other than the general election year.

Furthermore, oversight functions are performed by both the legislatures on legal matters and judiciary on legislative matters. These oversight functions are forms of check and

balance between these two arms of government. The legislatures in Nigeria seek to know the performance of the budget allocated to the judiciary arm of government so as to checkmate wastages and corruption (Aluko, 2020a). This is usually done through special or statutory committees on judicial matters. The judiciary on the other hands tends to render some laws made by the legislatures as ultra vires if it contradicts the provisions of the constitution. This was the case of the purported changes to the regulations guiding the code of conduct bureau and the code of conduct tribunal as relating to the immunity of the principal legislative officials. The insinuation was dismissed base on the fact it is contrary to the provisions of the constitution. The principal officers are mere elevated colleagues of the other legislators. Therefore, any immunity for their offices should also cover the whole legislators (Aluko, 2020b).

In addition, the judicial law making role is a unique area of linkage between the legislators and the judiciary. The legislators are primarily meant to make laws but the judiciary through judicial reviews and judgements of the Supreme Court do make law. The judicial reviews are special sections which are conducted by judicial officials to remould, strengthen and or outlaw some previously made laws which have been proven to be contrary or otherwise. The outcome of the judicial reviews becomes the modus operandi for the judiciary on both civil and criminal matters in the country (Fagbadebo, 2020). Also, the judgement of the Supreme Court becomes a binding precedent and a statue on the political system. In these cases, the judiciary had cross into the roles of the legislators by exercising quasi legislative law making roles.

Finally, there are institutional interrelations during the inauguration of a new political year. The judiciary through the chief justice of Nigeria swear-in the new political year during the May 29 democracy day ceremony in Nigeria. This event includes the swearing-in of the executive president of the country into the full capacity executive office. This as well marks the beginning of the new legislative calendar year. Prior to this period the old legislative officers' still performs their full legislative functions until the judiciary swearing-in ceremony that ends their actions for the new or retuning members to assumed duties.

CONCLUSION

The beauty of democracy is when all the arms and organs of government are allowed to function with all sense of freedom. This will impact on the cordiality and development in the society. The future of democracy may become crippled if these political, social and economic freedoms are restricted and the arms of government are in conflict of interests. Good governance and development cannot be fully attained when the arms of government

are working on a parallel basis. There must be a synergy between them so as to promote unity peace and harmony in the process of governance.

The constitution in developing countries must clearly spells out the roles and duties of the different arms of government. Arms of government in include the executive, the legislatures and the judiciary. They have mostly work at variance with one another. The lines of relationship are very weak and the little time they relate does often lead to rancour, acrimony and battle for supremacy.

The legislatives in developing countries are saddled with the constitutional responsibilities to make laws for the development of the country often do that in more egocentric ways. Laws are usually made to protect their personal interests and their cronies. Undue lobbies, bribery and other corrupt acts are prominent when bills are originating from the judiciary, the executive arm of government or the concerned publics. Their over sight functions are as well done mostly to victimise the recipient who are usually either the judiciary agencies, judicial commissions or the executive agencies and executive commission. This kind of relationship therefore widens the fissure in governance and promotes more disunity among the arms of government.

In the light of this, the judiciary on their part when interpreting the laws, they exert their judicial power of law reviewing to amend some of the provisions of the obnoxious or perceived selfish laws. The Supreme Court in Nigeria on its part also make slight or total adjustments to the operations of principle of the laws that were made by the legislatures during constitution amendment sessions so as to ensure equity, fairness and tranquillity in the governance process. This shows the presence of lacuna instead of synergy in the system of law making and interpretation in Nigeria. To this end, the interpretations of the various courts of the law on an amended section of the constitution may be different and creating more confusion in the political system.

The major problems that can be palpated in the legislature-judicial relations in developing countries include; corruption, nepotism, selfishness, ethnic chauvinism, religious bigotry, unprofessionalism, inadequate intellectual capacity, suspicious trust, inter and intra institutional rivalry, battle for supremacy, political aggrandisement and poor political will to ensure development in the country among other ignoble demeanours. In the light of the foregoing, there is a rapid need for synergy to be restored between the various arms of government especially the legislative and the judiciary who deals directly with the body of law and the constitution of the country. This is because the constitution is the instrument that regulates human behaviours and ensures the sacrosanct of the integrity of the country. To ensure peace, good governance and sustainable development in the country, the legislature and the judiciary should promote and embark on the following; Create an inter

institution forum for regular meeting when important sections of the constitution is about to be amended so as to ensure proper guidance and acceptable procedures and outcomes supported by the bench which will interpret such laws. The legislators should have official judicial aid which is assigned by the judicial commission to assist the legislatures on legal matter and not the usual informal or personal legal aid system. Legislative arm should as well include judiciary relations course in the pre work training they usually embark on before they commence the legislative year. The judiciary as well through the judicial commission should be ready to render to the legislative arms free consultative windows for collaboration and brainstorming for the development of the body of law and good governance in developing countries. All of these things will lead to good governance, accountability, transparency and advance healthy relationship in the daily operations of the legislatures and the judicial arms of government in developing countries.

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