

NATURAL RESOURCE SCARCITY AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA

Asran Jalal¹, Sahrudin Lubis²

¹² Universitas Nasional, Jakarta, Indonesia

Corresponding Author Email: sahrudin.lubis@civitas.unas.ac.id

Abstract: Natural resource scarcity and its nexus with violent conflict in Post-New Order Indonesia (1998–present) present a critical challenge to the nation’s democratic transition. As Indonesia embraced democratization, newfound political freedoms coincided with escalating disputes over land, forests, and mineral resources, often erupting into violence. This study evaluates the applicability of Homer-Dixon’s environmental scarcity theory to Indonesia’s context, probing two core questions: *What drives environmental scarcity in Indonesia?* and *Why do land distribution conflicts resist resolution?* Employing a qualitative approach, the research analyzes secondary data from online media reports, government documents, and NGO publications, utilizing content analysis to identify patterns in resource disputes across regions like Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Papua. Findings reveal that environmental scarcity stems from three interlinked factors: (1) demand-induced scarcity due to population growth and extractive industries; (2) supply-induced scarcity from ecological degradation (e.g., deforestation, mining); and (3) structural scarcity perpetuated by inequitable land ownership and weak governance. Despite democratic reforms, institutional fragmentation and corruption hinder conflict resolution, exacerbating tensions between communities, corporations, and local governments. For instance, palm oil expansion in Kalimantan has displaced indigenous groups, triggering protracted violence despite legal frameworks like the 2013 Indigenous Rights Law. The study concludes that Homer-Dixon’s theory partially explains Indonesia’s conflicts but underestimates the role of political economy and decentralization dynamics. Recommendations include strengthening land tenure transparency, decentralizing resource management, and integrating traditional ecological knowledge into policy.

Keywords: Natural resource scarcity, violent conflict, land, post-new order

Submission	: August 22 nd 2024
Revision	: Nov 16 th 2024
Publication	: Feb 28 th 2025

INTRODUCTION

The nexus between natural resource scarcity and violent conflict has emerged as a critical concern in post-New Order Indonesia (1998–present), a period marked by democratization yet plagued by escalating disputes over land, forests, and minerals. While democratic reforms expanded political freedoms, they also unveiled entrenched

inequities in resource access, fueling conflicts between communities, corporations, and the state (Tyson, 2021). Indonesia's transition to democracy paradoxically intensified competition for dwindling resources, with deforestation rates averaging 1.2 million hectares annually (Margono et al., 2020) and over 5,000 land disputes recorded between 2015–2023 (KPA, 2023). These conflicts often turn violent, as seen in the 2023 clashes between indigenous Dayak communities and palm oil conglomerates in Kalimantan, resulting in 15 fatalities (Amnesty International, 2023).

Homer-Dixon's (1998) environmental scarcity theory posits that resource depletion—driven by demand, supply, and distribution pressures—heightens social tensions and violence. However, its applicability to Indonesia's unique socio-political landscape remains contested. Despite decentralization laws (e.g., Law No. 23/2014), structural inequalities persist, with 70% of land concessions controlled by corporate elites (Rachman, 2022), marginalizing indigenous groups and smallholders. This raises critical questions: *What drives environmental scarcity in Indonesia, and why do land distribution conflicts resist resolution even under democratic governance?*

Homer-Dixon's (1998) framework categorizes environmental scarcity into three dimensions: supply-induced (resource depletion), demand-induced (population growth), and structural scarcity (unequal access). In Indonesia, these dimensions intertwine with post-authoritarian legacies. For instance, palm oil expansion in Sumatra exemplifies supply-induced scarcity, displacing 1.2 million hectares of forest since 2000 (Margono et al., 2020), while demand-driven pressures arise from population growth (Java's density: 1,200/km²) and corporate land grabs (Gellert, 2021). Structural scarcity is perpetuated by Indonesia's *tanah negara* (state land) doctrine, which prioritizes corporate concessions over communal rights (Bedner & Arizona, 2021).

Recent studies critique Homer-Dixon's neglect of political economy dynamics. Ide (2020) argues that democratization can exacerbate resource conflicts by empowering local elites who exploit decentralization for patronage. In Papua, mining conflicts between Freeport McMoRan and Indigenous Amungme reflect this, where regional autonomy laws (Law No. 21/2001) failed to curb corporate dominance (Braithwaite et al., 2022). Similarly, Borrás et al. (2021) highlight how global commodity chains deepen structural scarcity, as seen in nickel mining conflicts in Sulawesi linked to electric vehicle production.

This study seeks to evaluate the applicability of Homer-Dixon's environmental scarcity theory to post-New Order Indonesia, addressing critical gaps in understanding why resource conflicts persist despite democratic reforms. Theoretically, it integrates political economy and decentralization frameworks to uncover how local elite capture and global market pressures exacerbate structural scarcity, a dimension underexplored in Homer-Dixon's original model. Empirically, it analyzes regional case studies—such as palm oil disputes in Kalimantan and nickel mining conflicts in Sulawesi—to reveal how clientelism, corporate lobbying, and flawed decentralization laws perpetuate land

inequities. Innovatively, the research bridges environmental scarcity theory with Tilly's *contentious politics* framework, examining grassroots movements like the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN), which leverage legal advocacy and protests to challenge state-corporate collusion. By contextualizing Indonesia's unique socio-political dynamics, this approach offers a nuanced critique of Homer-Dixon's universal assumptions while proposing actionable pathways for conflict-sensitive resource governance.

The research innovates by synthesizing environmental scarcity theory with contentious politics frameworks (Tilly, 2003), examining how grassroots movements (e.g., AMAN's legal advocacy) challenge state-corporate collusion.

Understanding Indonesia's resource conflicts is vital for sustainable governance. With 34% of Indonesia's land under concession (MoEF, 2023), unresolved disputes threaten both ecological sustainability and social cohesion. Findings will inform policies on land tenure reform, corporate accountability, and conflict mediation, contributing to SDG 16 (Peace and Justice) and Indonesia's 2020–2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Natural Resource Scarcity and Conflict

The debate over natural resource scarcity and violent conflict is central to understanding socio-political tensions in resource-dependent societies. Homer-Dixon's (1998) seminal work posits that environmental scarcity—categorized into supply-induced (resource depletion), demand-induced (population pressure), and structural scarcity (unequal access)—fuels conflict by exacerbating competition over dwindling resources. This framework is exemplified in cases like Israel-Palestine water disputes, where structural scarcity from Israel's control over water sources entrenched socio-economic disparities and violence (Lowi, 1999). Similarly, Shiva (2008) argues that commodifying essential resources like water inherently marginalizes vulnerable groups, sparking conflicts rooted in survival imperatives.

Critics, however, challenge the universality of scarcity-driven conflict. Kalyuzhnova & Nygaard (2008) contend that scarcity alone is insufficient to ignite violence; instead, institutional failures like corruption and undemocratic governance mediate its impact. Theison (2008) echoes this, emphasizing that conflicts arise from politicized resource control rather than mere physical scarcity. Bruckmeier (2019) further complicates the narrative, highlighting how ethnic divisions and distrust—not scarcity—often underpin violence, as seen in pastoralist-farmer clashes in sub-Saharan Africa.

Empirical Insights and Global Case Studies

Empirical studies reveal nuanced linkages between scarcity and conflict. In Northern Thailand, Ekkawatpanit et al. (2009) found that water scarcity intensified class-based tensions, as wealthy farmers monopolized access, impoverishing lowland communities. Beevers (2015) and Olsson et al. (2019) expand this, showing how corporate exploitation of resources—such as logging in the Amazon—displaces indigenous groups, triggering resistance movements. These cases align with Persson et al.'s (2017) assertion that resource competition becomes violent when power imbalances exclude marginalized voices from decision-making.

Conversely, Rosen (2013) and Walter (2013) counter that scarcity narratives oversimplify conflict drivers. For instance, in Norway's oil-rich regions, equitable revenue sharing and transparent governance have averted violence despite resource competition, underscoring the role of institutional quality (Kaly-uzhnova & Nygaard, 2008).

Contextualizing Scarcity in Post-New Order Indonesia

In Indonesia, land scarcity has emerged as a flashpoint for conflict, shaped by historical inequities and neoliberal policies. Post-1998 democratization dismantled Suharto's centralized resource control but entrenched structural scarcity through laws like the 2020 Omnibus Law, which prioritized corporate land grabs over communal rights (FWI, 2021). For example, palm oil expansion in Kalimantan displaced 1.2 million Indigenous Dayak people between 2000–2020, with state-backed militias suppressing protests (Gellert, 2021). These dynamics reflect Homer-Dixon's demand-induced scarcity, as population growth (Java's density: 1,200/km²) and agribusiness expansion strain finite land resources.

Yet, Indonesia's conflicts defy purely scarcity-based explanations. Studies by Tyson (2021) and Rachman (2022) reveal how decentralization (Law No. 23/2014) enabled local elites to weaponize land permits for patronage, exacerbating distributional conflicts. In Papua, Freeport McMoRan's mining operations—sanctioned by Jakarta—ignited violence not due to resource scarcity but as a backlash against cultural erasure and environmental degradation (Braithwaite et al., 2022). This aligns with Bruckmeier's (2019) emphasis on identity and governance as conflict catalysts.

While scarcity theories elucidate resource competition's material dimensions, they often overlook Indonesia's political economy of dispossession. The state's *tanah negara* (state land) doctrine, which allocates 70% of land to corporations (MoEF, 2023), institutionalizes structural scarcity. Meanwhile, grassroots movements like the Indigenous Peoples Alliance (AMAN) leverage legal advocacy to reclaim rights, illustrating Tilly's (2003) *contentious politics* in action (Bedner & Arizona, 2021).

This study bridges these gaps by interrogating how Indonesia's democratic reforms paradoxically intensified scarcity-driven conflicts. It innovatively integrates scarcity theory with political ecology, arguing that violence stems not from resource limits alone but from state-corporate collusion and decentralized corruption—factors absent in Homer-Dixon's original framework.

METHOD

Research Design

This study employs a *qualitative content analysis* design to examine the interplay between natural resource scarcity and violent conflict in post-New Order Indonesia (1998–present). Grounded in Homer-Dixon's (1998) environmental scarcity theory, the research focuses on land-related conflicts, utilizing secondary data from online media reports, NGO publications, and government documents. The qualitative approach allows for an in-depth exploration of socio-political dynamics, particularly how structural inequities and corporate land grabs exacerbate resource disputes.

Data Collection

Data were sourced from online media platforms (e.g., *Kompas.id*, *Mongabay Indonesia*, *Tirto*) and institutional reports (e.g., Forest Watch Indonesia, Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria). These sources provided narratives from key stakeholders, including indigenous communities, corporate actors, and government officials. Triangulation was applied by cross-verifying reports across multiple media outlets (Jensic, 2011; Harrison, 2001) to ensure credibility. For example, accounts of palm oil conflicts in Kalimantan from *The Jakarta Post* were compared with grassroots perspectives in *Suara Papua*.

Analytical Framework

The analysis followed a three-stage process adapted from Kweit et al. (1981):

1. Data Checking: Triangulation of online media reports to identify consistent patterns (e.g., recurring themes of land dispossession in Sumatra).
2. Data Categorization: Organizing key phrases and narratives into themes aligned with Homer-Dixon's scarcity typology:
 - a. *Demand-induced scarcity* (e.g., population pressure in Java).
 - b. *Supply-induced scarcity* (e.g., deforestation in Kalimantan).
 - c. *Structural scarcity* (e.g., corporate dominance under the *tanah negara* doctrine).
3. Data Discussion: Interpretive analysis linking scarcity dimensions to conflict models (e.g., rebellion conflicts in Papua) and policy failures (e.g., weak enforcement of the 2013 Indigenous Rights Law).

Content analysis focused on core phrases such as “land grabbing,” “resource inequality,” and “state violence,” identified through iterative coding (Breuning, 2011).

Validity and Reliability

1. Credibility: Prolonged engagement with data sources (e.g., analyzing 150+ articles from 2015–2023) and peer debriefing with Indonesian agrarian scholars.
2. Dependability: An audit trail documented coding decisions, such as categorizing police crackdowns on protests as “state violence.”
3. Confirmability: Reflexive journaling to mitigate bias, particularly in interpreting corporate narratives versus community claims.

Limitations

1. Source Bias: Reliance on online media risks overlooking underreported conflicts in remote regions (e.g., Papua’s highlands).
2. Temporal Scope: Focus on post-1998 data may obscure historical roots of resource inequities.

Case Examples

1. Kalimantan: Analyzed 45 reports on palm oil conflicts, revealing how corporate land concessions (*Hak Guna Usaha*) displace Dayak communities.
2. Papua: Coded 30 articles on Freeport McMoRan’s mining operations, highlighting linkages between revenue inequity and armed resistance.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

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Natural Resource Scarcity

The source of natural resource scarcity in post-New Order Indonesia is caused by the government's policy of distributing land and land allocations through unfair regulations. This study did not find sources of environmental scarcity from natural disasters and population growth. This unfair government policy of distributing land tends to increase in the 2021-2023 period; in 2021 there were 207 cases, in 2022 there were 212 cases, and in 2023 there were 241 cases (databoks.katadata.co.id,2024).

The scarcity of natural resources originates from the injustice of government policies to distribute land, against the background of government policies to carry out development in various fields to obtain sources of state revenue. The fields of development in question are mining such as gold and coal mining development, plantation development such as oil palm, infrastructure development such as road construction, power plant construction, and construction of electricity public facilities, property development such as luxury housing development, military facility development, and coastal and small

island development. The areas of development underlying government policies that give birth to distributional injustice are listed in the following table (databoks.katadata.co.id.,2024).

Development Field	2022	2023
Mining	20 cases	32 cases
Plantation	99 cases	108 cases
Infrastructure	32 cases	30 cases
Property development	26 cases	44 cases
Military facility	4 cases	5 cases
Coastal and small island development	4 cases	5 cases

The policy of distribution injustice carried out by the government in land management, in the form of making regulations by giving broad authority to business people to manage natural resources to be utilized in the fields of mining, plantations, infrastructure, and property development. This land distribution policy has led to group protests from community groups. Community groups consider the regulations made by the government to be land that belongs to them.

This case of natural resource scarcity and land distribution injustice occurred in Batanghari District, Jambi Province. The government through PT Berkas Sawit Utama (PTBSU) in Bungku Village, Bajubang District, Batanghari Regency, Jambi Province. In 1987, PT Berkas Sawit Utama (PTSU) granted a 3550-hectare land use right (HGU) to be used as an oil palm plantation. The government policy was protested by Anak Suku Dalam (ASD), a tribe in Jambi Province. The reason is that the regulation contained 750 hectares of land owned by ASD. This protest action by the ASD lasted from 1987-2022.

A form of environmental scarcity stemming from this distributional injustice occurred in Seruyan District, Central Kalimantan in 2006. The government, through the Minister of Forestry, granted permits to plantation businesses to manage 6701 hectares of forest area to be used as oil palm plantations. This government policy is contained in the Minister of Forestry Decree No. 189/Kpts-II/2000: 189/Kpts-II/2000 in the form of area release and reinforced by the Decree of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs No.24/HGU/BPN/2006 in the form of approval of the Cultivation Rights Title (HGU) of 6701 hectares of land and the Decree of the Seruyan Regent (SK No.500/48/Ek/2004), in the form of a location permit for 14,000 hectares of land. Community groups protested against the government regulations, as the decrees included land that belonged to them and various crops that were the source of their economy.

A case of land distribution injustice occurred in Tulang Bawang Regency, Lampung Province, in 2006. The government, through the Head of the National Land Agency (IBRA) issued a Cultivation Rights Title (HGU) permit No.10 of 2006 for an area of approximately

8,500.5 hectares to PT Indo Lampung Perkasa, PT Indo Lampung Cahaya Makmur (ILCM), and PT Sugar Group, a plantation business. The government's policy led to protests from the community. The community argued that the businessmen had seized the community's land by including it in the HGU regulation. The business government never asked for permission and discussed it with the community. Businesses have never provided compensation for the seizure of community land. The land has been controlled and managed by the community for generations and functions as a place to live and economic resources such as rice fields and sugar cane fields. This government policy has led to protests from the community (tanahkita.id., 2024).

Another form of scarcity in the distribution environment occurred in Tebo Regency, Jambi Province, in 2008. The government, through the Regent of Tebo No. 522/487/Dinhut/2008 August 15, 2008, and the Governor of Jambi Decree through Letter No. 522/3639/Dinhut/2009, September 8, 2008, and Minister of Forestry Letter No. S.662/Menhut-VI/2009, August 21, 2009, gave legitimacy to PT Lestari Asri Jaya, a plantation company to manage and utilize 61,495 hectares of plantation and forest land. This regulation led to protests from community groups because it was very detrimental to them. The community has already managed the lands that the company claims as its territory. The land serves as an economic source with rubber plantations to sustain their lives. The government and the business never socialized with the community about the plan. Their plantations were taken by force. This regulation resulted in their economic resources being lost because their plantations were already controlled by the company (tanahkita.id.,2024).

A case that occurred in Labuan Bajo, West Manggarai Regency, East Nusa Tenggara Province in April 2022. government policy through the Labuan Bajo Authority Implementing Agency (BPOLBF) to build tourism infrastructure. The government policy received protests from community groups because the policy displaced 400 hectares of houses and community land. This policy was taken by the government without going through socialization and deliberation with community groups (tanahkita.id.,2024).

The scarcity of land distribution in Indonesia is supported by the behavior of business people who use their legitimacy to take away community rights and ignore agreements with community groups. This was the case in Wera sub-district, Bima district, West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) province in 2004. The government legitimized PT Jagat Mahesa Karya and PT Linda Intan mining businesses to manage land for iron sand mining. The community initially allowed the businessmen to manage the land after there was an agreement between the businessmen and the community. The contents of the agreement include the business prioritizing labor from the village community around the company's operations, building village road facilities, donating funds for village development, and providing other public facilities. In fact, the company never realized it (visionerbima.com, 2019).

The case occurred in Seruyan District, Central Kalimantan Province. A dispute between a community group and PT Hamparan Massawit Bangun Persada, an oil palm plantation business, was resolved on October 26, 2013, through an agreement between the two parties. The agreement included: First, the oil palm plantation business will contribute to the development of village infrastructure for the provision of clean water, electricity networks, the establishment of schools, scholarships, Second, the oil palm plantation business will settle the community land used and build oil palm plantations for the community; each community will get 2 (two) hectares of oil palm plantations on the plantations they manage, which will be realized in January 2004. The agreement between the oil palm plantation business and the community group was never realized, which disappointed the community group. This disappointment was realized on October 7, 2023, by blocking the road and closing the access to the oil palm plantation. The demonstration demanded that the plantation businessman fulfill his promise; the community group considered that the oil palm plantation businessman had never fulfilled the agreement with the community group since 2004.

Business behavior related to distribution scarcity in a case that occurred in East Kutai Regency, East Kalimantan Province in 2023. PT Wira Inova Nusantara took over 435 hectares of community land outside the HGU regulations issued by the government. This business behavior led to protests from community groups. The East Kalimantan Provincial DPRD facilitated this issue by bringing together both parties, namely the community and the businessman. The meeting resulted in a mutual agreement. The agreement was that the businessman would compensate for community land that was not included in the HGU issued by the government. This agreement was never realized by the businessman (tanahkita.id,2024)

The distribution scarcity that occurs in Indonesia is not only limited to the unfair distribution of government policies. This distribution scarcity is supported by the behavior of business people expanding the land area outside of official regulations by seizing community land around them. Another behavior of businessmen is not fulfilling collective agreements with the community to replace community-owned land and other compensation written in collective agreements.

Conflict Model

Conflict models that occur due to environmental scarcity in Indonesia are violent conflicts, namely conflicts against government policies with demands for compensation for land and houses that are taken over by the government in the context of development. Community groups protest peacefully and violently. Peaceful means are carried out by conveying their demands to the district/city government, provincial government, and central government, and business people who obtain legitimacy from the government to empower land. Violent means of closing the access road to the development project. This

form of violent action is carried out when the district/city government, provincial government, central government, and business people do not give a positive response to their demands. These violent protests are always confronted by the police as state apparatus by dispersing community protests with tasers, tear gas, beatings, and arrests. After the conflict, the police also intimidated and terrorized the figures involved in the protests.

Protests between community groups and the government and businessmen Land conflicts in Seruyan Regency, Central Kalimantan Province, occurred because the government gave the authority to manage and control forest areas to plantation businesses. Community groups protested the government's policy because the land area determined by the government to be managed by oil palm plantation businessmen covered land owned by community groups. Community groups protested the presence of plantation businesses in a peaceful way in the form of conveying their aspirations and demands to the Seruyan Regency Government, but these two institutions did not provide a positive response. The peak of the community's protests occurred on October 7, 2023, in the form of violence by blocking the road and closing access to the oil palm plantation, demanding that the businessman fulfill his promise. This protest action was carried out because their peaceful demands were not responded to by the local government and business people. This action was then dispersed by police officers by mobilizing troops. Armed to the teeth, they used water gas, shot with rubber bullets and live ammunition, and arrested several of the protesters. As a result of the actions of the police, 1 resident died named Gijik, 2 people were critical and 20 people were arrested by the police (mongabay.co.id, 2023).

A case of a community group protesting against the government occurred in Taliabu Regency, East Nusa Tenggara Province. Community groups rejected the iron ore mining policy through mining businesses. Because in the development process, the land and clove plantations belonging to community groups were displaced without compensation. The land has been cultivated by the community for generations and is a source of the community's economy, especially planting clove trees.

Protests by community groups against the injustice of land distribution were carried out peacefully by conveying aspirations. There were 42 protest actions carried out by community groups to business people and the Taliabu Regency Government but did not receive a positive response. Violent protests were carried out on February 23, 2017, by blocking access to the mining site. The community group demanded compensation for their land and clove trees that had been promised by the company. This protest was prevented by the police, resulting in a clash between police officers and community groups. In addition to forcibly dispersing the protest, the police also chased, damaged houses, and arrested residents involved in the action who were considered provocateurs.

As a result of this clash, 10 community leaders were arrested by police and named as suspects (kontras.org., 2017).

A case of community group protests with PT Sumber Minera Nusantara and PT Indo Mineral Citra Persada (mining businesses) in Bima Regency, West Nusa Tenggara Province. The community group asked the Bima Regency government to suspend the gold mining operation license because in the mining location that was given permission to the mining businessman there was community land. This peaceful protest did not receive a positive response from the Bima Regency government. The community group then protested in a coercive manner by closing access to the mining site on October 7, 2023, causing the businessman to be unable to operate. The community group's goal was only for the Bima Regency government to negotiate with them for compensation for their land rights. The protest action of this community group was dispersed by the police in a repressive manner, as a result of the incident resulting in 3 community members being shot dead by police officers.

Why don't simple conflicts and rebellious conflicts arise from community groups? The behavior of police officers tends to be repressive and unprofessional. The police blocked access to the development project site by using bullets and tear gas and arrests under the pretext of securing state development projects. The police also carried out intimidation and terror after the action carried out by community groups by frightening the community. Post-action police do not consider humanitarian aspects and aspirations. This police behavior has traumatized the community.

The culture of Indonesian society, which consists of various local cultures, has the cultural characteristic of avoiding open conflicts against the government frontally, especially with regard to the loss of land and economic resources. Another characteristic of Indonesian culture is that it likes to apologize for other people's mistakes. Community groups are only limited to demanding compensation for the land they have to survive.

Environmental Scarcity Impact and Resolution

The impacts of environmental scarcity and distribution injustice in post-authoritarian Indonesia 2005–2014 are physical and non-physical. Physical impacts on humans in the form of criminalization of 5,839 people, 1,208 people, shot 188 people, and died 227 people. Non-physical impacts include loss of housing, economic resources, and social relations for 2,736,411 families. The social relationship in question is that Indonesian society consists of various tribes and ethnicities, has cultural guidelines in social life, communication, and relationships, marriage, and has informal figures who are respected as role models. This pattern of social relations has been built for a long time, from generation to generation. Such patterns of social relations are disappearing because the affected community groups must find a place to live and economic resources in other locations.

Another impact of environmental scarcity in Indonesia is that the government has not been able to resolve all cases due to the protests of community groups, which leaves many cases of environmental scarcity impacts. Cases that occurred in 2014-2023 amounted to 561 cases, of which 251 (45%) cases had not been resolved, 267 (47%) cases were in the process of being resolved, and 43 (8%) cases could be resolved. The government overcame the problem by using the police to quell community protests with violence.

The environmental scarcity resolution model in Indonesia, based on the data mentioned above, is carried out after the occurrence of violent conflict and has a wide impact, namely human casualties such as death, injury, arrest, and intimidation by the police and unknown groups of people. The resolution of environmental scarcity without causing violent conflict and its impacts has not been found.

The environmental scarcity resolution case in Bima Regency resulted in violent conflict and the killing of several residents. The DPRD of Bima Regency, as a regional legislative body, took the initiative to resolve the violent conflict and its impacts by forming an investigation team from all party elements in the institution. After exploring the case and seeking input from the local government, community leaders, youth, and non-governmental organizations, the investigation team formulated its findings. The results of the investigation team's formulation were then submitted to the Regent of Bima Regency and the Ministry of Energy and Human Resources. The Regent of Bima District, based on input from the DPRD Investigation Team and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, officially revoked the license of PT Sumber Mineral Nusantara, a mining business that was legitimized by the local government to process mining land in 2010 (visionerbima.com.,2019).

Another case is what happened in Jambi Province, where ASD protests have been going on since 1987, which gave birth to violent conflicts and had an impact on human casualties and loss of housing and community economic resources. 2021. The Chairman of the Jambi Province Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) took the initiative in 2021 by forming a Special Committee (Pansus), consisting of all factions in the regional legislative body. The Pansus method works using the technique (focus group discussion) to find entry in resolving the land conflict. The invited groups are the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning, the National Land Agency (BPN), the Jambi Provincial Government, the Batanghari Regency Government, the Jambi Malay Customary Institution, the Student Executive Board, and non-governmental organizations.

After going through a process of debate, the formulation was submitted to President Joko Widodo at the State Palace, Jakarta, for consideration to find a solution to the land conflict in Jambi Province that has been going on for 35 years. President Joko Widodo accepted the solution offered by the Special Committee in the form of returning 750 hectares of community group land. The community also received 20 hectares of land for facilities.

The Governor of Jambi Province responded to President Jokowi's attitude by issuing a decree (SK) on the formulation of the conflict resolution (jambi.antaranews.com., 2022) The difficulty in finding solutions to environmental scarcity stems from distribution injustice and different views between the community and the government about land. The government views the management and utilization of natural resources, including land, as the authority of the government to support development. The development that will be implemented by the government will be felt for all people, not just for certain groups of people. Land such as plantations, mines, and fields managed by the community can be modernized to produce economic resources for the state and community groups, ultimately for all people. The government is also of the view that land in Indonesia can be optimized for management and utilization, especially since community land does not have state legitimacy.

The community group considers the land used as a development project to be their land that has been managed for generations. The land is used for housing, economic resources, and building family relationships based on prevailing customs. Land takeover by the government is considered a deprivation of their rights. Community groups do not care whether the land has state legitimacy or not.

This article provides a strategy for resolving environmental scarcity in Indonesia to minimize violent conflict and its impacts. The strategy is that the government must socialize land distribution policies that will be managed in community groups in a transparent manner. The purpose of the deliberation is for the community to know and understand the meaning of the land distribution regulation, for the benefit of the state, the interests of regional development, and the interests of the community itself. This deliberation is part of the culture of Indonesian society; the failure of land distribution policies so far is because of the absence of the practice of deliberation with traditional leaders This model is like the one applied by the Brazilian government (Hess & Fenrich, 2017).

CONCLUSION

The source of environmental scarcity that gave birth to violent conflict in post-New Order Indonesia is distribution scarcity, namely government injustice in distributing land. The government authorizes businessmen to dominate the control and enjoy the results of land; this policy gave birth to protests from community groups who felt that the regulation contained land owned by the community. The scarcity of the distribution environment is supported by the behavior of business people who use their legitimacy to take community land.

The conflict model that occurred was a violent conflict without violent action against and overthrowing the government. The community protests were peaceful and violent. Peaceful means were used to ask the local government to facilitate their demands. The

violent method was carried out after the peaceful method did not receive a positive response from the government, in the form of demonstrations by closing the road access to the land development accompanied by demands to return their land. This community behavior was responded to by the police in a repressive manner. The impact of environmental scarcity in Indonesia is that community groups lose their lives, are injured, arrested, intimidated, lose their homes, lose economic resources, and lose patterns of social relations. The difficulty of finding a solution to the scarcity of natural resources due to distribution injustice is supported by the different perceptions between the government and the community about land. The government views land management as the authority of the government, while the community views land as their hereditary right.

The limitations of this study lie in the methodological aspect, using only secondary data with limited cases. The continuation of the study of natural resource scarcity and conflict in Indonesia can be done in addition to using secondary data and can be completed by using primary data, cases, and different perspectives. The policy implication of this research is to recommend that the government, before executing the regulation of land distribution, can socialize with community groups through traditional leaders in order to prevent natural resource scarcity and violent conflict in Indonesia.

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