Journal of Social Political Sciences
JSPS
Vol. 6, No. 2, May 2025

THE DYNAMICS OF EU-RUSSIA ENERGY DIPLOMACY AFTER THE UKRAINE WAR 2022-2024

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Abstract:
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has fundamentally altered the landscape of energy diplomacy between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation, resulting in a profound reconfiguration of global energy geopolitics. In response to the crisis, the EU has initiated a strategic decoupling from Russian energy dependence, marked by a comprehensive recalibration of its energy policy. The period from 2022 to 2024 is characterized by the implementation of disruptive measures, including economic sanctions, diversification of energy supply sources, and an accelerated transition toward renewable energy systems. This study employs a qualitative comparative methodology, incorporating the analysis of official policy documents and energy trade data, to examine the evolving energy relationship between the EU and Russia. The findings reveal that the war has catalyzed a significant shift in the EU's energy import patterns, particularly in reducing reliance on Russian gas and oil. The EU has actively engaged in forging new energy partnerships with alternative suppliers such as Azerbaijan, Qatar, and the United States, while simultaneously enhancing investments in green energy infrastructure. Concurrently, Russia has reoriented its energy export strategy toward Asian markets, reflecting a broader geopolitical realignment. The study concludes that the Ukraine conflict has accelerated the fragmentation of traditional energy interdependence between the EU and Russia, fostering the emergence of new diplomatic alignments and reinforcing the strategic importance of energy autonomy and diversification in contemporary international relations.

Keywords: ***Energy diplomacy, energy security, energy geopolitics, European Union, Russia***

Submission	:	Feb, 13th 2025
Revision	:	March 24th 2025
Publication	:	May 28th 2025

ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online)

INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary global order, energy diplomacy has become a central pillar in the strategic calculus of both producer and consumer nations. Amid escalating global energy demand and increasing resource constraints, states are compelled to navigate a complex matrix of geopolitical interests, market volatility, and transnational regulatory frameworks. Beyond mere economic necessity, energy diplomacy today plays a pivotal role in addressing global challenges such as climate change through the advancement of sustainable and cooperative energy policies.

Energy diplomacy refers to the utilization of diplomatic instruments and international engagement strategies to secure a nation's energy interests on the global stage. It encompasses the negotiation of energy trade agreements, international collaboration on resource development, and conflict resolution over energy access. More broadly, it aims to enhance energy security, reduce dependence on politically volatile supply routes, and foster stable economic and political relations between energy-producing and consuming states. As such, energy diplomacy intersects directly with a state's foreign policy framework, representing both a tool of influence and a means of strategic resilience.

The intricate relationship between energy security and foreign policy underscores the importance of energy diplomacy in shaping global security dynamics. Conducted across bilateral, regional, and multilateral platforms, energy diplomacy involves a wide array of actors—nation-states, international organizations, private corporations, and non-state stakeholders. Institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) play crucial roles in mediating cooperation and mitigating potential conflicts (Goldthau, 2013). A particularly salient aspect is the instrumentalization of energy resources by supplier states—especially those endowed with oil and gas reserves—as leverage in achieving broader foreign policy objectives, often described as the use of "energy as a weapon" (Shaffer, 2009).

This strategic utility is not limited to coercion. Energy diplomacy is also employed as a mechanism for defense cooperation and power projection, as illustrated by its role in shaping military alliances and deterrence strategies (Prayuda, 2019). In this context, the post-2022 geopolitical upheaval following Russia's invasion of Ukraine has emerged as a defining moment in the reconfiguration of energy diplomacy—particularly between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation. The war has triggered the most acute energy

crisis in Europe since the 1970s, compelling the EU to fundamentally reassess its energy security doctrine and diplomatic posture.

The EU's longstanding dependence on Russian fossil fuels—constituting approximately 40% of its natural gas, 27% of crude oil, and 46% of coal imports in 2021—has historically been shaped by geographic proximity, cost-efficiency, and long-term supply contracts (International Energy Agency, 2022). These imports were primarily delivered through key transcontinental pipelines such as Nord Stream 1, Yamal-Europe, and the Brotherhood Pipeline. The Nord Stream 2 project, although suspended in early 2022, symbolized the depth of mutual interdependence, particularly between Germany and Russia. However, this dependence came under intense scrutiny as Russia's military aggression in Ukraine exposed the inherent risks of asymmetrical energy reliance (Goldthau, 2016).

In response, the European Union launched a concerted effort to decouple from Russian energy by reducing gas imports to less than 10% within a year, while simultaneously initiating large-scale diversification strategies and accelerating the transition to renewable energy (IEA, 2023). Countries such as Germany, Austria, Sweden, and the Netherlands declared national energy emergencies as part of this collective recalibration (Logayah et al., 2023). Concurrently, the EU has sought alternative suppliers, notably Qatar, Azerbaijan, and the United States, primarily through Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) imports (Stern, 2023). These developments have introduced complex economic and diplomatic consequences for both the EU and Russia.

Russia, on the other hand, has responded by reorienting its energy exports toward Asian markets and leveraging its strategic energy reserves to maintain global influence. The dynamic interaction between these two actors has thus created a new axis of energy diplomacy, marked by confrontation, adaptation, and strategic recalibration.

Within this context, the present study seeks to analyze the evolving landscape of energy diplomacy between the European Union and Russia following the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Specifically, it aims to examine the extent to which energy diplomacy has served as an effective tool for advancing national interests, managing interdependence, and reshaping international power dynamics. Of particular interest is the EU’s deployment of economic sanctions and diversification strategies vis-à-vis Russia’s adaptive energy partnerships and geopolitical maneuvering.

The core research question that guides this investigation is: *How has energy diplomacy been employed as an instrument of national interest by the European Union and Russia, particularly in the management of energy security and the projection of power in the international system?*

To address this question, the study adopts a qualitative analytical framework supported by comparative case studies, document analysis, and trade data evaluation. The article is structured as follows: the next section presents a review of relevant literature and theoretical perspectives; this is followed by a description of the research methodology; the subsequent sections discuss the empirical findings and offer a critical analysis; and finally, the conclusion highlights the implications of this study for future energy diplomacy and international relations practice.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of power dynamics in international relations has been significantly shaped by Joseph Nye's seminal work *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (1990), in which he introduces the dichotomy of *hard power* and *soft power*. Hard power refers to a state's coercive capabilities—typically military or economic—that compel behavioral change in other actors through force or inducement. Nye (1990) emphasizes that while hard power can yield short-term strategic compliance, its overreliance risks undermining long-term diplomatic relations, especially in the interconnected fabric of modern global politics. In contrast, soft power depends on attraction and persuasion via cultural appeal, political values, and legitimacy in foreign policy.

The theoretical framework provided by Nye is especially relevant in analyzing Russia's energy diplomacy, where energy resources are deployed as instruments of statecraft. Pami Aalto (2023), in *Russian Energy Diplomacy*, elucidates how Russia positions itself as an *energy superpower*, leveraging its vast oil and natural gas reserves to influence international political outcomes. Russia's strategy includes the use of state-controlled firms such as Gazprom and Rosneft, differential pricing schemes based on political alignment, and dominance over strategic infrastructure in the post-Soviet space. Aalto also introduces the concept of "energy as a weapon," particularly evident in instances where Russia has disrupted energy supplies to exert political pressure.

A key feature identified by Aalto is the asymmetrical interdependence between Russia and Europe—while the European Union depends on Russian

energy for security and continuity, Russia equally relies on European markets for its export revenues. This mutual dependency, while beneficial under stable conditions, creates geopolitical vulnerability during crises. Russia's strategic *pivot to the East*—diversifying energy exports to Asia, especially China—is highlighted as a long-term response to tensions with the West.

Further deepening this discourse, Marco Siddi (2022) explores EU-Russia energy relations through a historical and geopolitical lens in *The Handbook of Energy Governance in Europe*. He illustrates how energy ties have persisted since the Cold War, with Russia remaining a dominant supplier of gas and oil to the EU despite recurring political rifts. The gas crises of 2006 and 2009, in particular, exposed the EU's vulnerability to supply disruptions and spurred diversification initiatives. Siddi also underscores the growing politicization of energy in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea, which led to sanctions and recalibration of the EU's energy strategy.

These studies collectively reveal a transformation of energy from an economic commodity into a strategic geopolitical tool, particularly within the context of EU-Russia relations post-2022.

To analyze this transformation, the study draws on the Hard Power Theory, as conceptualized by Nye (1990) and further elaborated by Guzzini (2013) and Berridge (2022). Hard power refers to the application of military strength, economic leverage, and coercive diplomacy to influence international actors. In economic diplomacy, this includes the use of sanctions, trade embargoes, and financial inducements to enforce compliance or punish non-alignment (Berridge, 2022). Hard power, when projected through control of energy resources, forms the basis for energy coercion, where exporting countries exert influence over dependent importers.

This framework is particularly suitable for analyzing Russia's approach, which exhibits characteristics of complex economic diplomacy, including price manipulation, infrastructure dominance, and politically motivated supply disruptions. In contrast, the European Union's counterstrategy—sanctions and diversification—reflects an attempt to neutralize this coercive leverage by enhancing energy autonomy and pursuing multilateral alliances.

As Nye (1990) states, the effectiveness of hard power is not only dependent on material capability but also on the vulnerability and interdependence of the targeted party. This is highly pertinent in the EU-Russia case, where reciprocal

economic dependence constrains the extent to which either side can fully exploit the relationship.

The field of energy diplomacy represents a convergence of foreign policy and energy security. Goldthau (2012) and Herranz-Surrallés (2016) define energy diplomacy as the strategic deployment of diplomatic tools to secure access to foreign energy resources, ensure domestic energy security, and promote international cooperation. This includes bilateral and multilateral agreements, strategic dialogues, infrastructure investments, and technology transfer.

In practice, energy diplomacy operates across multiple levels—from government-to-government negotiations to the involvement of corporations and international institutions. As Shaffer (2009) notes, both energy-importing and exporting nations employ energy diplomacy: the former to ensure supply continuity and price stability, and the latter to secure markets and advance geopolitical goals.

The EU-Russia energy relationship between 2022 and 2024 exemplifies this evolving diplomacy. In response to the Ukraine war, the EU adopted a multipronged strategy involving economic sanctions, diversification of suppliers, and acceleration of renewable energy adoption. This was not only a technical pivot but a deliberate act of geopolitical repositioning, signaling a recalibration of the EU's long-standing dependence on Russian energy. Simultaneously, Russia responded by strengthening ties with non-Western partners and positioning itself within alternative global energy networks.

While existing studies have explored the use of energy in diplomacy, there remains a relative paucity of empirical research examining the failure or effectiveness of energy diplomacy strategies during ongoing geopolitical crises, particularly with regard to the EU's response post-2022. Additionally, much of the literature focuses on macro-level strategies but lacks insight into the micro-diplomatic mechanisms and institutional adaptations taking place within the EU to manage the energy crisis.

This study contributes to the field by critically analyzing the efficacy of the EU's energy diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia, especially in the context of hard power instruments such as economic sanctions and energy decoupling. It also evaluates Russia's adaptive strategy and its implications for global energy governance.

METHOD

This study adopts a qualitative research approach, aimed at providing an in-depth understanding of the strategic dynamics underlying energy diplomacy between the European Union and Russia, particularly within the context of the post-2022 geopolitical realignment. As stated by Creswell (2009), qualitative research is a method for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or political phenomenon. It involves an emerging set of questions and procedures, data collected from various sources, and inductive data analysis that builds from specific observations to broader thematic interpretations (Creswell, 2009, p. 4).

In this study, the qualitative method is employed to examine the interpretive dimensions of energy diplomacy and *hard power* politics, with emphasis on actors, strategies, discourse, and policy responses in a natural social-political setting. As Creswell (2009, p. 175) notes, qualitative research prioritizes context, meaning, and depth over generalizability, allowing researchers to construct a rich, holistic narrative of the phenomenon under investigation.

Data Collection

The primary technique used for data collection is a literature study (library research). This method entails collecting and reviewing secondary data relevant to the research objectives, drawn from a wide array of credible and authoritative sources. These include:

1. Books and academic monographs
2. Peer-reviewed scientific journals (both national and international)
3. Policy reports, position papers, and strategic documents
4. Publications from reputable think tanks, particularly Russian and European Union institutions
5. Official government documents and media statements
6. Archival sources, digital libraries, and verified social media statements from policymakers

All sources were selected based on credibility, relevance, and accessibility through institutional repositories or official platforms (Neumann, 2011, p. 371).

Research Procedure

The research was conducted in sequential stages as follows:

1. Problem Formulation: Identification of core issues related to EU-Russia energy diplomacy and framing the main research question regarding the use of energy as a tool of hard power.
2. Data Retrieval: Systematic collection of documents, journal articles, reports, speeches, and policy papers through content exploration from institutional websites and academic databases.
3. Data Organization: Classification of materials based on themes such as economic sanctions, energy security, trade dependence, infrastructure diplomacy, and diversification strategies.
4. Theoretical Framing: Application of relevant theoretical lenses—particularly Hard Power Theory (Nye, 1990) and the framework of energy diplomacy (Goldthau, 2012; Shaffer, 2009)—to guide interpretation.
5. Data Reduction and Coding: Reduction and synthesis of large volumes of textual information into coded categories to facilitate thematic interpretation.
6. Interpretation and Analysis: Drawing connections between data segments to identify strategic patterns, policy responses, and power dynamics. Analysis was carried out inductively, allowing empirical patterns to inform conceptual conclusions.

This process ensures a systematic, iterative, and reflective cycle of analysis, consistent with qualitative best practices.

Data Analysis Technique

The qualitative data analysis in this study was conducted using thematic content analysis, anchored on the integration of hard power theory and the conceptual framework of energy diplomacy. The analysis began with a thorough review of collected textual data, including official documents, policy statements, and speeches by key actors. Emphasis was placed on how energy instruments were utilized to exert pressure, secure strategic leverage, and influence diplomatic outcomes.

Following this, the data were reduced and abstracted into interpretive themes such as: (1) coercive energy strategies, (2) supply dependency and infrastructure politics, (3) diversification diplomacy, and (4) geopolitical responses. This process

of data reduction serves to sharpen focus, classify insights, and synthesize findings in relation to the research question. Each theme was then connected back to the theoretical model to allow for interpretation and theoretical generalization.

Ethical Considerations

Although the research is based entirely on secondary data, ethical considerations were addressed through adherence to proper citation standards, source credibility verification, and transparent analytical procedures. All data were accessed from publicly available sources and analyzed in accordance with academic integrity principles. No personal or confidential data were involved in the research, thereby eliminating concerns related to informed consent or privacy violations.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Strategic Disruption of EU–Russia Energy Interdependence

The empirical findings drawn from literature and policy analysis confirm a fundamental disruption in the structure of EU–Russia energy relations. Prior to the Russia–Ukraine war, the European Union and Russia maintained a long-standing energy partnership grounded in geographic proximity, pipeline infrastructure, and historical trade agreements. This interdependence was asymmetrical—Europe needed energy, and Russia needed markets—but relatively stable (Aalto, 2023; Siddi, 2022).

However, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered a radical geopolitical shift, transforming energy from a domain of economic cooperation into a strategic battleground. The EU's imposition of sweeping economic sanctions, combined with efforts to decouple from Russian gas and oil, marked a deliberate strategy of structural resistance. Conversely, Russia weaponized energy flows by restricting gas deliveries and leveraging infrastructure dominance to increase diplomatic pressure on the EU (Goldthau, 2022; Krickovic, 2015).

This development confirms that energy diplomacy has evolved from a tool of economic interdependence into a mechanism of geopolitical coercion. The EU’s subsequent transition from reliance to resilience was not merely an energy policy shift but a reorientation of its grand strategy in international relations.

EU Energy Diplomacy (2022–2024): Between Adaptation and Vulnerability

The EU's response to Russia's energy weaponization reflects a complex balancing act between crisis response and structural transformation. Strategic policy initiatives such as the *REPowerEU Plan* (European Commission, 2022) and accelerated LNG procurement from the United States and Norway aimed to safeguard short-term supply security while catalyzing long-term energy autonomy.

Yet, the EU's diversification strategy was fraught with logistical, economic, and political constraints:

1. Logistical rigidity: The EU's existing pipeline infrastructure—historically tailored to Russian imports—limited immediate substitution. LNG terminals were unevenly distributed, with bottlenecks in Central and Eastern Europe.
2. Economic costs: Spot market LNG purchases and rapid infrastructure expansion led to energy price inflation, placing enormous burdens on households and industries. Germany's 20% increase in coal usage in 2022 (IEA, 2023) illustrates the paradox: striving for green transition, yet regressing under pressure.
3. Political fragmentation: Not all member states shared uniform support for sanctions. Hungary and Slovakia, for example, retained energy ties with Gazprom, weakening the EU's collective diplomatic stance (Politico Europe, 2023).

The energy crisis revealed the limits of EU coherence in implementing coercive energy diplomacy. While the Union presented a united front rhetorically, the heterogeneity of member state energy mixes and dependencies created policy incoherence and implementation asymmetries.

Furthermore, EU energy diplomacy has increasingly adopted multi-vector partnerships, including intensified collaboration with Azerbaijan (Southern Gas Corridor), Algeria, and the US. While this reflects strategic flexibility, it also introduces new dependencies—raising questions about the sustainability and geopolitical neutrality of diversification.

The Structural Effectiveness of Russian Energy Diplomacy

On the Russian side, the effectiveness of energy diplomacy manifested in its ability to recalibrate trade flows, sustain revenue, and fracture global consensus. Despite unprecedented sanctions, Russia succeeded in several key dimensions:

1. Revenue preservation: Russian energy export earnings in 2022 reached over $337 billion—a 38% increase from 2021—despite export volume stagnation (Offshore Technology, 2022).
2. Market pivoting: Through strategic discounting, Russia deepened energy relations with India (33-fold increase in oil imports) and maintained dominance in China's crude supply (Reuters, 2023; CNBC, 2023). Gas flows to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline increased 50% year-on-year (Gazprom, 2023).
3. Alliance building: Russia used energy leverage to solidify its geopolitical footprint in the Global South. Countries such as Turkey, India, and Brazil continued cooperation, rejecting the Western sanctions regime.

This outcome illustrates the success of hard power diplomacy when embedded in long-standing trade relationships, infrastructure ownership, and global energy demand asymmetries. Unlike the EU, which faced inward fragmentation, Russia operated from a more centralized and coordinated energy governance structure, enabling decisive policy shifts.

Interpretative Synthesis: Energy as Hard Power, Diplomacy as Contest

Theoretically, the findings strongly validate Joseph Nye's framework of hard power, particularly its coercive dimension through economic and infrastructural instruments (Nye, 1990). Russia employed energy restrictions not merely as retaliation, but as a calibrated diplomatic offensive to undermine EU unity, elevate negotiation costs, and secure new strategic alignments.

Simultaneously, the EU attempted to transform energy diplomacy into a normative power projection, using sanctions to enforce international norms and human rights. However, the lack of global alignment—particularly among emerging economies—diminished the reach of this strategy. Energy diplomacy, in this context, revealed its inherent asymmetries: it is most effective when supported by infrastructure, market flexibility, and global consensus—elements that favored Russia more than the EU in the immediate term.

Moreover, the EU's dual objectives—decarbonization and energy security—created a strategic tension. The rapid abandonment of Russian fossil fuels conflicted with domestic energy affordability and climate goals. For instance, reverting to coal weakened EU credibility on global climate leadership, exposing normative contradictions in its external action strategy.

The Paradox of Sanctions and the Realignment of Global Energy Governance

One of the most profound insights from this study is the paradoxical impact of economic sanctions. Designed to isolate and weaken, sanctions against Russia's energy exports instead prompted:

1. Acceleration of non-Western energy blocs (e.g., BRICS+ discussions on energy trade in non-dollar currencies)
2. Erosion of Western-centric energy governance frameworks
3. Diversification of Russia's export infrastructure, reducing its vulnerability to EU markets

These developments signal a potential restructuring of global energy governance. Russia's successful pivot may encourage other energy-exporting countries to hedge against Western markets by cultivating alternative geopolitical partnerships and payment systems. The EU, meanwhile, is entering a new phase of energy geopolitics marked by sustainability-driven alliances, yet burdened by infrastructural legacies and internal fragmentation.

Key Themes	Findings
Asymmetric Interdependence	Pre-2022 EU–Russia energy ties were mutually beneficial yet structurally unbalanced
Geopolitical Transformation	Post-invasion, energy became a tool of coercion and resistance, not cooperation
EU Vulnerabilities	Infrastructure bottlenecks, price surges, and internal disunity weakened energy diplomacy
Russian Adaptation	Successfully redirected exports, preserved revenue, and exploited global energy realignment
Limitations of Sanctions	Sanctions lacked global enforcement; some EU members and the Global South did not comply
Structural Shift	From energy interdependence to systemic decoupling and rival energy blocs

The findings of this study indicate that energy diplomacy in the post-Ukraine war era has become the principal arena of strategic rivalry, embodying both coercive and adaptive state behavior. While the European Union pursued a normative and diversification-based diplomacy, its internal fragmentation and overreliance on centralized supply networks limited its leverage.

In contrast, Russia's centralized control over energy assets and strategic realignment toward Asian markets showcased a successful model of hard power

diplomacy, albeit one that is increasingly reliant on fewer buyers and long-term systemic risks. These dynamics reflect not only a change in energy trade flows but also a transformation in the architecture of global energy governance, with implications for strategic alliances, infrastructure investment, and geopolitical risk assessment in the decades to come.

The discourse of energy diplomacy must now evolve beyond supply security to encompass multidimensional statecraft—combining sustainability, economic strategy, and geopolitical foresight.

Dimension	European Union (EU)	Russian Federation
Pre-War Dependency	~40% gas imports from Russia (IEA, 2022)	~48% of exports to EU, mostly energy (Europa.eu, 2017)
Strategic Response	Sanctions, diversification (LNG from US, Qatar, Norway), REPowerEU	Export redirection to Asia (China, India, Turkey), discount pricing
Diplomatic Tools	Normative diplomacy, climate-based initiatives	Energy weaponization, bilateral pricing leverage
Short-Term Outcomes	Supply shocks, price inflation, coal resurgence in Germany	Revenue spike ($337B in 2022), pipeline reorientation
Long-Term Strategies	Energy autonomy, renewables (42.5% target by 2030)	Power of Siberia II pipeline, BRICS+ energy cooperation
Internal Constraints	Member state fragmentation (e.g., Hungary, Austria)	Centralized energy policy, Gazprom dominance
Global Alignment	Limited Global South support for sanctions	Expanded trade with non-aligned countries
Diplomatic Outcome	Structural resistance, reconfiguration of energy partnerships	Reinforced geopolitical presence in Asia, weakened Western ties

CONCLUSION

This study set out to explore how energy diplomacy has been reshaped by the Russia–Ukraine conflict, focusing on the strategic recalibrations of the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation between 2022 and 2024. As outlined in the introduction, the research questioned how energy diplomacy—particularly through mechanisms of *hard power* and economic coercion—could serve national interests amid geopolitical crises. The findings presented in the discussion affirm that energy diplomacy, in this context, has evolved into a multidimensional tool of geopolitical contestation, producing divergent outcomes for both actors.

The results show that the European Union, driven by security imperatives, succeeded in reducing its reliance on Russian natural gas from over 40% to under 10% within a short period. This rapid detachment was accompanied by aggressive

energy diversification strategies, acceleration of renewable energy investments, and structural realignment toward sustainable energy systems. Initiatives such as REPowerEU demonstrate the EU's long-term commitment to achieving energy sovereignty, environmental resilience, and geopolitical stability.

Conversely, Russia leveraged energy as a geopolitical instrument, redirecting its exports to Asian markets—particularly China and India—after losing access to its principal European consumers. Despite Western sanctions, Russia maintained strong revenue flows in 2022, demonstrating the adaptive strength of its energy diplomacy. However, the shift toward Asia also entailed significant trade-offs: lower export prices, costly infrastructure realignment, and asymmetrical bargaining positions with new buyers. The Nord Stream pipelines, once strategic lifelines to Europe, became emblematic of sunk geopolitical investments rendered obsolete by war.

These developments underscore a fundamental transformation in global energy geopolitics. The Ukraine war accelerated the fragmentation of long-standing interdependence between Europe and Russia, catalyzed the transition toward decarbonization, and ushered in a new energy diplomacy paradigm marked by diversification, decentralization, and sustainability.

In this new landscape, the EU is progressively redefining energy as a matter of strategic autonomy and climate governance, while Russia recalibrates its influence through bilateral partnerships in the East. The global energy order is no longer dictated solely by fossil fuel access or infrastructure dominance, but by the ability to innovate, adapt, and align energy policy with broader strategic and environmental imperatives.

This case highlights the limitations of traditional economic sanctions in a multipolar energy market and raises questions about the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in an era of strategic realignments. Future research could explore:

1. The long-term resilience of Asian markets to absorb Russian energy supply,
2. The institutional and policy adjustments required within the EU to maintain decarbonization momentum under geopolitical stress,
3. The evolving role of emerging economies (Global South) in reshaping global energy diplomacy norms.

By deepening our understanding of these dynamics, scholars and policymakers can better anticipate the next phase of international energy relations—where security, sustainability, and sovereignty will define the contours of energy diplomacy.

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