

TÜRKIYE FACTOR IN INDONESIA STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

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Abstract:

In recent years, the concept of strategic autonomy has gained significant attention as middle powers try to navigate the intensifying great-power competition in their regions. Türkiye, as one of the emerging middle powers, have significantly proved that the enhancement of strategic autonomy played a key role in navigating both regional and global tension. Against this backdrop, numerous studies have examined how Indonesia strategic partnership with Türkiye have intensified, especially in terms of defense diplomacy, however, limited attention has been paid to what the strategic rationale behind Indonesia's preference for Türkiye and how it affect Indonesia's overall strategic autonomy. This study contends that Indonesia's deepening defense ties with Türkiye are not accidental but are a calculated strategy to enhance strategic autonomy. Indonesia chooses Türkiye not just for the arms transaction, but for the opportunity for capacity-building and access to diverse partners. By engaging with Türkiye a nation that has successfully developed its own indigenous defense industry Indonesia seeks to replicate this success, securing not just weapons, but the knowledge to build them, thereby insulating its national security from the volatility of Great Power politics. Employing a descriptive qualitative approach, this study utilizes data from official documents, bilateral accords, policy statements, scholarly publications, and media sources.

Keywords: *Middle Power, Strategic Autonomy, Foreign Policy, Defense Diplomacy, International Relations, Indonesia-Türkiye Bilateral Relations.*

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INTRODUCTION

The year 2025 marks a significant milestone in the diplomatic history of the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Türkiye: the 75th anniversary of bilateral relations. While these seven decades have been characterized by cordial diplomatic engagement and shared socio-cultural values, the nature of this relationship has undergone a profound transformation in recent years. No longer confined to ceremonial diplomacy or low-level trade, the Jakarta-Ankara

connection has rapidly evolved into a strategic partnership defined by substantial defense cooperation. During President Erdoğan of Türkiye visit to Jakarta, he emphasized that the defense collaboration between Türkiye and Indonesia served a strategic importance in strengthening the national defense and strategic autonomy in defense industry of both countries while also contributing to the global peace and security (*İletişim Başkanlığı*, 2025). Likewise, President Prabowo of Indonesia also stated that the cooperation should extended to become a model for Global South cooperation and as a strategic partners in the new world order (*Sekretaris Kabinet Republik Indonesia*, 2025).

Hence, this anniversary serves not merely as a celebratory occasion but as a critical juncture to analyze a shifting paradigm in the Global South. As the international system becomes increasingly multipolar, the relationship between these two nations exemplifies a broader trend: the rise of inter-middle power cooperation. This phenomenon challenges the traditional reliance on Great Powers, suggesting a new pathway where nations like Indonesia seek alternative partners to navigate the complexities of modern geopolitics. In this regards, Indonesian Ambassador to Türkiye Achmad Rizal Purnama evaluates the cooperation between Indonesia and Türkiye, especially in the defense sector, is exceptional; in which it is intends not to cause conflict or threaten others, but rather to contribute to regional and global peace and stability (Anadolu Agency, 2025).

Despite the elevated visibility of this partnership, current academic literature presents a notable gap. Existing scholarship on Indonesia-Türkiye relations predominantly focuses on defense cooperation as a merely diplomatic tools that ties the two countries closer. However, these studies often overlook the underlying strategic rationale: Why has Indonesia specifically chosen Türkiye? And how it impact Indonesia's overall defense policy? In a global arms market dominated by established superpowers like the United States, Russia, and emerging giants like China, Indonesia's pivot toward Türkiye is worth a deeper explanation.

The following sections expand these arguments. The first section describes the existing studies on Indonesia-Türkiye defense collaboration and examines how it overlook the strategic rationale within the partnership. It also explores how the neoclassical realism as the underpinning framework of middle power and strategic autonomy concept could relate on Indonesia's strategy amidst rising tension in the region. The second section examines the external and internal factors that shaped Indonesia's policy on defense industry and how it coincides with Türkiye's policy on arms export and defense collaboration. Finally, I draw some conclusions at the

end and argued that Indonesia's deepening defense ties with Türkiye are not accidental but are a calculated strategy to enhance strategic autonomy. Indonesia chooses Türkiye not just for the hardware, but for the opportunity for capacity-building and access to diverse partners. By engaging with Türkiye—a nation that has successfully developed its own indigenous defense industry—Indonesia seeks to replicate this success, securing not just weapons, but the knowledge to build them, thereby insulating its national security from the volatility of Great Power politics.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the past decade, the studies about the relation between Indonesia and Türkiye has increased significantly. Not only the relation between the two countries has become closer, it also has produced substantial outcome especially in the defense sector such as the joint production of a Kaplan Tank or *Tank Harimau*. Scholars in this topic have highlighted that the defense collaboration has succeeded to ties Indonesia and Türkiye closer. Many argued that Türkiye's success story of building self-sufficiency defense industry has met with Indonesia's ambition on modernizing its national mechanism which eventually would end up in self-sufficiency weapon system. For instances, Boran and Priamarizki (2025) portrait that Ankara's renewed approach toward Southeast Asia as well as Türkiye's advancement in defense industry has welcomed by Indonesia's strategic interest as well as Prabowo's goal for the modernization of Indonesian military (TNI). Similarly, Athirah (2025) contends that in the long-term cooperation with Türkiye will help Indonesia to enhance technological independence, geopolitical positioning, and a more autonomous foreign policy. In addition, Elisabeth et al. (2021) report that the cooperation between Indonesia and Türkiye that based upon the principle of equality, mutual trust, need, and business has succeeded in achieving high-level defense cooperation between two countries.

Despite the growing literatures the relationship between Indonesia and Türkiye, current literatures on Indonesia-Türkiye bilateral relations largely treats the defense cooperation as the diplomatic tools, a something that ties the two countries closer, rather than survival strategies. However, limited attention has been directed towards Indonesia's survival strategies embedded in decision to cooperate with Türkiye. There is less detailed empirical analysis of how exactly Türkiye's engagement influences Indonesia's strategic autonomy.

Ultimately, the aims of middle power to cooperate with other middle power is to enhance their strategic autonomy, especially amidst the great power rivalry in their backyard. Through this perspective, Indonesia's decision to cooperate with

Türkiye should be understood as Indonesia's survival strategy amidst great power rivalry and to enhance its strategic autonomy. In this regard, limited attention has been put towards how this bilateral engagement modifies Indonesia's overall strategic autonomy posture vis-à-vis major powers or regional dynamics.

Thus, while Indonesia and Türkiye have celebrated the 75th years of diplomatic relations, this study will turn the focus on how has Jakarta-Ankara partnership has influenced Indonesia's strategic autonomy in the domestic security and foreign-policy domains? To what extent has Indonesia's partnership with Türkiye enabled a diversification of its defense procurement and thereby reduced its strategic dependence on traditional major-power suppliers?

Neoclassical Realism as Theoretical Framework

Gideon Rose (1998), who coined the term of 'neoclassical realism', observes that foreign policy is a work driven by external and internal factors. The external factors, which considers as international structure, defines a country's position in international system in relation to their respective material capabilities, it will also contain systemic pressures to the extent that a country must act. However, the articulation of such systemic pressures and power capabilities must translated through variant variables at the unit level before implemented as a foreign policy. Ultimately, Rose (1998) insisted that "foreign policy choices are made by actual leaders and elites, and it is so their perceptions of relative power that matter". Therefore, neoclassical realist contends that a state's foreign policy is driven primarily by its place in the international system, but this systemic pressure is filtered through complex domestic political structures before it results in a specific policy action.

Using the framework of neoclassical realism, this study draws that the combination of changes in international structure and the demand from domestic politics explains on why Indonesia has selected Türkiye as strategic partner while at the same time try to enhance its strategic autonomy. In this case, the structural realist would argue that Indonesia cooperates with Türkiye simply because they are balancing against US-China rivalry by diversifying their partners. However, be that as it may, it could not explain why in particular Indonesia chooses Türkiye as its strategic partner. In other words, using the framework of neoclassical realism it draws that systemic pressure, i.e., the growing tension and competition for influence in Indo-Pacific region, would create the incentive for Indonesia to hedge against great power, but domestic politics determine the alternative partner that Indonesia takes.

Furthermore, while structural realism often marginalizes the role of middle powers in international structures, neoclassical realism accommodates the agency of middle powers by shifting the focus from material quantity to state capacity. Structural realist like Kenneth Waltz (2010) posits that the international structure is defined solely by the distribution of capabilities among the Great Powers. Consequently, middle powers are conceptually relegated to the status of 'rule-takers' actors who must adapt to the constraints set by great powers rather than shaping them. However, scholars of neoclassical realism like Jeffrey Taliaferro (2006) challenges that state's role in international system does not merely defined by their material quantity, rather, it is defined by its ability to extract and mobilize resources. In this perspective, the role of middle power in international system is acknowledged in the sense that; while they have limited resources, middle powers are still extracting and mobilizing their power to gain strategic autonomy against great power.

Understanding the Middle Power and Strategic Autonomy

In an increasingly multipolar international system, the discussion about middle power have increased extensively as they started to attain significant position in the much of discussion in global arena. In this regard, Anrew Carr (2013) posits that the structure of the international system plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior and influence of middle powers. Furthermore, compared with unipolar and bipolar order which states must act according to great power, Kutlay and Öniş (2017) examined that middle power tend to be behave more active in a multipolar order because it would give middle power better space to act autonomously and seek for alternative power. Therefore, in such environment, due to limitations in their material resources and diplomatic leverage, middle powers tend to favor act through multilateral institutions, hedging strategies, or *niche* diplomacy to navigate their interest within international system.

Entering the 21st century, amidst the emerging trend of multipolar order, the discourse of international relations have been impacted by the wave of great power competition and how it impacts the international system. As such, the ability of middle power to navigate their interest and autonomy have been questioned to a great extent. Be that as it may, scholars have noted that despite structural constraints middle power are still able to navigate their quest for autonomy through issue-specific leadership and niche diplomacy (Shin, 2015). Similarly, Keohane and Nye's (2012) theory of complex interdependence highlights that the diffusion of power across multiple channels economic, institutional, and transnational creates opportunities for middle powers to maneuver independently

of strict great-power binaries. These perspectives suggest that structural constraints may limit, but do not eliminate, the space for middle power autonomy.

Eventually, what middle power aims in such dynamic environment is what it's called 'strategic autonomy.' It refers to the capacity of a state to set priorities and make decisions independently while having the institutional, political, and material means to implement them, either alone or in cooperation (Lippert et al., 2019). It integrates dimensions of sovereignty, economic resilience, and geopolitical agency, with emphasis on managing dependencies rather than pursuing absolute independence. In this sense, strategic autonomy is linked to the ability to navigate global interdependencies while protecting core interests and values. Nevertheless, the idea of strategic autonomy shouldn't be confused with complete sovereignty. Being strategically autonomy does not mean that a country is in total isolation and having ultimate self-sufficiency. Rather, it means that a country having the ability to act in international affairs without necessarily severing external ties (Kutlay and Öniş, 2021; Nissen and Larsen, 2021).

After gaining prominence during the Cold War, the idea of strategic autonomy has become the central aspiration for emerging and middle power. In this context, as a country started to gain some level of material or political capacities to act in international arena, pursuing an autonomous foreign policy was seen as the most viable option to navigate their interest amidst great power competition (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025; Lüthi, 2016). One of the earliest examples would be when Indonesia declined to align itself with major powers specifically the US and the USSR during the Cold War choosing instead to pursue an autonomous foreign policy through Non-Aligned Movement, while remaining open to constructive engagement that served its national interests (Umar, 2023).

Traditional way for middle powers to boost their strategic autonomy is through an active participation in multilateral forums. This strategy was also widely acknowledged by scholars in middle power studies as the main behavior of middle power because of their limitation in terms of capability to act unilaterally, middle power tends to favor seeking leverage through coalition-building and multilateral institutions (Keohane, 1969; Jordaan, 2003; Cooper et al., 1993; Yalçın, 2012). For instance, Cooper et al. (1993) explains that middle powers could taking advantage by having a greater opportunity to be heard within multilateral institutions. In other words, multilateral mechanism would give middle power greater voice opportunity. In the similar vein, multilateral institution also gives greater opportunity for *niche* diplomacy in which middle powers seek for 'issues-

specific' leadership in global arena (Cooper, 1997; Shin, 2015). In doing so, it would amplify their international identity and global position against other actors.

Nevertheless, in a global system that is increasingly impacted by great power rivalry, conventional wisdom has it that middle power achieves strategic autonomy amidst great power competition by adopting the strategy of 'Hedging'. It refers to a strategy of uncertainty management adopted by states especially middle powers when they face competing great powers and cannot fully commit to balancing or bandwagoning (Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019). Hedging involves simultaneously pursuing cooperative and counterbalancing measures to avoid overdependence on any one major power while keeping multiple strategic options open (Kuik, 2008). On the one hand, middle power still lacks the military and economic capabilities to balance against great power. On the other hand, they also refuse badwagoning with great power to avoid pressures from the other great power amidst global rivalry. Hence, in this sense, hedging offers a pragmatic alternative approach to navigate middle power's interest.

Against this background, this study will examine on how Indonesia could enhance their strategic autonomy by assuming its role as a middle power, especially amidst great power rivalry in its region. Scholars has noted that Indonesia has begun its foreign policy diversification by extending its wings across ASEAN, IORA, Indo-Pacific forums, and bilateral partnerships (Anwar, 2020; Laksmana, 2017). On bilateral level, Indonesia has notably seeking diversification in alternative powers by aligning with other middle power countries like South Korea, the UAE, Qatar, and Türkiye. While each actors possess strategical importance for the enhancement of Indonesian strategic autonomy, this study however will focus on how Türkiye has participated in Indonesian foreign policy diversification and strategic autonomy enhancement.

METHOD

This research employs a qualitative approach to examine the impact of Türkiye's defense industry toward Indonesia's strategy to enhance strategic autonomy. The study draws upon a diverse set of qualitative data sources, including academic journal articles, news media reports, and official government press releases to capture both scholarly interpretations and official statements. These multiple sources of evidence allow for data triangulation, ensuring greater reliability and validity in understanding the dynamics of Indonesia's foreign policy under Prabowo's leadership. Through this methodological design, the research aims to provide a nuanced and contextually grounded account of how Türkiye's

have an impact towards Indonesia defense modernization and strategic autonomy enhancement.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

External and Internal Factor of Indonesia's Strategy for Strategic Autonomy

Indonesia's current security landscape is currently being shaped by stacked external pressure that can quietly erode policy freedom. Most notably, the rising tension in maritime sphere that often triggers a security stand-off in the region. Just days after Prabowo Subianto came to the Presidency in 2024, Indonesian maritime authorities twice drove a Chinese coast guard vessel out of waters off the Natuna Islands after it disrupted a Pertamina energy survey within Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (Reuters, 2024); this accident spurred Jakarta to reaffirm robust responses to safeguard its maritime sovereignty. Likewise, The announcement of the AUKUS pact (Australia, UK, US) in September 2021 created a new security dilemma for Indonesia. While the Indonesian officials see this as the opportunity to contain Chinese influence in the region (Haripin and Priamarizki, 2024). However, Jakarta approach is still cautious that Indonesia could be a 'transit corridor' for belligerents in a US-China rivalry (Liliansa, 2023). Accordingly, the nuclear-powered submarines included in the AUKUS arrangement are designed for long-endurance and deep-diving operations. If Australian nuclear submarines use to transit between the Indian and Pacific Oceans to contain China through the Sunda or Lombok Straits (which are deep enough for submerged transit, unlike the Malacca Strait) without surfacing, Indonesia has no way of knowing they are there, thus undermining Indonesia's territorial integrity (Darmawan, 2023).

To a great extent, the great power rivalry between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific has affected the current security landscape in Indonesia. Therefore, observers have noted that the rise of China has fundamentally reconfigured the regional balance of power while to some extent it also affected Indonesia's domestic and regional security challenges (Gindarsah and Priamarizki, 2015; Poling and Natalegawa, 2025). At the same time, Indonesia refused to believe that the U.S. and other great powers possess the tools and wills to deal with Indonesia security challenges vis-à-vis the rise of China (Gindarsah and Priamarizki, 2015; Laksmana, 2017). For this particular reason, Laskmana (2017) noted that Indonesia's approach toward great power management is one of the full engagements in various forms of cooperation while simultaneously maintaining both strategic autonomy and keeping equal balance with other great powers. In addition, to address security challenges, Indonesia needs to modernize its own

defense capabilities to enhance the country's strategic autonomy (Gindarsah and Priamarizki, 2015).

Regarding the internal factors, Indonesia lays down several strategies designed to make procurement serve capability-building, not just equipment buying, to advance the defense modernization. The backbone of this initiative initially described in the Law No. 16/2012 on the Defense Industry which frames the defense industry as part of national resilience and explicitly links it to independence of the defense system (Republic of Indonesia. Ministry of Defense, 2012). In practice, this creates a policy imperative to shift Indonesia from being primarily an end-user/importer toward being a producer and integrator of defense systems—at least for priority platforms and subsystems. This law also mandates that in case of arms imports, Indonesia should prioritize the Transfer of Technology (ToT), or joint productions included in the procurement deals with foreign counterparts. At the same time, within the context of great power rivalry Indonesia needs to diversify its arms supplier to avoid overreliance on single power and navigate the great power management. In short, Indonesia's defense industrialization is not merely a military modernization program, but a hedging strategy designed to secure strategic autonomy. By leveraging its market size to enforce Technology Transfer, Indonesia attempts to escape the 'client trap' of Great Power competition, though it remains constrained by budgetary limitations and technological absorptive capacity.

How Türkiye has Impacted Indonesia Strategic Autonomy

Türkiye's advancement in defense industry sector has attracted many countries that seek alternative for arms procurement without relying on the great and traditional arms supplier. For Indonesia, maintaining strategic partnership with Türkiye, especially in the defense sector, serves two important roles. First, it gives access to diverse supplier. In doing so, Türkiye helps Indonesia avoid overreliance on a single supplier and complements engagement with Western and mainstream partners, which consistent with Indonesia's broader strategy of defense diversification. Second, this cooperation could translate into institutionalized partnership, in which the rise of Türkiye defense industry cooperation serves as an element of Indonesia's defense diplomacy toolkit for capacity building in the defense sector.

Over the past decade, the cooperation on defense sector between Indonesia and Türkiye has improved significantly. It started notably when the former Indonesian President Yudhoyono visited Ankara in June 2010 when the two countries signed agreement on defense-industry cooperation which included in

the 12 agreements concluded covering political, economic and cultural cooperation (Beyaz Gazete, 2010). Although this visit does not explicitly result in specific arms and defense procurement, however this visit marked first step towards Indonesia-Türkiye defense collaboration. In the following year, the two countries also agreed to upgrade their relations towards “Strategic Partnership” which signaling that Türkiye viewed Indonesia as its anchor in Southeast Asia, while Indonesia saw Türkiye as the potential for its interest in defense modernization (Republic of Türkiye. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no date).


Then in 2012, President Yudhoyono passed the Law No. 16/2012 on Defense Industry which shifted Indonesian defense policy and mandated that all defense procurement should include technology transfer and joint production in order Indonesia’s reliance on imports and foster local defense capabilities (Hanif, 2025). As a result, while mainstream Western arms producers were hesitant for technology transfer, Türkiye emerged as the key actor who was willing to share. By 2014, following the elevated relation between Indonesia and Türkiye as well as Indonesia’s shift in defense policy, FNSS Savunma Sistemleri from Türkiye and PT Pindad from Indonesia had begun joint projects in the development of a medium tank known as Harimau Tank or Kaplan MT (TRT Haber, 2017). The tank was successfully unveiled in 2017 and was delivered to Indonesian army for the first time in 2024. Furthermore, the two countries agreed to upgrade this cooperation in 2024 by extending to the development of 30-ton class armored personnel carriers known as “KAPLAN Zırhlı Personel Taşıyıcı (KAPLAN ZPT)” (FNSS, 2025). Accordingly, the first vehicle will be produced at FNSS facilities in Turkey, while the second vehicle will be produced by PT Pindad in Indonesia and the first delivery is expected in 2026.

Furthermore, the defense cooperation between Indonesia and Türkiye was increased substantively during the Jokowi administration, especially when Prabowo Subianto assumed the role of Indonesian as Ministry of Defense since 2019. Cooperation expanded from land system to aerospace sector. The deliberate success of Türkiye in drone production and combat-proven success in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine war has attracted Indonesia for defense modernization through drone procurement. Consequently, Indonesia signed a \$300 million contract for 12 ANKA drones from Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in 2023. This was a major pivot; Indonesia chose the Turkish ANKA over the Chinese CH-4, which it already operated but had reliability issues with operational performances (Defence Security Asia, 2025). By acquiring new drones from Türkiye, it reflects Indonesia’s aims to boost collaboration with Türkiye and diversify its military

supply chain. At the same time, it also signals Indonesia's intent to reduce dependence on great power manufacture like China. Moreover, the deal with Türkiye came with capacity-building programs including training, logistics, and significant technology transfer (Türkiye Today, 2025).

Currently, under Prabowo administration the defense relationship between Indonesia and Türkiye has accelerated aggressively. As of mid-2025, Indonesia has formally committed to purchasing 48 KAAN fighter jets, Türkiye's 5th gen stealth fighter (*Anadolu Ajansı*, 2025). Following the \$300 million deal with TAI, Indonesia scale up its drone cooperation with Türkiye by signing agreements for the joint production of Bayraktar TB3 and Akıncı drones in February 2025. At this point, Indonesia views Türkiye not merely as 'supplier' rather as a 'building partner' and 'model' for how a middle power country can advance its defense industry. In addition, the two countries have also extended its partnership towards the development in the navy system. In July 2025, Indonesian Ministry of Defense signed a deal with Turkish shipbuilding group TAIS Shipyard for the production of two I-class (Istif-class/Istanbul-class) frigates for the Indonesian Navy (Vavasseur, 2025).

During the preceding decade, Indonesia and Türkiye has signed over 15 major agreements in the defense sector, including arms procurement, joint production, and ToT. The SIPRI Trend Indicator Value (TIV) data (Figure 1.) shows that Indonesia while continues to maintain relations with its traditional defense partners primarily the United States, France, and Germany—which consistently dominate the top positions across the period from 2015-2024. However, the latest ranking also demonstrates a notable diversification in Indonesia's arms procurement landscape. Most significantly, Türkiye has risen to become Indonesia's 8th largest arms supplier in the 2020–2024 period, surpassing several long-established European suppliers. This shift reflects the deepening Indonesia–Türkiye defense cooperation. In other words, while Indonesia still maintains relationships with its mainstream partners, the data confirms that Ankara has successfully secured a visible and growing role in Indonesia's procurement ecosystem.

Indonesia's main arms suppliers – according to SIPRI Trend Indicator Value (TIV)¹

¹ The SIPRI Trend Indicator Value (TIV) is a standardized metric developed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to quantify the volume of international transfers of major conventional arms, focusing on the military capability and resource transfer rather than the financial or market value of the weapons involved.

Figure 1 Ranking of Indonesia's main arms suppliers / Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Finally, findings show that while international structure, i.e. the great power rivalry, pushes Indonesia to develop strategic autonomy, particularly in defense sector, domestic factors such as leader's perspective and Indonesia policy on defense industry drives policymakers to choose Türkiye as a partner due to two major factors. First, Türkiye offers NATO-standard quality defense mechanisms without the heavy political strings which paved the way for diversification in Indonesia defense policy and avoid overreliance on mainstream defense producers. Second, while Türkiye stands as an alternative partner for arms procurement, it also emerged as a capacity-building partner which willing for technology transfer and joint production along the cooperation. This aligns with the policy of Indonesia's defense industry that want to foster local defense production capabilities.

CONCLUSION

This study has explored the complex interplay between Indonesia's defense posture and its survival strategies amidst great power rivalry. As demonstrated, the cooperation on Türkiye was not merely a reaction to security threats, but a calculated move to establish strategic autonomy. Theoretically, this contributes to the Middle Power debate by showing that while external pressure creates a tendency for a country to react, however, it is calculated decision-making process by domestic and internal actors that tells in what particular ways the country

would react. It also set out to analyze how inter-middle power cooperation helps middle power to navigate security challenges and avoid overreliance on major powers.

Therefore, this study set out to analyze on how Indonesia's strategies for strategic autonomy against great power rivalry aligns with what Türkiye could offers to Indonesia in the defense sector. This study argues that Türkiye played two roles in advancing Indonesia's strategic autonomy. First, it presents as the alternative power that could offers a reliable quality of defense materials without heavy political strings, therefore it allows Indonesia to diversify its strategic partners in defense sector. Second, Türkiye are more open for collaboration based on capacity-building in terms of joint production and technology transfers, hence it aligns with Indonesia's strategic interest in developing the capability of locally produced armaments. It also highlights why Türkiye has risen significantly among Indonesia's arms suppliers surpassing several long-established European suppliers.

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