Journal of Social Political Sciences
JSPS
Vol. 7, No. 4, November 2026

REASSESSING INDONESIA'S BEBAS-AKTIF DOCTRINE: CRITICAL ANALYSIS TO INDONESIA'S DUAL COMMITMENT IN BRICS AND OECD

Siti Mawaddah Palamani[1]
[1] Department of International Relation, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Riau

Corresponding Author Email: siti.mawaddah@lecturer.unri.ac.id

Submission	:	April 28, 2026
Revision	:	July 28, 2026
Publication	:	November 30, 2026

Abstract: This study critically evaluates Indonesia's foreign political-economic strategy under President Prabowo Subianto, specifically its simultaneous pursuit of membership in both BRICS and the OECD. Framed as a modern realisation of the "Free and Active" (Bebas-Aktif) foreign policy and "strategic hedging", dual accession is examined through Social Identity Status-Seeking Theory and Robert Putnam's Two-Level Games. The paper analyses the structural friction between Level I international prestige ambitions and Level II domestic fiscal and regulatory constraints. The findings indicate that simultaneous engagement generates severe institutional overload, a sovereignty-compliance paradox, and a clear misalignment with domestic economic realities, where strict fiscal efficiency is required to fund high-cost priority social programmes amidst public demands for price stability and job creation. The study argues that dual accession represents an overextended status-seeking tactic rather than genuine strategic hedging. Ultimately, the paper concludes that if Indonesia needs to choose a new global body, BRICS offers a significantly more viable option than the OECD, providing flexible liquidity via the New Development Bank without demanding rigid neoliberal legal overhauls that threaten domestic industrial sovereignty.

Keywords: Bebas-Aktif, BRICS, OECD accession, Two-Level Games, Status-seeking theory

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's Free and Active (Bebas-Aktif) foreign policy has anchored the country's diplomacy since independence. "Free" means Indonesia answers to no power bloc or ideological camp; it makes its own choices, free of outside pressure (Iswardhana, 2025). "Active" means Indonesia does not sit on the sidelines: it works to settle international disputes and push for a fairer, more peaceful global order (Ribawati & Setiawan, 2025). The doctrine traces back to the 1945 Constitution's Preamble, which commits Indonesia to a global order built on independence, lasting peace, and social justice (Iswardhana, 2025). Sutan Sjahrir first articulated the idea in 1947 at the Inter-Asia Relations Conference, when he refused to let Indonesia be forced into either the Anglo-Saxon or Soviet camp (Ribawati & Setiawan, 2025). Mohammad Hatta gave it its lasting image in 1948, in a speech titled "Mendajung Antara Dua Karang" (Rowing Between Two Reefs) that Indonesia had to chart its own course between the reefs of the US and the USSR (Syahdami, 2023).

Indonesia's role at the 1955 Asian-African Conference and its founding membership in the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 cemented that stance (Ribawati & Setiawan, 2025). At its core, the Free and Active policy tries to do two things at once: protect Indonesia's national interests and contribute to international stability, without ever becoming a proxy for a superpower (Iswardhana, 2025). Indonesia keeps applying the principle in practice, adapting it rather than treating it as fixed doctrine (Ribawati & Setiawan, 2025). During the Russia-Ukraine war, for instance, Indonesia stayed neutral: it refused to sanction Russia but still backed UN resolutions defending Ukrainian sovereignty. President Jokowi flew shuttle diplomacy between Moscow and Kyiv in 2022 to keep communication open and address the global wheat shortage the war had triggered (Husein & Sudiarto, 2024).

Indonesia treats both superpowers as equal partners under its "a thousand friends, one enemy is too many" philosophy (Wiranto, 2025): it builds the high-speed rail with China while cooperating with the US on defence and security, staying out of their rivalry rather than picking a side (Alexandra et al., 2025). It applies the same logic to its own military, buying F-15EX jets from the US and Rafale fighters from France and exploring defence ties with South Korea, so no single supplier can hold its armed forces hostage. And it takes the same stance in regional diplomacy, pushing for an end to violence and inclusive dialogue in Myanmar through the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, without crossing into the kind of interference non-alignment forbids.

Guided by "free and active" principles, Indonesia's diplomacy today is largely a strategic response, one that tries to align national interest with a shifting regional and global environment (Syahdami, 2023). National interest still sets the agenda, and in the current period that means several things at once. Economically, diplomacy chases funding for strategic projects, courts infrastructure investment, and backs President Prabowo's 8% growth target (Syamsudin, 2025). Strategically, it means guarding decision-making autonomy and sovereignty, so Indonesia never functions as anyone else's proxy (Alexandra et al., 2025).

US-China rivalry now defines the global landscape, and it pushes Indonesia toward a hedging, multi-alignment strategy to limit its economic and political exposure (Maulana & Azis, 2025). Under bebas-aktif, Indonesia treats the major powers as equals and refuses binary alignment with either bloc (Shofa, 2025). The doctrine keeps getting reinterpreted this way: as a form of strategic autonomy flexible enough to navigate a more complex multipolar order while still serving Indonesians at home.

By simultaneously interacting with various international platforms, free and active policy is employed in the modern period to optimise economic gain and investment (Wiranto, 2025). This is exemplified by President Prabowo Subianto's efforts to join both the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) economic alliance, which represents the developing Global South economy, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which represents developed-country norms and practices (Syamsudin, 2025). In

order to follow developed-country governance standards, boost investment credibility, and promote bureaucratic change, the Indonesian government is concurrently pursuing OECD membership (Alexandra et al., 2025). In the meantime, Indonesia joined BRICS in order to seek alternative finance through the New Development Bank (NDB) and to bolster the voice of the Global South (Sumner et al., 2025).

Indonesia became BRICS's 10th member in January 2025, gaining NDB access immediately (Isaac, 2025). Eleven emerging economies now sit in the bloc, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Ethiopia, Iran, and Indonesia, united around shared development goals in the Global South. BRICS Plus runs without a charter, a treaty, a budget, or a permanent secretariat, yet it still holds these countries together on one platform (Hussain, 2025), and membership carries real financial weight through both the NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).

BRICS membership boosts Indonesia's diplomatic standing and cements its role as a bridge between developed and developing nations (Wiranto, 2025). It also opens export markets outside the traditional West for commodities like coal and crude palm oil (Sari & Ningsih, 2025), giving Indonesia a foothold in economies that hold 42% of the world's population and a sizable share of global GDP (Hussain, 2025). Foreign Minister Sugiono made the same case to CNBC Indonesia:

“Bergabungnya Indonesia ke BRICS merupakan pengejawantahan politik luar negeri bebas aktif. Bukan berarti kita ikut kubu tertentu, melainkan kita berpartisipasi aktif di semua forum. Kita juga melihat prioritas BRICS selaras dengan program kerja Kabinet Merah Putih, antara lain terkait ketahanan pangan dan energi, pemberantasan kemiskinan ataupun pemajuan sumber daya manusia”

“Indonesia's accession to BRICS embodies its "independent and active" foreign policy. This does not mean aligning with a specific bloc; rather, it signifies active participation across all forums. Furthermore, we view BRICS' priorities as aligning with the Red and White Cabinet’s work programmes, particularly regarding food and energy security, poverty eradication, and human resource development.” (Revo, 2025).

Indonesia seeks to access new funding sources for national strategic projects, such as infrastructure development and the transition to green energy, by joining the NDB. Indonesia's participation in BRICS is also motivated by the de-dollarisation issue, which aims to lessen dependency on the US dollar through local currency transaction initiatives (Sari & Ningsih, 2025).

The OECD, by contrast, is a club of wealthy countries, sometimes nicknamed the “rich countries' club,” built around evidence-based global norms for governance, environmental policy, and economic policy (Maulana & Azis, 2025). Indonesia treats the OECD framework as a roadmap to becoming a developed country by 2045 (Maulana & Azis, 2025), which means aligning national policy with international norms across 23 sectors, a move expected to

sharpen economic efficiency and lend legitimacy to national governance. Membership would also open access to OECD research, policy analysis, and technology transfer from wealthy members, and it would signal to investors that Indonesia runs a transparent, stable economy (Maulana & Azis, 2025).

The government's logic as the BRICS will help to secure Indonesia's economic interests in the Global South's fast-growing markets, while the OECD strengthens Indonesia's own economic institutions against Western norms (Syamsudin, 2025). Sari and Ningsih (2025) read this combination as a concrete expression of "independent and active" foreign policy carried out through multi-alignment or hedging, a way for Indonesia to protect its strategic autonomy without getting pulled into great-power rivalry. The bet is that engaging both economic poles at once maximises the gains from economic diplomacy while keeping political sovereignty intact (Maulana & Azis, 2025).

But that logic deserves scrutiny; how these two organisations actually operate, and what Indonesia stands to gain from each, matters more than the label attached to the strategy. Bebas-Aktif was never meant to justify joining every institution available. It is a normative doctrine: it asks Indonesia to weigh its options and pick the commitments that best serve national interest given the conditions at hand, domestic and international alike.

Although Indonesia's decision to join these organisations is motivated by particular goals and interests, the country does not necessarily stand to gain from this action, especially when it comes to the strain on fiscal and monetary budgets, the ideological conflicts between the two organisations, and the course of Indonesia's diplomacy. Joining different international organisations is becoming more expensive. According to Isaac (2025), in Indonesia Business Post.com, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Airlangga Hartarto has confirmed the Indonesian government's plan to provide US$1 billion (IDR 16.66 trillion) as an initial capital injection to support the financial arm of BRICS, the New Development Bank (NDB). He stated that

“As Indonesia joins BRICS, we are also joining the New Development Bank, and the government has agreed to provide US$1 billion for investment in the New Development Bank,” Airlangga said during the National Leadership Meeting of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) at The Park Hyatt Hotel in Jakarta on Monday, December 1, 2025 (Isaac, 2025).

OECD dues are only part of the bill. Indonesia also has to overhaul its economic policy, aligning with OECD frameworks across 23 areas through a 13-stage process that will take years (Maulana & Azis, 2025). The OECD wants due diligence requirements and Responsible Business Conduct principles written into national law, and it wants Indonesia to reconsider its Local Content Requirements (TKDN), a policy that raises costs for export-oriented sectors and works as a trade barrier (Shandy et al., 2025). The US and the EU, both key OECD members, have already objected to Indonesia's downstreaming strategy, and Indonesia has

already lost a WTO tribunal case over it (Alexandra et al., 2025). Existing scholarship explains Indonesia's dual engagement well enough as hedging,

status seeking, or middle-power diplomacy. What it has not done is ask whether joining both institutions at once still fits the normative logic of Bebas-Aktif once domestic political and economic constraints enter the picture.

Joining both blocs raises credibility problems of its own. Critics worry Indonesia could end up a directionless "neutral mediator," squeezed between the Western bloc and the China-Russia axis (Wiranto, 2025), and that its diplomacy runs ad hoc and reactive rather than off a long-term plan (Alexandra et al., 2025). The OECD's "like-mindedness" norm adds another constraint: it raises real questions about how much domestic policy space Indonesia keeps, particularly for measures like industrial downstreaming that developed OECD members already criticise (Maulana & Azis, 2025).

Inside BRICS, Indonesia uses the forum to call for an end to "trade discrimination" and to defend poorer countries' right to manage their own natural resources (Alexandra et al., 2025), a stance the EU and other OECD partners actively oppose through WTO litigation

as a violation of free trade principles (Alexandra et al., 2025). And despite BRICS's framing as South-South cooperation, China alone generates two-thirds of the bloc's total GDP, which leaves Indonesia exposed to China's own economic volatility (Syamsudin, 2025). Market openness within BRICS also means Indonesia should expect a surge of cheap imports, especially from China (Maulana & Azis, 2025), and Washington and its allies could read BRICS membership itself as backing a bloc that challenges the Western-led order (Syamsudin, 2025).

Financing Indonesia's international ambitions runs straight into internal political constraints: tight budgets, competing spending priorities, and a public focused on problems closer to home. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw its 2025 budget ceiling of IDR 9.8 trillion cut by IDR 2 trillion (Janati & Setuningsih, 2025). Of what remains, 74.69% (Rp 7,391,371,446,000) covers basic obligations: personnel costs, staff relocation, and rent for representative offices, official residences, and ambassadors' and consuls general's quarters, plus the security of Indonesian nationals abroad, passport and visa document printing, and Indonesia's dues to international organisations. Only 25.31% (Rp 2,505,217,045) is left for the Ministry's core functions (Janati & Setuningsih, 2025).

Critics also question how efficiently that money gets used: Indonesia spends heavily on high-profile gatherings like G20 or ASEAN presidencies while embassy operating budgets in regions such as Africa and Latin America stay squeezed or face further cuts. Membership in more than 170 international organisations, many argue, has never been evaluated for what it actually delivers or multiplies back for the national interest (Alexandra et al., 2025).

Set against BRICS, OECD entry demands far stricter constitutional and policy adjustment. Beyond the membership fee, it requires updating the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Consumer Protection Law and stripping out protectionist investment rules, including the IDR 10 billion

minimum capital requirement for foreign investors, a process that will take years (Shandy et al., 2025). Changes at that scale carry a real risk: Indonesia could lose economic autonomy once it locks itself into OECD membership.

BRICS fits Indonesia's short-term economic goals more comfortably. It runs "informally formal," with no legal changes or market liberalisation required as a condition of membership (Shandy et al., 2025). Indonesia plans to draw on New Development Bank funding for 77 national strategic projects between 2025 and 2029, among them 3 million new homes, the green energy transition, and the Makan Bergizi Gratis free-meals programme (Shandy et al., 2025). Prabowo's 8% growth target leans heavily on diversifying exports of coal, crude palm oil, and rubber to BRICS members, while local-currency trade initiatives inside the bloc strengthen monetary sovereignty and cut exposure to dollar swings (Shandy et al., 2025).

Given these budget constraints, pursuing BRICS and OECD membership at the same time, in the name of "free and active" foreign policy, looks out of step with Indonesia's domestic economic capacity and national interest. Foreign policy is an extension of domestic objectives, and this study takes that premise as its starting point to ask how bebas-aktif ought to operate in practice. Indonesia's simultaneous pursuit of both organisations exposes a strategic paradox, a genuine financial burden, and an ideological conflict that goes to the heart of what the doctrine is supposed to mean.

Some scholars frame this dual membership as "existential diplomacy," a bid to assert Indonesia's position in a multipolar world (Iswardhana, 2025), even as Iswardhana himself argues it is not "fully grounded in genuine domestic needs." Fadillah and Komarudin (2026) go further, reading Prabowo's foreign policy as a deliberate status-seeking tactic meant to position Indonesia as a "sought-after middle power" courted by both Western and Eastern blocs.

The purpose of this research is to evaluate Indonesia's foreign political-economic strategies. The study specifically looks at the nation's “free and active” policy using a qualitative descriptive analysis and a case study of Indonesia joining two ideologically opposing organisations. According to Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko (2010) and Wohlforth et al. (2018), the “status-seeking” theory in international relations is used to assess if this is a type of “hedging” or merely a quest for status on the international scene. Indonesia runs the risk of experiencing policy fragmentation if the “free and active” principle is understood to mean nothing more than the freedom to join any group.

The structural conflict between Level I (international negotiation/diplomacy) and Level II (domestic politics and budgetary restrictions) will also be examined using Robert Putnam's (1988) “Two-Level Games” theory. At Level I, the government spends money on expensive diplomatic initiatives, such funding the OECD membership process and investing in the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), while at Level II, the domestic economy is experiencing

financial difficulties. Aligning the “win-set” or the area of potential consensus across these two levels is necessary for a viable foreign strategy. Additionally, a critical examination of government declarations and extant literature that describe Indonesia's concurrent pursuit of BRICS and OECD membership as a practical implementation of the foreign policy principle and a method of strategic hedging will be undertaken.

This article treats "free and active" as more than a mandate to align with every bloc. It signifies the flexibility to choose whichever option serves Indonesia's interests best, especially in the international political economy. The central question, then, is whether joining OECD and BRICS at the same time is really the best course, or whether joining one, or neither, would serve Indonesia better.

Under Indonesia's current domestic economic constraints and development priorities, this paper argues, BRICS serves that purpose more effectively than OECD accession, and more effectively than pursuing both at once. Indonesia should build alliances that advance its national interests and political-economic sovereignty by putting its independent and active principle to work, rather than chase the ambiguous label of a "developed economy."

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework

This study employs the Status Seeking Theory to explain why Indonesia pursues simultaneous memberships despite structural frictions. The theory is used to determine whether this dual engagement constitutes a calculated "hedging strategy" or an unrestrained pursuit of prestige that results in policy fragmentation and "symbolic diplomacy" devoid of tangible domestic multiplier effects.

Apart from that, this research also uses the Two Level Games Theory from Robert Putnam which explains the overlap between what is internationally negotiated (Level I) and what is domestically viable and beneficial (Level II). If Level I commitments exceed Level II fiscal capacity or compromise key domestic development programmes, the win-set shrinks, revealing a strategic paradox (Putnam, 2017).

This theoretical framework evaluates whether simultaneous dual-accession (BRICS and OECD) represents a genuine fulfillment of Free-Active or a distorted, fragmented interpretation that treats neutrality as joining every available international coalition. The following is an explanation of these two theories, and how the theories are relevant to this research.

Status Seeking Theory

Status-seeking theory grows out of Social Identity Theory (SIT): states, it argues, chase wealth and security, but they also want positive distinctiveness and international recognition (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). Diplomacy, in this framework, becomes a tool for managing a

state's identity and rank within the international hierarchy. Psychologists Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner developed SIT originally; in International Relations, Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko (2010) adapted it to explain how rising powers like China and Russia respond to US primacy.

Wohlforth et al. (2018) extended the field further, treating status-seeking as a rational choice tied to prestige and great-power war, and examining how small and middle powers seek status through "good state" diplomacy. Paul David Beaumont (2025) added a framework for the "grammar of status competition," focused on how status gets theorised within

domestic politics. The theory reads a country's diplomacy as a strategic bid for positive distinctiveness, aimed at admission into "elite clubs" that confer social esteem and material privileges (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). Countries use diplomacy to shape how the international community ranks them, not just to chase wealth or security (Beaumont, 2025). According to this theory, the status seeker states would follow one of these strategies to enhance their standing:

Social Mobility: When elite club boundaries are permeable, a state emulates the values and institutions of the dominant group to gain admission. For example, Central European states adopted liberal reforms to join NATO and the EU (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010).

Social Competition: If clubs are closed, a state may try to equal or surpass the dominant power in areas like military technology, arms racing, or regional influence to force recognition of their status (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010).

Social Creativity: A state seeks prestige in a new domain where it can excel. This involves reframing a negative trait as a positive or achieving preeminence in an alternative area, such as becoming a "moral superpower" in peace mediation or humanitarian aid (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010).

Acquisition of Status Symbols: States invest in "Veblen goods" items like aircraft carriers, nuclear weapons, or hosting the Olympics that signal their arrival as a first-class nation, often regardless of the item's practical military or economic utility (Duque, 2018).

A country that cannot, or does not want to, compete on military or economic terms can turn to social creativity instead, building preeminence in a different domain. Smaller and middle powers often chase status this way, becoming "moral superpowers" in global governance, humanitarian aid, or peace mediation (Wohlforth et al., 2018), or reframing their identity to lead an alternative group entirely. Indonesia's full BRICS membership fits this pattern: an effort to lead the Global South and champion a more multipolar, inclusive world order, gaining status outside Western-dominated frameworks (Pambagyo & Herningtyas, 2025).

Status-seeking is not mere vanity. It pays real material and psychological dividends. High status opens the door to elite institutions with funding access, the New Development Bank for

BRICS members, for example, plus trade benefits and technology transfers (Duque, 2018). Higher-status states "punch above their weight," gaining a louder voice in global rule-making and more influence over international standards (Lee et al., 2025).

International recognition also validates the government's narrative at home, generating national pride and political support. For a middle power, joining multiple groups at once, the OECD and BRICS together, functions as an institutional hedge, so no single great power holds absolute leverage over it (Lee et al., 2025). And recognition as a "good state" or a useful ally lets a smaller power secure a place in the order where a hegemon protects its interests (Wohlforth et al., 2018).

The rewards can run high, but so can the costs, material, geopolitical, and domestic. Status usually demands investment in symbols or elite memberships that function as "pure Veblen goods": aircraft carriers, global mega-events, high opportunity cost, little material payoff (Wohlforth, 2025). Chasing status in one club risks alienating other powerful actors, and it can backfire domestically too, when expensive prestige projects fail to deliver the benefits promised to citizens (Wohlforth, 2025).

Social mobility, joining elite Western clubs like the OECD, usually means adhering to stringent international standards that limit a state's policy autonomy (Heriyana & Agustina, 2025), creating what Zaelani et al. (2025) call a sovereignty-compliance paradox: trading domestic control for international recognition.

Applied to Indonesia, status-seeking theory offers a clear explanation for why the Prabowo administration pursues OECD accession and BRICS membership at the same time. Framing diplomacy as identity management and recognition-seeking, not just material gain (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010), clarifies why Indonesia seeks entry into two opposing elite clubs. OECD membership is a social mobility play: Indonesia adopts developed Western nations' liberal economic norms and regulatory frameworks to earn the prestige of a recognised "developed economy" (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; Maulana & Azis, 2025). BRICS membership works as social creativity instead, letting Indonesia reframe its non-aligned identity into Global South leadership and a champion of multipolarity (Pambagyo & Herningtyas, 2025).

More importantly, the theory gives this study a way to evaluate the friction between Indonesia's international status ambitions and its domestic political-economic reality. High status in elite bodies promises material dividends and diplomatic clout (Lee et al., 2025), but the theory is equally clear that chasing it often costs heavily: material costs, geopolitical strain, domestic backlash (Wohlforth, 2025). In Indonesia's case, that plays out as a sovereignty-compliance paradox (Zaelani et al., 2025): the OECD's social-mobility path charges high fees and demands rigid

overhauls, revising anti-monopoly laws, scaling back local content requirements (Shandy et al., 2025), that constrain domestic policy autonomy and collide with national industrial goals like downstreaming.

Status-seeking theory, then, gives this research the tool to test whether Indonesia's dual accession is a calibrated, value-adding hedge or an overextended chase for symbolic "Veblen goods" (Duque, 2018) that strains domestic fiscal capacity and fragments the long-standing Bebas-Aktif policy.

Two-Level Games Theory

Robert D. Putnam introduced Two-Level Game Theory in 1988 as a framework that treats international negotiation as a simultaneous process running at both the domestic and international levels (Éva, 2020). It rejects the "unitary actor" assumption common in realist theory: national leaders, or the Chief of Government (COG), have to navigate two separate but interdependent game boards to reach a workable agreement (Putnam, 2017).

The theory splits negotiation into two stages. Level I, international, is where negotiators from two or more nations bargain toward a tentative agreement, each one trying to satisfy domestic pressures while limiting the damage from foreign developments (Putnam, 2017). Level II, domestic, is where each state separately decides whether to ratify that Level I agreement. Ratification here does not necessarily mean a formal parliamentary vote; it covers whatever process endorses or implements the agreement, whether that runs through bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, or public opinion (Putnam, 2017).

The win-set sits at the centre of the theory: the range of possible Level I agreements that would actually get ratified by Level II domestic constituents (Noone, 2019). An international deal succeeds only when the negotiating parties' win-sets overlap; without overlap, no agreement is possible (Putnam, 2017). Win-set size cuts both ways. A larger win-set makes agreement more likely, since there is more room for overlap. A smaller one can actually strengthen a negotiator's hand: claiming domestic constraints tie your hands forces the other party into more concessions (Putnam, 2017).

The theory also highlights the mechanics diplomats actually use. The Chief of Government, a President, King, Sultan, whoever holds the role, is the only formal link between the two levels, balancing personal policy preferences and political survival against the need for a deal that will actually ratify at home (Putnam, 2017). Negotiators can also use an international deal to unlock domestic policy options that were previously out of reach, linking an unpopular reform to a desired international

benefit and reshaping the domestic coalition and win-set in the process. International pressure can echo back into domestic politics this way, shifting public opinion or empowering a domestic minority, and expanding the win-set enough to make a deal possible (Putnam, 2017).

In international political economy specifically, the COG tries to maximise domestic economic gains, GDP growth, job creation, while limiting the damage from foreign developments like trade deficits or sanctions (Putnam, 2017). An international deal can create leverage at home:

a leader might use an agreement that speeds export growth to deliver more jobs, effectively buying the support of a domestic majority that initially opposed another part of the same deal (Putnam, 2017).

Applied to Indonesia's accession to both BRICS and OECD, this framework connects Level I decisions directly to Level II conditions. Level I covers diplomatic negotiations, status projection, and commitments: the $1 billion pledge to the NDB, the €13.62 million OECD accession fee, alignment with 23 OECD sectoral standards, and so on. Level II covers the internal political-economic constraints that have to absorb those commitments: fiscal reality, public spending priorities, and legal reform requirements like MoFA's reduced budget ceiling, updated anti-monopoly laws, local content requirements, and TKDN adjustments.

For Indonesia's simultaneous BRICS and OECD pursuit under President Prabowo Subianto, Putnam's theory functions as a precise diagnostic: it measures how well diplomatic ambition actually lines up with internal capability. Mapping Level I financial obligations against Level II budgetary limits reveals an over-extended international strategy straining domestic diplomatic infrastructure.

Pursuing both organisations at once fragments Indonesia's domestic win-set severely, this analysis shows, forcing policymakers into that same sovereignty-compliance paradox. Weighing these competing pressures supports the study's core thesis: given current domestic economic constraints and development priorities, BRICS offers a broader, fiscally aligned domestic win-set that preserves strategic autonomy, while OECD accession demands excessive Level II concessions for Level I status gains that remain far from certain.

METHOD

This study employs a qualitative research design utilising a single-case study approach with embedded units of analysis to critically evaluate Indonesia’s foreign political-economic strategy under the administration of President Prabowo Subianto. Qualitative methodology is particularly suited for this inquiry as it facilitates an in-depth, context-rich examination of complex decision-making processes, institutional interactions, and normative doctrines within international relations (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

The primary unit of analysis is Indonesia’s dual foreign-economic trajectory under the guiding doctrine of "Free and Active" (Bebas-Aktif) foreign policy. To capture the multi-dimensional nature of this policy, the study incorporates two embedded units of analysis (Yin, 2018):

The BRICS Track: Encompassing Indonesia’s formal admission as the 10th member of BRICS, its financial commitment to the New Development Bank (NDB), participation in Local Currency Transaction (LCT) initiatives, and alignment with Global South development objectives.

The OECD Accession Track: Encompassing Indonesia's formal accession bid, subscription fee structures, and the required regulatory alignment across 23 policy sectors to match Western-led governance standards.

By examining these two embedded tracks through the theoretical lenses of Robert Putnam's (1988) Two-Level Games and Status-Seeking Theory (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010), the research design provides a robust analytical structure to evaluate whether simultaneous dual membership constitutes a viable hedging strategy or an overextended pursuit of international prestige that contradicts domestic political-economic realities.

Because this research examines contemporary foreign political economy decisions, data collection relies on qualitative document analysis and desk-based research across four primary document types such as official state, policy documents, statutory and regulatory framework, official speeches and ministerial statements. This study also uses news media and previous literature to support the argument in the result and discussion.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Level I: Indonesia's Foreign Policy in Dual Commitments of BRICS and OECD

Under President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia runs a dual-track foreign policy: joining BRICS and the OECD at the same time, as an expression of "free and active" strategy. Indonesia has held OECD "Key Partner" status since 2007, and on February 20, 2024, the OECD Council formally agreed to open accession discussions (Maulana & Azis, 2025). President Joko Widodo began the push; Prabowo has continued it (Wiranto, 2025), after the OECD Council, representing existing members, extended the official invitation to start the process (Shandy et al., 2025).

A formal roadmap adopted on March 29, 2024, lays out the mandatory steps toward OECD standards: technical reviews from 26 substantive committees and alignment with roughly 260 legal instruments. That means structural reform across 23 to 26 specific fields, covering investment and open trade, inclusive growth, governance, and anti-corruption (Shandy et al., 2025). Key actions include tightening export credit and anti-bribery laws and updating the Consumer Protection Law (Law No. 8/1999) to cover e-commerce and protect minors (Shandy et al., 2025). To attract international SMEs, Indonesia also has to simplify its overlapping regulations, lower barriers to foreign direct investment, and revisit the IDR 10 billion minimum capital requirement for foreign businesses (Shandy et al., 2025).

The OECD also recommends Indonesia revise its Anti-Monopoly Law (UU No. 5/1999) to guarantee equal treatment between private firms and SOEs in market control, phasing out its SOE-centric market strategy (Shandy et al., 2025), and requires it to liberalise logistics, air travel, and maritime transport, and review cabotage laws, to open up fairer competition in

international shipping (Shandy et al., 2025). Specific reviews will also cover infrastructure, digitalisation, and transportation. On environment and sustainability, committees will evaluate policy on biodiversity, climate, and the renewable energy transition (Shandy et al., 2025), and on the sector side, they will review agriculture, manufacturing, and extractive industries, including coal, gas, and metal ore mining (Shandy et al., 2025).

The review process runs in stages: Indonesia submits an Initial Memorandum summarising its compliance with OECD law; technical committees then evaluate Indonesian policy against global best practice; the Secretariat-General assesses Indonesia's capacity to implement the legal instruments; the substantive committees submit their opinions to the OECD Council; and the Council makes a final, unanimous decision on whether to invite the candidate as a full member. Indonesia is targeting full membership by 2027 (Shandy et al., 2025).

Meanwhile, the BRICS runs differently. BRICS works on a "formally informal" platform with no charter, no permanent secretariat, and no binding legal treaty. BRICS leaders endorsed Indonesia's candidacy at the Johannesburg Summit in August 2023 (Hussain, 2025). Prabowo made the strategic decision to pursue full membership, Foreign Minister Sugiono represented Indonesia at the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan to finalise entry, and after the government formally notified the forum, Indonesia became a full member on January 6, 2025, during Brazil's presidency of the bloc (Hussain, 2025). Accession here runs on political consensus among existing members, not a standardised legal process.

Membership carries no requirement to rewrite national law the way OECD accession does. The deal here centres on Global South solidarity, de-dollarisation through local-currency trade, and access to alternative financing (Sari & Ningsih, 2025). Indonesia's entry into the New Development Bank, BRICS's financial arm, confirmed by Prabowo on March 25, 2025, is the critical piece of that deal (Lissovolik, 2025), and through the NDB, Indonesia expects to fund 77 national strategic projects (Syamsudin, 2025).

Pursuing both memberships at once represents an effort to balance domestic development needs against global political influence, what much of the literature and government rhetoric alike calls "strategic hedging" (Maulana & Azis, 2025). In that framing, the OECD serves as a blueprint for internal structural reform, and BRICS as an engine for external market expansion and alternative financing.

The government treats OECD accession as a catalyst for institutional reform and a signal of international credibility. Aligning with roughly 260 legal instruments across 26 substantive committees effectively forces improvements in anti-corruption, tax, labour, and environmental standards (Shandy et al., 2025). But the real challenge sits in implementation, in the audits and evaluations that follow, since the strict rules Indonesia has to follow do not always match what the government can actually deliver domestically.

By the Indonesian OECD accession team's own projections, membership would attract USD 87.7 billion in FDI inflows by 2028 and lift medium-term GDP growth 0.92 percentage points above baseline (Shandy et al., 2025). The team also expects higher real wages from increased labour demand and better education outcomes through alignment with the OECD's PISA programme and other global benchmarks (Shandy et al., 2025).

Every benefit comes with a cost, and OECD membership is no exception. The Finance Ministry puts Indonesia's accession bid at €13.62 million, roughly Rp 245.26 billion at Rp 18,000 per euro, in membership fees alone (Yudi, 2025). That spreads across IDR 50.99 billion in 2024, IDR 105.26 billion in 2025, and IDR 89.01 billion in 2026 (Yudi, 2025), figures Masyita Crystallin, the Ministry's Director General of Financial Sector Stability and Development, disclosed to House Commission XI on July 14, 2025 (Yudi, 2025). The Fiscal Policy Agency originally held this budget; after a reorganisation, the Financial Sector Stability and Development directorate now oversees it, under an OECD accession team established by Presidential Decree No. 17 of 2024 and led by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs (Yudi, 2025).

Accession to OECD also requires Indonesia to "tunduk" (submit) to a neoliberal legal blueprint that can conflict with nationalist policies like nickel downstreaming, or hilirisasi (Maulana & Azis, 2025), on top of separate participation fees for specific programmes like PISA and the administrative cost of sweeping regulatory overhauls. Agriculture and manufacturing may even shrink at first, as capital and labour shift toward construction and utilities (Maulana & Azis, 2025).

Weighed against the OECD, BRICS offers a more flexible, pragmatic platform built around Global South solidarity and economic diversification (Sari & Ningsih, 2025). BRICS markets hold over 40% of the world's population and 42.2% of global GDP at PPP, a critical outlet for Indonesian coal, CPO, and rubber (Syamsudin, 2025), opening new Global South markets on better terms and access. The bloc's push for Local Currency Transactions helps the Rupiah too, stabilising it and cutting exposure to US monetary policy swings (Sari & Ningsih, 2025).

NDB membership also funds 77 national strategic projects, 47 carried over from the Jokowi administration and 30 new initiatives launched under Prabowo (Syamsudin, 2025), including the Makan Bergizi Gratis free meals programme and the 3 million homes programme (Lissovolik, 2025), plus infrastructure work on Ibu Kota Nusantara (IKN), Sekolah Rakyat, and Food Estate initiatives (Hanan, 2026), waste-to-energy plants, other large-scale renewable energy projects, and expansion of the palm oil production chain to add value to national commodities (Syamsudin, 2025).

None of this comes free, though. BRICS charges no annual membership fee, but joining the NDB requires substantial capital: Airlangga Hartarto has confirmed a US$1 billion (IDR 16.66 trillion) initial injection into the bank (Isaac, 2025). China's dominance inside the bloc poses

its own risk. It controls two-thirds of BRICS's total GDP, so Indonesia risks swapping Western dependence for systemic dependence on China's economy (Maulana & Azis, 2025). And unlike OECD members, BRICS members share no requirement of like-mindedness, which is exactly why conflicts surface between them, the China-India border dispute among them (Syamsudin, 2025).

Institutional overload is the bigger worry. Indonesia already belongs to more than 170 international organisations, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is absorbing significant budget cuts at the same time (Alexandra et al., 2025). Without a strong central coordinating body, critics argue, this dual pursuit risks becoming little more than a publicity stunt: a search for status with no domestic alignment behind it, burning through scarce fiscal resources.

Read through status-seeking theory, dual membership looks like a deliberate bid to maximise diplomatic capital, positioning Indonesia as an indispensable bridge between the Global North and Global South (Wiranto, 2025), a strategy of "existential diplomacy" meant to assert Indonesia's identity as a global middle power (Iswardhana, 2025). OECD accession works as a stamp of approval from developed nations, signaling to global markets that Indonesia has adopted real standards of transparency, anti-corruption, and governance, and boosting its status as a stable, rule-based economy (Shandy et al., 2025). BRICS membership revives a different role: Indonesia as a leader of the developing world, advocating for a multipolar order and reform of the global financial architecture (Hussain, 2025).

The dual-track strategy's primary risk is strategic disorientation, since the two blocs pull in conflicting directions (Alexandra et al., 2025). The OECD demands "competitive neutrality" for state-owned enterprises (BUMN) and the removal of trade barriers (Shandy et al., 2025), which clashes directly with nickel downstreaming, or hilirisasi, a core national interest that BRICS treats as legitimate "resource sovereignty" but that OECD members actively litigate at the WTO (Maulana & Azis, 2025).

Pursuing OECD membership, dominated by the US and the G7, while also courting BRICS creates the perception of "menunggang dua kuda" ("riding two horses"), and that perception can erode Indonesia's credibility in both camps (Alexandra et al., 2025). Critics point to a specific contradiction: entering a bloc that includes Russia and China, both viewed in the West as challengers to the rules-based order, could complicate Indonesia's own OECD technical review (Wiranto, 2025).

This surfaces a deeper tension where there is a "legitimacy gap" between elite status-seeking and actual domestic capacity. Both memberships risk becoming symbolic gestures rather than a strategy grounded in real capability, leaving Indonesia's moves reactive and ad hoc, "free" to join but unable to be effectively "active," the institutional overload problem again (Alexandra et al., 2025). That status stays fragile and cosmetic unless the government resolves the regulatory conflict between its own industrial goals and the OECD's neoliberal demands,

while still managing the fiscal burden of global ambition in an era that otherwise calls for domestic efficiency.

Level II: The Domestic Economic and Political Constraint to The Dual Commitment

Indonesia has maintained a stable economic growth rate of 5-6% over the last few decades, though it has struggled with negative total factor productivity growth (-0.66%) and stagnant foreign direct investment (FDI) since 2011 (Shandy et al., 2025). Under the leadership of President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia's economic and political landscape is characterised by a drive for high-growth targets tempered by strict domestic fiscal efficiency.

In the Prabowo era, the central economic demand was the ambitious target of 8% GDP growth (Hanan, 2026). Politically, there is heavy emphasis on resource sovereignty (hilirisasi), energy transition, and "de-dollarisation" to protect the Rupiah from global fluctuations. Public demands also focus heavily on poverty reduction, job creation, and controlling the price of basic commodities (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2025).

The Prabowo government era launched several Fastest Results Programmes, or Program Hasil Terbaik Cepat (PHTC) such as: (1) Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG) or Free Nutritious Meal, which is a programme providing free nutritious meals to students and pregnant/breastfeeding women, (2) Kopdes (Koperasi Desa) Merah Putih or Merah Putih Village Cooperative that aimed at revitalising village cooperatives to serve as a pillar of the "people's economy" and support food security, (3) construction of 3 million houses, (4) the establishment of Sekolah Rakyat or People's School, and (5) massive investments in dams for water and food security or Food Estate programme (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2025).

These programmes are costing a lot of money in Indonesia's fiscal condition. The MBG programme will serve at least 60 million beneficiaries with an operational cost of IDR 900 billion per day in 2026. The budget ceiling for the National Nutrition Agency or Badan Gizi Nasional (BGN) itself has been set at IDR 268 trillion, with a reserve fund of IDR 67 trillion. Consequently, the BGN's budget for 2026 stands at IDR 335 trillion (Rahmad, 2025). Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa also confirmed that funding of IDR 240 trillion for the Koperasi Desa (Kopdes) Merah Putih programme is already available. The funds will be utilised over a six-year period through a phased payment scheme by the government (Rizky & Arief, 2026).

The previous Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati stated that the government has allocated a budget of Rp 57.7 trillion to support the "3 Million Homes" programme. The funds would be used to construct 770,000 housing units in 2026. This figure represents a significant increase of Rp 17.43 trillion compared to this year's budget of Rp 40.27 trillion (Tempo.co, 2025).

The Directorate General of Strategic Infrastructure at the Ministry of Public Works is allocating the majority of its 2027 budget to the construction of Sekolah Rakyat. This

programme is one of the government's priorities for improving access to education. A total of IDR 26.301 trillion has been allocated for Phase 3 of the Sekolah Rakyat construction, covering the building of 100 units and a partial down payment for Phase 4 (Sandi, 2026). President Prabowo Subianto also allocated a budget of Rp53.3 trillion for food estates and food reserves in the 2026 Draft State Budget (RAPBN). Food self-sufficiency, particularly in rice and corn, is a primary focus of Prabowo's priority programmes. Prabowo during his speech presenting the 2026 State Budget Bill stated that

"Untuk lumbung pangan dan cadangan pangan Rp53,3 triliun kita siapkan, subsidi pupuk tahun 2026 kita alokasikan Rp46,9 triliun untuk 9,26 juta ton pupuk,"

“We are preparing IDR 53.3 trillion for food barns and food reserves, and for the 2026 fertilizer subsidy, we are allocating IDR 46.9 trillion for 9.26 million tons of fertilizer.” (Nurdifa, 2025).

Implementing these programmes has produced a complicated economic picture. MBG improved public perception overall, but it initially faced significant pushback because it weakened local governments' fiscal capacity (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2025); pulling resources away from other productive local sectors kept the broader multiplier effect low.

Public concern over the burden on the national budget (APBN) runs high, with critics arguing the money would serve education or targeted social assistance better (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2025). Operational failures compound the concern: reported food poisoning cases, "stale" (basi) menus, poor hygiene, plus a strong public perception that the programme is vulnerable to corruption, misses its targets, and wastes significant food (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2025).

Between the scale of these programmes and membership in over 170 international organisations, institutional overload has set in (Yakti, 2025). The government has redirected budgets from other sectors to fund these direct social interventions, and the public generally backs efficiency cuts to "wasteful" spending, official travel, stationery, that free up funds for social programmes. But critics see a risk in managing both memberships while cutting the diplomatic budget: status-seeking without the domestic alignment or resources to actually be "active" on the global stage (Alexandra et al., 2025).

Muhammad Saleh, a legal researcher at the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), puts the cost of Prabowo's overseas visits at a staggering Rp 1.1 trillion over 1.5 years, based on CELIOS data covering at least 56 international trips at an average Rp 22.5 billion each: Rp 5-10 billion for Asia, Rp 10-20 billion for the Middle East, Rp 25 billion for Europe, Rp 30 billion for the Americas. Saleh disputes the government's claim that these trips drive foreign investment, pointing out that foreign sources make up only 49% of the projected Rp 2,000 trillion in 2025 investment (Bella, 2026). Saleh stated that

“Kalau kita lihat angka belakangan ini, realisasi investasi asing di Indonesia itu kan justru tidak jauh lebih baik. Misalkan Teddy (Sekretaris Kabinet Merah Putih) klaim bahwa ada 2.000 triliun investasi di tahun 2025 itu kan angka gabungan dari penanaman modal asing

dan penanaman modal dalam negeri. Dan kontribusi asing atau penanaman modal asing itu kan cuman 49% dari keseluruhan itu. Artinya proporsinya itu tidak begitu besar,"

"If we look at recent figures, the realisation of foreign investment in Indonesia hasn't actually been much better. For instance, when Teddy (the Cabinet Secretary of the Red and White Cabinet) claims there will be IDR 2,000 trillion in investment in 2025, that figure is a combination of foreign and domestic investment. Yet, foreign investment accounts for only 49% of the total; meaning, its proportion isn't particularly large." (Bella, 2026).

A separate CELIOS report finds 84% of the public views current taxes and levies as overly burdensome with no direct benefit in return, and half of respondents rate employment policy as poor or very poor, a sentiment driven by layoff waves in manufacturing and the digital sector (Askar et al., 2025).

The ongoing Iran-US conflict adds to the burden, straining oil and fuel supply. Indonesia still relies on fossil fuels for 67.5% of its electricity generation and much of its primary energy use, so these disruptions threaten the steady flow of imported petroleum (Shandy et al., 2025). Rising oil and energy prices trickle into daily life, driving inflation and higher costs for basic goods, depressing domestic demand, and weakening the purchasing power of households already struggling to get by. 22.4% of citizens now name controlling the price of basic commodities (sembako) among the government's top three most urgent problems (Askar et al., 2025).

Programme costs, budget allocation, economic demand, and fiscal burden together reveal a mismatch with what the domestic situation actually needs. The economic landscape under Prabowo shows a sharp contradiction: ambitious

international status-seeking set against a strained domestic reality of fiscal burden and programme mismanagement.

The Indonesian public's demands remain rooted in basic economic survival. Surveys put 76.8% of citizens naming corruption eradication (25.5%), commodity price control (22.3%), and job creation (15.6%) as the most urgent problems (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2025), against a backdrop of negative total factor productivity growth (-0.66%) between 2005 and 2019 (Shandy et al., 2025). A real legitimacy gap sits underneath all this: 53% of the public feels government programmes have no impact on their lives, and 84% feel the tax and levy burden is too heavy (Askar et al., 2025).

Applying Putnam's Two-Level Games theory surfaces the disconnect directly. At Level I, Prabowo and his cabinet are aggressively expanding Indonesia's international win-set, joining both BRICS and OECD as an expression of "free and active" policy and strategic hedging: using the OECD to force bureaucratic reform, and BRICS to secure NDB funding for 77 strategic projects that bypass Western fiscal constraints (Maulana & Azis, 2025). At Level

II, though, the domestic win-set stays far narrower, focused on the price of daily goods and job security (Askar et al., 2025).

Joining both at once fails to serve the public interest that way. A so-called “strategic hedging” act by joining BRICS and OECD at the same time prioritises international image and alternative debt over the structural efficiency and price stability Indonesians actually need. The Level I win-set runs too broad and too conflicting, producing an institutional overload the current domestic fiscal and bureaucratic framework simply cannot support.

Critical Analysis in Indonesia’s Dual Commitment in BRICS and OECD

Evaluating Indonesia’s simultaneous pursuit of BRICS and OECD membership against the economic landscape reveals a fundamental misalignment between elite international ambitions and domestic structural capacity. Indonesia’s economic reality has been defined by stagnant foreign direct investment (FDI), negative total factor productivity growth (-0.66%), and heightened domestic vulnerability to energy and food price volatility (Shandy et al., 2025).

While the administration pursues a Golden Vision 2045 and an 8% GDP growth target, the Indikator Politik Indonesia (2025) surveys show that 76.8% of citizens identify the most urgent problems as corruption (25.5%), controlling basic commodity prices (22.3%), and job creation (15.6%). Under President Prabowo Subianto, domestic political economy demands have crystallised around immediate,

large-scale interventions such as securing energy and food self-sufficiency, funding priority social programmes (such as Makan Bergizi Gratis at IDR 335 trillion and Koperasi Desa Merah Putih at IDR 240 trillion), and alleviating the tax and cost-of-living burdens (Askar et al., 2025; Rahmad, 2025).

In this context of strict budget efficiency, attempting to satisfy the dual commitments of BRICS and OECD creates a severe budgetary and administrative burden. While OECD accession requires €13.62 million (IDR 245.26 billion) in subscription and review fees alongside the massive operational costs of aligning 23 to 26 policy sectors across 260 legal instruments, BRICS requires an immediate US$1 billion (IDR 16.66 trillion) capital injection into the New Development Bank (NDB) (Isaac, 2025; Yudi, 2025). Demanding that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu), which faces an Rp 2 trillion budget reduction and domestic regulatory bodies manage both tracks concurrently, produces severe institutional overload (Alexandra et al., 2025). Below is the table of dual accession risk and gain in both OECD and BRICS.

Table 1. Comparison of Indonesia Dual Commitment in BRICS and OECD

Dimension	OECD	BRICS	Benefit / Risk
Fiscal and Capital Requirements	- €13.62M (IDR 245.26B) entry fees - Ongoing programme participation and audit expenditures	- $1B (IDR 16.66T) initial capital injection for NDB membership - Capital-intensive project co-funding	OECD has lower cost at first, but higher need for internal law adjustment. BRICS has higher cost in initial injection for NDB membership, but will gain access to the NDB funding.
Regulatory Adjustment	High: Overhaul around 260 instruments in 23 to 26 sector Liberalise logistics & transport Amend Anti-Monopoly & Consumer Protection Laws (UU 5/99, 8/99)	- No legal adjustment, charter, or binding regulatory subordination required	OECD has more work to improve the regulatory law, while BRICS is a more practical, and safer option for economic sovereignty.
Domestic Strategic Alignment	Has direct conflict with demand of SOE neutrality and opposes the industrial downstreaming policy (hilirisasi).	Aligned with the domestic demand, gain direct loan access for 77 National Strategic Projects	BRICS gains more benefit and alignment, OECD might clash with Indonesian domestic economic policy
Strategic and Legal Primary Risk	Has a sovereignty risk when Indonesia has to adjust and compromises industrial policy autonomy to meet the Western market standards.	Risk of being dominated by China's economic exposure and market capabilities.	Both have risks, but OECD's risk is more about sovereignty, and BRICS risk is about Indonesian capability to avoid economic domination.

Source: Processed by researcher, 2026

The international risks of simultaneous accession are not trivial, either. OECD membership, dominated by G7 nations, demands market liberalisation and competitive neutrality that directly challenge hilirisasi, a policy OECD members already litigate at the WTO (Maulana & Azis, 2025). Joining BRICS at the same time, a forum whose members actively challenge Western financial dominance, risks reading as geopolitical hedging that erodes credibility in both camps, and it exposes Indonesia to Western backlash: the US threat of 100% tariffs on BRICS products alone could devastate Indonesia's nickel exports. Rather than mitigating risk, this so-called strategic hedge compounds diplomatic and regulatory friction.

Joining both organisations does not meet Indonesia's immediate domestic demands: the public prioritises price stability and corruption eradication over global status. The strategy offers a path toward Golden Vision 2045, but a massive budgetary burden is already starving the diplomatic corps of the resources it needs, and internationally, Indonesia risks strategic disorientation, caught between Western regulatory demands and the geopolitical pull of a China-led BRICS.

This raises the question this research now turns to: what if Indonesia joined only one organisation, or neither? Choosing just one would simplify the regulatory and fiscal burden, though at the cost of half the development engine on offer. BRICS markets alone account for 42.2% of global GDP, and the bloc demands none of the painful structural reform or neoliberal legal alignment the OECD requires. It supports de-dollarisation too, which would help stabilise the Rupiah against shocks like the ongoing US-Iran conflict and oil price spikes (Maulana & Azis, 2025), making BRICS alone a pragmatic choice for the Indonesian economy.

Choosing the OECD alone would push bureaucratic reform hard enough to fix negative productivity growth and attract high-tech investment beyond commodities. But accession is expensive, and it demands submitting to rules that clash with nationalist policy, the same rules OECD members already litigate at the WTO, and it offers no quick-win funds for the 22.4% of citizens currently struggling with basic commodity prices.

Indonesia already belongs to more than 170 international bodies, including the ASEAN Economic Community, RCEP, and the G20. Extracting maximum value from those existing frameworks costs nothing in additional entry fees or capital injections, freeing fiscal resources instead for basic commodity price stability, job creation, and domestic energy shocks. Stepping back from both BRICS and the OECD would avoid the $1 billion NDB injection and the €13.62 million OECD fee outright, along with the regulatory friction both would create with hilirisasi and TKDN.

Opting out of both carries its own costs, though: real economic, institutional, and geopolitical benefits Indonesia would forgo. OECD membership signals to institutional investors that if a country runs transparent, predictable, rule-based governance, and CGE modelling projects it would attract USD 87.7 billion in FDI inflows by 2028. Without that stamp of approval, Indonesia risks the same stagnant FDI growth it has seen since 2011 (Shandy et al., 2025), struggling to attract the high-quality, long-term Western institutional capital that requires OECD-level compliance. The OECD's technical review across 26 policy sectors also serves as external pressure that forces domestic bureaucracies to streamline overlapping regulations, reduce corruption, and modernise tax and labour systems (Shandy et al., 2025), pressure that, absent, often lets structural reform stall on internal political friction.

BRICS represents the core coalition of the Global South and emerging market economies, and opting out limits Indonesia's access to alternative financing and non-Western diplomatic

alignment. Full membership opens direct credit lines from the NDB (Maulana & Azis, 2025); without it, Indonesia loses a co-financing mechanism for strategic projects, food security, renewable energy, housing, logistics, that comes free of the austerity or market-liberalisation conditions Western-backed institutions typically attach. It would also lose preferential access to a bloc representing 42.2% of global GDP (PPP) and more than 40% of the world's population (Sari & Ningsih, 2025), critical for diversifying coal, CPO, and rubber exports beyond traditional Western markets.

Not joining either organisation might actually deepen Indonesia's economic stagnation. Indonesia would keep total regulatory sovereignty and dodge both the West's entry costs and like-mindedness traps and the East's geopolitical friction, but without external pressure from either bloc, internal sectoral egos and corruption would likely keep hindering Golden Vision 2045 all the same. Indonesia currently counts as a "sought-after middle power" precisely because both Western and non-Western blocs compete for its alignment; joining neither risks losing that position and sliding into diplomatic marginalisation instead.

If political imperatives demand joining a new global body regardless, a rigorous comparison using Putnam's Two-Level Games and Status-Seeking Theory shows BRICS as significantly more advantageous for Indonesia than the OECD. Table 2 sets out that theoretical comparison.

Table 2. Theoretical Comparison of BRICS and OECD

Theory	OECD	BRICS
Status Seeking Theory	Works as the Social Mobility Strategy Emulates the Western norms and liberalisation standard	Social Creativity Strategy Reassert Global South Leadership Flexible and non-conforming status
Two-Level Games Theory	- High domestic legal resistance (conflicted policy with national agenda)	- Higher compatibility with state-led development priorities Lower risk on the economic sovereignty
Risks	- Higher risk on economic sovereignty, TKDN and Hilirisasi policy	Risk of economic dominance by China No domestic legislative amendment or broad regulatory adjustment

Source: Processed by researcher, 2026 from Larson & Shevchenko, 2010 and Putnam, 2017

OECD accession represents a strategy of Social Mobility in Status Seeking Theory, which is an attempt to gain prestige by mimicking the legal and economic standards of established Western powers (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). However, this status is conditional upon rigid

compliance with rules that were designed without input from emerging economies. In contrast, BRICS membership represents Social Creativity, which allows the country to seek status by championing alternative, multipolar financial architectures and Global South solidarity (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010).

In Putnam's Two Level Games theory (2017), the domestic (Level II) win-set for OECD accession is exceptionally narrow. Ratifying OECD requirements would force the Indonesian government to dismantle local content requirements (TKDN), amend Anti-Monopoly laws (UU No. 5/1999) to remove SOE protections, and abandon maritime cabotage restrictions (Shandy et al., 2025). This creates severe political and legal friction at home. Conversely, BRICS requires zero domestic legal or regulatory overhauls, preserving full economic sovereignty over national industrial strategies like nickel downstreaming. The NDB provides direct liquidity to co-finance domestic priority programmes, including 47 carried-over national strategic projects, 30 new initiatives under President Prabowo, food estate programmes, and renewable energy infrastructure (Syamsudin, 2025).

Therefore, true status gain does not require joining more international clubs or forcing the domestic economy to "fit in" with Western standards. Real international prestige stems from domestic economic strength, fiscal stability, and state capacity. Selecting an organisation must be dictated by domestic material utility rather than symbolic emulation.

Since the accession to OECD is still ongoing and expected to be done by 2027, and Indonesia has become a member of BRICS by 2025, this research argues that the logical approach is to maximise the BRICS membership benefit and hold the process to OECD until the domestic economy demand has been fulfilled. It would be better to prioritise BRICS/NDB membership first to secure the liquidity needed for domestic stability, while slowing the OECD accession until the domestic fiscal capacity recovers from the current social-programme spending spree (Alexandra et al., 2025).

Reassessing the "Bebas Aktif" Foreign Policy Concept in BRICS and OECD

Labelling this dual track the modern embodiment of "Free and Active" foreign policy represents a fundamental conceptual mismatch. Framed that way, Indonesia's simultaneous BRICS and OECD pursuit increasingly reads as a high-stakes risk rather than coherent strategic hedging. Status-seeking theory offers a better description: "existential diplomacy," a search for international prestige and recognition as a global middle power that ignores Indonesia's current domestic fiscal and institutional constraints (Shandy et al., 2025).

Much of the current literature and government rhetoric frames this dual membership as a hedging strategy, a calculated attempt to diversify risk and maximise benefit across both blocs. True strategic hedging takes opposing policy positions to minimise downside risk (Shandy et al., 2025). But committing to the OECD, structurally bound to neoliberal trade regimes, while simultaneously building alternative trade and financial structures through BRICS, compounds risk instead of minimising it.

Genuine hedging demands real diplomatic and technical capital to navigate conflicting requirements, and the administration has cut US$18.84 billion in state spending as part of a drastic efficiency drive, leaving the diplomatic corps short of the resources it needs to stay effectively active in either bloc. A true hedge spreads risk; this strategy instead creates a regulatory collision. The OECD's demand for competitive neutrality for SOEs and the removal of trade barriers stands directly opposed to the protectionist, state-led development model the current administration favours, a model BRICS's "resource sovereignty" narrative actively supports (Shandy et al., 2025).

Dual membership, in reality, functions as a risky pursuit of status rather than a strategic hedge. It exposes Indonesia to compliance penalties, geopolitical skepticism from Western partners, trade dependency on China, and internal fiscal exhaustion, prioritising international image over domestic capacity and policy coherence. Trying to fit the OECD's Western standard while seeking refuge in BRICS's alternative framework, Jakarta risks achieving neither goal well, and lands in strategic paralysis instead of the promised Golden Vision 2045.

A reputable status gets maximised not by fitting Western standards or multiplying memberships, but by choosing organisations that protect Indonesia's core political and economic agenda. Labelling dual accession as Bebas-Aktif confuses process with substance: it mistakes the act of joining for actual diplomatic influence. Bebas-Aktif was never meant to mean omnidirectional compliance or the uncritical accumulation of memberships. In its true historic sense, it signifies strategic autonomy, the independence to make foreign policy choices strictly on national interest, uncoerced by external power blocs. The doctrine holds without joining both organisations at once; it just requires choosing the organisation that actually aligns with Indonesia's vision. True strategic autonomy shows up as the sovereignty to decline any framework whose regulatory demands threaten domestic industrial priorities or whose entry costs strain the national budget.

Recommendations for Indonesia's Economic Growth

Indonesia should prioritise the immediate liquidity and market benefits of BRICS/NDB while treating OECD accession as a long-term, slow-burn structural reform project. To align foreign political economy with domestic fiscal constraints and sustain long-term economic growth, this research recommended some alternative that the Indonesian government could adopt the following strategic measures:

1. If Indonesia retains the political latitude to step back from one of the two accession pipelines, it should pause or decelerate its OECD accession process. The rationale for this prioritisation is clear, the OECD accession process is structurally rigid, highly technical, and inherently long-term. It demands extensive legal overhauls across 260 legal instruments that threaten core domestic policies, including nickel downstreaming (hilirisasi), SOE development mandates, and national procurement protections (Shandy et al., 2025). Given

that the direct economic yields of OECD membership like the projected FDI increases are speculative and medium-to-long-term, while the compliance costs as in €13.62 million in direct fees plus administrative overhauls are immediate, pausing the OECD track removes severe regulatory friction and preserves state capacity under current budget efficiency mandates.

2. If breaking formal agreements with both organisations is politically unviable because initial commitments and membership costs have already been incurred, the government must adopt a strict fiscal reallocation and utility-maximising strategy. The US$1 billion (IDR 16.66 trillion) capital injection into the NDB must not function as a passive financial contribution. The Ministry of Finance and Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs must ensure that NDB credit lines are actively mobilised to finance high-multiplier domestic infrastructure. Specifically, NDB funding should be channeled into rural logistics networks for Koperasi Desa Merah Putih, storage and distribution infrastructure for the Makan Bergizi Gratis programme, and renewable energy grids for Ibu Kota Nusantara (IKN) (Syamsudin, 2025). This directly connects Level I international capital expenditure with Level II domestic welfare generation.

3. Treat the OECD as a diagnostic advisory tool rather than a legal mandate. Instead of rushing to amend domestic laws to achieve full membership by 2027, Indonesia should treat the OECD technical review process purely as a non-binding policy benchmark. Since the eradication of corruption is the public's main concern (25.5%), the government should prioritise the OECD's anti-bribery and tax transparency instruments to build domestic trust. Meanwhile, Indonesia also needs to explicitly use the OECD's provision for "reservations" to safeguard its nickel downstreaming policy. Completely submitting to the OECD's neoliberal blueprint on "competitive neutrality" for SOEs would undermine the domestic demand for job creation and state-led development. By shifting from symbolic status-seeking to selective pragmatic consolidation, Indonesia can protect its economic sovereignty, stay within its budget limits, and focus its foreign policy on real domestic economic development.

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that Indonesia's simultaneous pursuit of membership in both BRICS and the OECD creates a profound strategic paradox, imposing severe fiscal and regulatory burdens that run counter to current domestic economic realities. Guided by an overextended interpretation of the Bebas-Aktif doctrine, dual accession reflects a status-seeking impulse for international prestige rather than a calibrated hedging strategy.

Through the lens of Putnam's Two-Level Games, a clear structural misalignment emerges between Level I diplomatic ambitions and Level II domestic constraints. At a time when the domestic economy is governed by strict fiscal efficiency mandates and the public prioritises immediate economic survival - such as basic commodity price stability, job creation, and poverty reduction - allocating scarce capital and diplomatic bandwidth toward dual

multilateral commitments induces severe institutional overload and starves priority national programmes.

The most pragmatic path for Indonesia is to refrain from joining multiple new global alliances, or to step back from expanding institutional commitments altogether. Indonesia is already a signatory to over 170 international frameworks, including ASEAN, RCEP, and the G20, which offer ample diplomatic and economic leverage without requiring additional membership fees, capital injections, or the surrender of regulatory sovereignty.

By foregoing new dual accessions, Indonesia preserves its fiscal capital and avoids deep regulatory friction with core domestic development strategies, most notably industrial downstreaming (hilirisasi) and local content requirements. True strategic autonomy under the Bebas-Aktif ethos is not demonstrated by the uncritical accumulation of institutional badges, but by the sovereign strength to focus internal resources on domestic economic stabilisation, structural productivity, and self-sufficiency.

However, if executive political imperatives dictate that Indonesia must commit to a new international body, BRICS represents a far more viable and pragmatically aligned choice than the OECD. While OECD accession demands an extensive, long-term overhaul of over 260 legal instruments alongside rigid adherence to neoliberal market norms that directly challenge state-led development goals, BRICS offers a flexible, non-binding platform grounded in Global South solidarity. Access to the New Development Bank (NDB) provides immediate liquidity to co-finance priority national infrastructure and social programmes without demanding structural austerity or legal concessions.

Therefore, the result of this research argues that if a choice must be made, Indonesia should prioritise the immediate capital and market diversification benefits of BRICS while pausing formal OECD accession, ensuring that foreign political economy strictly serves concrete domestic welfare rather than symbolic international prestige.

REFERENCES

Alexandra, L. A., Mantong, A. W., Kharisma, M. W., Dzakwan, M. H. A., Pandie, P. A., Julianto, F., Paramastuti, H. A., & Widyautami, A. A. (2025). Menata ulang kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia: Reformasi internal dan penataan strategis untuk menghadapi tatanan dunia yang berubah. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia. https://www.csis.or.id/publication/menata-ulang-kebijakan-luar-negeri-indonesia-reformasi-internal-dan-penataan-strategis-untuk-menghadapi-tatanan-dunia-yang-berubah/

Askar, M. W., Adhinegara, B. Y., Fikri, B., Darmawan, J., Muhammad, G. D., Saleh, M., Fikri, M. Z., & Lianasari, A. (2025). Rapor kinerja 1 tahun pemerintahan Prabowo-Gibran. Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS). https://celios.co.id/rapor-kinerja-1-tahun-prabowo-gibran/

Beaumont, P. D. (2025). Rational illusions: Everyday theories of international status and the domestic politics of Boer War. *Politics and Governance*, *13*. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.9113

Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2009). *Research designs: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. Sage.

Duque, M. G. (2018). Recognizing international status: A relational approach. *International Studies Quarterly*, *62*(3), 577-592. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy001

Éva, Á. (2020). The impossible bargain: Iranian-American relations in the extended framework of Putnam's two-level game theory.

Fadlillah, S., & Komarudin, U. (2026). Prabowo's independent active foreign policy on Palestine and its global implications. *JWP (Jurnal Wacana Politik)*, *11*(1), 1.

Hanan, A. (2026, February 5). Indonesia's strategic breakout: From ASEAN restraints to Global South power broker. Australian Outlook, Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/indonesias-strategic-breakout-from-asean-restraints-to-global-south-power-broker/

Heriyana, H., & Agustina, I. (2025). Indonesia's accession to the OECD: Strategic motivation and foreign policy challenges in the era of Prabowo Subianto. *Journal of Social Research*, *4*(12), 3394-3406. https://doi.org/10.55324/josr.v4i12.2910

Husein, M., & Sudiarto, T. D. (2024). Diplomasi luar negeri Indonesia yang bebas dan aktif dalam perang Rusia-Ukraina selama masa presidensi G20 di Indonesia. *Arus Jurnal Sosial Dan Humaniora*, *4*(3), 1237-1245. https://doi.org/10.57250/ajsh.v4i3.624

Hussain, M. (2025, February 19). BRICS expansion in ASEAN and Indonesia's entry. Indian Council of World Affairs. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=12481&lid=7624

Indikator Politik Indonesia. (2025, November 8). Rilis survei nasional: Evaluasi publik atas kinerja setahun pemerintahan Prabowo-Gibran. https://indikator.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/RILIS_SURVEI_NASIONAL_INDIKATOR_08_NOVEMBER_2025.pdf

Isaac, J. (2025, December 2). Indonesia committed to US$1 B as it fully joins BRICS' New Development Bank. Indonesia Business Post. https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/5735/markets-and-finance/indonesia-committed-to-us-1-b-as-it-fully-joins-brics-new-development-bank

Iswardhana, M. R. (2025). Analysis of President Prabowo's foreign policy: Indonesia's existential diplomacy in joining of BRICS and OECD. *Khatulistiwa: Jurnal Pendidikan dan Sosial Humaniora*. https://doi.org/10.55606/khatulistiwa.v5i3.7164

Janati, F., & Setuningsih, N. (2025, February 13). Kena efisiensi, anggaran Kemenlu terpangkas Rp 2 triliun. Kompas.com. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/02/13/14391831/kena-efisiensi-anggaran-kemenlu-terpangkas-rp-2-triliun

Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses to US primacy. *International Security*, *34*(4), 63-95. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.63

Lee, B. T. F., Kornphetcharat, K., & Sims, J. P. (2025). Indonesia in BRICS: A realist perspective. *Journal of Strategic and Global Studies*, *8*(2), 6. https://doi.org/10.7454/jsgs.v8i2.1186

Lissovolik, Y. (2025, March 26). Indonesia set to become a member of the New Development Bank. BRICS+ Analytics. https://brics-plus-analytics.org/indonesia-set-to-become-a-member-of-the-new-development-bank/

Maulana, A. R., & Azis, A. A. (2025). Considering Indonesia's economic growth direction: Between the OECD and BRICS. *Journal of Social Research*, *4*(7), 1536-1550. https://doi.org/10.55324/josr.v4i7.2640

Noone, H. (2019). Two-level games and the policy process: Assessing domestic-foreign policy linkage theory. *World Affairs*, *182*(2), 165-186. https://doi.org/10.1177/0043820019839074

Nurdifa, A. R. (2025, August 15). Prabowo anggarkan Rp53,3 triliun untuk program food estate tahun depan. Bisnis.com. https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20250815/99/1902745/prabowo-anggarkan-rp533-triliun-untuk-program-food-estate-tahun-depan

Pambagyo, W., & Herningtyas, R. (2025). Indonesia's rationality in improving the economy through BRICS: A world system theory approach. *Citizen: Jurnal Ilmiah Multidisiplin Indonesia*, *5*(5), 1317-1333. https://doi.org/10.53866/jimi.v5i5.1025

Putnam, R. D. (2017). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. In *International organization* (pp. 437-470). Routledge.

Rahmad, M. K. (2025, December 1). Anggaran MBG capai Rp 900 miliar per hari mulai 2026, 85% untuk pangan. Investortrust.id. https://investortrust.id/macro/87187/anggaran-mbg-capai-rp-900-miliar-per-hari-mulai-2026-85-untuk-pangan

Revo, M. (2024, October 27). Mau jadi anggota BRICS, Indonesia sumbang Rp21.000 triliun. CNBC Indonesia. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/research/20241027150353-128-583388/mau-jadi-anggota-brics-indonesia-sumbang-rp21000-triliun

Ribawati, E., & Setiawan, F. Z. (2025). Politik luar negeri Indonesia bebas aktif pada masa Soekarno tahun 1945-1965: Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy during the Soekarno era (1945-1965). *JAGADDHITA: Jurnal Kebhinnekaan dan Wawasan Kebangsaan*, *5*(1), 1-7.

Rizky, D., & Arief, T. M. V. (2026, July 18). Pemerintah siapkan Rp 240 triliun untuk Kopdes Merah Putih selama 6 tahun. Kompas.com. https://money.kompas.com/read/2026/07/18/071800626/pemerintah-siapkan-rp-240-triliun-untuk-kopdes-merah-putih-selama-6-tahun

Sandi, F. (2026, July 6). Anggaran bangun 100 sekolah rakyat tahun depan capai Rp26,3 triliun. CNBC Indonesia. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20260706132507-4-748385/anggaran-bangun-100-sekolah-rakyat-tahun-depan-capai-rp263-triliun

Sari, D. F., & Ningsih, W. O. J. (2025). Analisis strategis keanggotaan Indonesia dalam BRICS terhadap migrasi dan proteksionisme tenaga kerja: Tinjauan ekonomi politik migrasi. *Global and Policy Journal of International Relations*, *13*(01). https://doi.org/10.33005/jgp.v13i01.5119

Shandy, B., Pane, D., Yuriza, F., Hasran, Gupta, K., Fadila, L., Dominika, M., Nabila, N., & Bahar, W. (2025, July). Indonesia's accession to OECD: Understanding the economic implications. Center for Indonesian Policy Studies. https://repository.cips-indonesia.org/media/publications/620682-indonesia-s-accession-to-oecd-understand-2cfedd12.pdf

Shofa, J. N. (2025, April 12). Indonesia says it treats US, China as equals. Jakarta Globe. https://jakartaglobe.id/business/indonesia-says-it-treats-us-china-as-equals

Sumner, A., Klingebiel, S., & Yusuf, A. A. (2025). A new development paradigm and strategy for the OECD (and beyond): What should the "D" of OECD stand for? (IDOS Policy Brief No. 1/2025).

Syahdami, S. (2023). Studi komparatif kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia bebas-aktif dan lebih dekat ke salah satu blok, mana yang lebih menguntungkan kepentingan nasional Indonesia? *Jurnal Kajian Stratejik Ketahanan Nasional*, *5*(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.7454/jkskn.v5i1.10063

Syamsudin, A. (2025). Indonesia's diplomacy strategy in BRICS: Bridging national interest and global political balance. *Security Intelligence Terrorism Journal (SITJ)*, *2*(2), 156-184. https://doi.org/10.70710/sitj.v2i2.44

Tempo.co. (2025, August 17). Anggaran program 3 juta rumah bertambah Rp 17 triliun. Tempo.co. https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/anggaran-program-3-juta-rumah-bertambah-rp-17-triliun-2059855

Wiranto, S. (2025, November 12). Dilema strategis Indonesia antara OECD dan BRICS: Meneguhkan politik luar negeri bebas-aktif di era multi-alignment. Indo-Pacific Strategic Intelligence. https://www.isi-indonesia.com/post/dilema-strategis-indonesia-antara-oecd-dan-brics-meneguhkan-politik-luar-negeri-bebas-aktif-di-era

Wohlforth, W. (2025). The irony of prestige: Status-seeking as rational choice. *Cooperation and Conflict*, *60*(1), 193-209. https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367241302453

Wohlforth, W. C., De Carvalho, B., Leira, H., & Neumann, I. B. (2018). Moral authority and status in International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking. *Review of International Studies*, *44*(3), 526-546. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210517000560

Yakti, P. D. (2025, November 6). Satu tahun bebas aktif politik luar negeri Prabowo-Gibran. detikNews. https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-8196990/satu-tahun-bebas-aktif-politik-luar-negeri-prabowo-gibran

Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case study research and applications* (6th ed.). Sage.

Yudi, A. L. (2025, June 18). Indonesia's OECD accession to cost Rp245bn, says Finance Ministry. Tempo English. https://en.tempo.co/read/2028480/indonesias-oecd-accession-to-cost-rp245bn-says-finance-ministry

Zaelani, I. R., Heryadi, R. D., Sinaga, O., & Mursitama, T. N. (2025). Navigating complexity: A soft systems approach to Indonesia's OECD membership bid. *Journal of Cultural Analysis and Social Change*, 1916-1930. https://doi.org/10.64753/jcasc.v10i4.3099