
COMPARISON OF THE POLITICAL DYNASTY IN BANTEN PROVINCE WITH THE POLITICAL DYNASTY IN CENTRAL MALUKU DISTRICT

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Abstract; The article of this study tries to explain political dynasties by making a comparison between political dynasties in Banten province and political dynasties in Central Maluku district. The political dynasties in these two regions have similarities in the basic framework of kinship relations, but the political dynasties in Central Maluku also show the dominance of the Hatuhaha Group in a strategic position in the social life of the people in Central Maluku and Maluku. This study also produces findings that local officials who carry out political dynasties focus on the economic and political interests of their groups and cause corruption in the management of power. In collecting data using library research method. The result showed that Political dynasties also show the weakness of political parties in the recruitment of regional leaders so that democracy at the local level is trapped by the interests of groups from the political dynasty.

Keywords: Democracy, Local Election, Political Dynasty, Political Party

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INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's political changes after the end of the New Order for 32 years (1967-1998) were marked by, among other things, constitutional reforms governing the Indonesian state administration system. Through four amendments to the Constitution in 1999-2002, two important political instruments became policy, namely democratic elections and the policy of regional autonomy or decentralization. One of the fundamental steps in decentralization policy is the implementation of general elections local to elect regional heads (Pilkada). The holding of national elections and local elections (Pilkada) is one indicator of the success of democracy in a transition country such as Indonesia (Thahir et al., 2020). Zubakhrum Tjenreng calls Indonesia's success in holding the National Election (since 1999) and Pilkada (since 2005) as the consolidation of electoral democracy, due to extraordinary elections taking place at the district/city, provincial and national levels. Direct Pilkada is thus a political process which is not only a political

mechanism to fill democratic positions (through the Pilkada), but also as the implementation of regional autonomy or real political decentralization (Thahir et al., 2020).

Pilkada in its development experience complex problems with the development of kinship politics and/or political dynasties during the current electoral democracy. The prohibition against dynastic politics was explicitly regulated in Law (UU) n. 8 of 2015 concerning Pilkada in Article 7 letter r, which states: "r. have no conflict of interest with the incumbent". In the Elucidation of Article 7 letter r of Law n. 8 of 2015 states: "What is meant by "no conflict of interest" is among others: not having blood relations, marital ties and/or lineage 1 (one) level straight up, down, sideways with the incumbent, namely father, mother, in-laws, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, in-laws, children, daughters-in-law, unless they have passed a gap of 1 (one) term of office."

But unfortunately, the legal umbrella regarding the prohibition of political dynasties in the election was annulled by the Constitutional Court (MK). In its decision No. 33/PUU-XIII/2015, the Constitutional Court stated that Article 7 letter r along with the Elucidation of Article 7 letter r of the Regional Head Election Law regarding the requirements for regional head candidates does not have a conflict of interest with the incumbent, contradicts the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI 1945) and has no binding legal force. The Constitutional Court is of the opinion that the prohibition as regulated in Article 7 letter r of the Regional Election Law is contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia because it violates the constitutional rights of citizens to obtain equal rights in law and government as well as the freedom of everyone from discriminatory actions. Thus, the Constitutional Court's decision shows that the Constitutional Court has declared the practice of political dynasties as a legitimate practice in accordance with the constitution of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

With the growth of kinship politics, the playing field will also be more unequal because kinship politics can already accumulate influence, wealth, control over certain areas, and economic control will be more likely to win political contestations, compared to other candidates whose resources are still limited and only rely on the power of hope (Harjanto, 2011).

The danger of kinship politics is that the Banten political dynasty is a prime example of a political dynasty designed by its relatives to enter politics. The political dynasty of Banten has been firmly established along with the age of Banten Province so that the network of power has spread strongly in the government (Djati, 2015).

If in Banten shows political dynasties occur in the context of family politics. However, political dynasties also occur in the context of family or clan politics, as

happened in Central Maluku Regency which shows a different phenomenon in the context of family or clan politics, or generally referred to as a political dynasty. In Central Maluku Regency, the occurrence of the Tuasikal clan control in the political structure of Central Maluku Regency, has shown the formation of a political dynasty.

The political dynasties that occurred in the post-New Order era showed that local elections tended to be individualistic in nature, so the role of political parties became increasingly limited, and the individual strength of the candidates became one of the determinants of victory in the struggle for political positions. Kinship politics has become an attractive option for political parties to win political positions currently in office. The multi-party system forces political parties to be pragmatic with the emphasis on winning alone, and pay less attention to the effectiveness of power in the medium and long term, so that the abnormality and absurdity of political support is often taken by major political parties to ensure victory in the Pilkada, even though political dynasties are considered the enemy of democracy. Based on the arguments above, the research question is What is the basis for the occurrence of political dynasties in the province of Banten and in the district of Central Maluku? What was the impact of the occurrence of political dynasties in Banten and Central Maluku? And, What solutions can be sought to break the chain of this political dynasty?

Writing in this study in obtaining answers to research questions was designed with a qualitative approach. Qualitative research is intended to focus on the object or phenomenon raised in this study, namely political dynasties.

METHOD

This study seeks to present detailed data and analysis of certain objects in a fairly deep and comprehensive manner (Emzir & Pd, 2012). Qualitative research according to Moleong (Moleong, 2007) is research that intends to understand the phenomenon of what is experienced by research subjects such as behavior, perception, motivation, action, and others, holistically, and by way of description in forms of words and language, in a special context that is natural and by utilizing various natural methods.

In collecting data using library research method. This library study refers to Nazir is a data collection technique by conducting a review study of books, literatures, notes, and reports that have to do with the problem to be solved. This technique is used to obtain the basics and opinions in writing which is done by studying various literatures related to the problem under study (Nazir, 2013) In carrying out the literature study procedure that the information collected from library sources is relevant to this research, then in the process of data management, the source will

be researched and analyzed and carried out an assessment to seek to produce research novelty in writing this research.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Political Dynasty Concept

The concept of a political dynasty is a political phenomenon of the emergence of candidates from the environment of the head of government in power. Besides being known for the word (sentence) of political dynasties, other words (sentences) are also known, namely dynastic politics. Dynastic politics which in simple language is defined as a regime of political power or political actors that is run for generations or carried out by one of the family or close relatives. This regime was formed because of the very high concern among family members on politics and usually the political orientation of the dynasty is power and wealth (Sakinah, 2015).

Literally, political dynasties can be understood as a political strategy to maintain power by passing on the power that has been held to other people who are still relatives (Effendi, 2017, 2018). In addition, dynastic politics can also be interpreted as the practice of power in which family members are given and/or get certain positions in the power structure. So, power is only divided into family/relatives and distributed among families/relatives only (Fossati et al., 2020; Muhtadi, 2018, 2019b, 2019a).

Political dynasties are considered as primitive power reproduction systems because they rely on the blood and descendants of only a few people. Meanwhile, dynastic politics is the process of directing the regeneration of power for the interests of certain groups (eg elite families) with the aim of gaining or maintaining power. Thus, political dynasties and political dynasties are considered enemies of democracy because the main requirements of democracy through elections, such as political equality, effective and competitive participation, are not fulfilled.

Politics of kinship and/or political dynasties occurs when political recruitment is based on considerations of kinship and not based on aspects of candidate qualifications. So kinship politics is political recruitment that results in family members occupying political/government positions that are not based on their abilities or not through the procedures outlined, but rather based on considerations of kinship relations (such as because of descent or marital ties). To distinguish political family members who obtain political positions as a manifestation of kinship politics and not kinship politics, it is done by analyzing two aspects, namely procedures in political recruitment and candidate

quality(Firmadi & Purwaningsih, 2016; PURWANINGSIH & RUBIYATI, 2019; Purwaningsih & Widodo, 2020).

Political dynasty for the case of Indonesia in the post-New Order decentralization era, that local government is controlled by a handful of people (oligarchs) or local strong people. By utilizing patronage networks, exercising control and control over resources, the use of politics and violence dominates regional politics. This understanding is explained by Migdal's thesis on local strongman(Migdal, 2020) and Sidel(Sidel, 2004) on local bossism, as well as the shadow state of Barabara White which explains the "piracy" of democracy by local elites(Harriss-White, 2008). The perspective of political dynasties as a form of local strongman and local bossim cartel which explains the influence of an elite who individually builds patrimonialistic relations in society and the state. In this case, political dynasties are a collective form of elite patronage in a collective form that is based on family relations, ethnicity, and other blood relations which essentially gives rise to monarchy in democracy at the local level (Jati, 2015).

Some political observers describe the phenomenon of political dynasties by calling it a political oligarchy. So they are sometimes relatively easy to reach power or fight for power. The dynastic politics is actually contrary to the notion of democracy which puts the interests of the community first, because in dynastic politics the basis and the goal are personal interests. Why that can happen, because democracy itself cannot be separated from oligarchy, as explained by Michels in Political Parties. Although he focuses primarily on the oligarchic character of political parties, and thinks that the legacy of autocracy is the basis of modern democratic oligarchy, he explains that this character can exist as an inherent character of modern democracies: democracy, while the substance of democracy is infused with aristocratic elements (Schmitt, 2021).

These oligarchs and local bossism then built political dynasties at the local level. Based on the research of Wasisto Raharjo Jati(Djati, 2015), there are at least five typologies of political dynasties formed in Indonesia, namely populism dyansties, octupussy dyansties, tribalism dyansties, family-based/gono-gini power, and feudalism dynasties. All of these political dynasties have the same generalization, namely that they were formed based on figuration and patrimonialism, aji mumpung, and elitism.

The Rise of a Political Dynasty

The phenomenon of political dynasties in the realm of local politics came in line with the implementation of the first Pilkada in Indonesia in 2005 and the implementation of regional autonomy in 2001. Along with the passage of the two processes as a form of democratization at the local level, various elites emerged in the regions to co-opt the two processes(Djati, 2015).

The dynasty referred to in this study is similar to the meaning of dynasty in the traditional political sense. The ruler tries to put his family, relatives, and relatives in strategic positions with the aim of building a political empire in the government (Syauket & Wijanarko, 2021). The presence of political dynasties in Banten cannot be separated from the possession of power in Banten, when a form of elite control that has existed for a long time and is widespread, for example with several families monopolizing political power. Political dynasties in Banten are of the type of octupussy dynasties, because of the synergy between rulers and businessmen in forming dynasties.

In Banten, decentralization has given birth to local strongmen with roots in the regions. This local strongman was Haji Chasan Shohib who had succeeded in establishing a centralized and programmed political dynasty. Haji Chasan Shohib is an octopus head who is a local strongman. Haji Chasan Shohib is an elder champion, a businessman from building construction, Chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin), traditional chairman of Banten and a loyalist to the Golkar Party, he is the main actor in the formation of Banten Province and the director of the political dynasty in Banten Province. Starting with the reality after the establishment of Banten Province, he placed his daughter, Ratu Atut Chosiyah as Deputy Governor, paired with a senior politician from the United Development Party (PPP), Djoko Munandar as Governor (Syauket & Wijanarko, 2021).

In the development of Ratu Atut's power management when he was in power, his family's informal network finally entered the ranks of government formally, including: Andika Hazrumy (son) became Deputy Governor of Banten (2017-2022), Ratu Tatu Chasanah (sister) served as Regent of Serang 2014-2020 and re-elected in the 2020 Pilkada (2020-2024 period), Ratu Ria Maryana is also the half-sister of Ratu Atut, now she serves as Deputy Chair of the Serang City DPRD. In addition, Ria also serves as Chairman of the DPD Golkar Serang City. Then Airin Rahmi Diany, Airin currently serves as Mayor of South Tangerang City for the 2016-2021 period, after being replaced by Pilar Saga Ichsan (the son of Ratu Tatu) who was elected in the 2020 Regional Head Election (2020-2024 period).

Table 1.1

Political Dynasty Governor Ratu Atut Chosiyah

Name	Position
Andika Hazrumy (First Son)	Member of DPD 2009-2014, continued as Vice Governor of Banten 2017-2022
Andiara Aprilia Hikmat	Member of the DPD for the Banten electoral district 2019-2024

Ade Rossi Chaerunnisa (Andika Harzrumy's Wife)	Member of the House of Representatives for the 2019-2024 period, previously the Chair of the Banten DPRD for the 2016-2019 period
Tanto Warsono (Andiara Aprilia Hikmat's Husband)	Vice Regent of Pandeglang elected in the 2020 Regional Head Election, 2020-2024 period
Tubagus Khaerul Zaman (Atut's step brother)	Member of the House of Representatives for the 2019-2024 Period
Ratu Ria Maryana (Atut's step sister)	Deputy Chairperson of the Serang City DPRD for the 2019-2024 Period
Ratu Tatu Chasanah (Atut's sister)	Serang Regent elected in the 2020 regional head election, 2020-2024 period
Pilar Saga Ichsana (Ratu Atut's nephew, daughter of Ratu Tatu Chasanah)	Deputy Mayor of South Tangerang elected in the 2020 Regional Head Election, 2020-2024 period
Airin Rachmi Diany (Atut's sister-in-law)	Mayor of South Tangerang for two terms (2011-2016, and 2016-2021)
Aden Abdul Khalig (Atut's brother-in-law)	Member of the Banten Regional House of Representatives for the period 2009-2014
Ratna Komalasari (stepmother)	Member of the Regional People's Representative Council of Serang City 2009-2014
Heryani (Atut's stepmother)	Vice Regent of Pandeglang for the period 2011-2016
Hikmat Tomet (Husband)	Member of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia 2009-2014

(Source: processed from various sources)

The design of the power of the political dynasty, which has been solid, was attempted to be perfected in Banten through an effort to win the Regent of Lebak Amir Hamzah in the Constitutional Court. However, in the end, they uncovered a bribery case involving the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court Akil Mochtar and a network from the dynasty in Banten in 2013, it turned out that this case only temporarily "undermine" the political authority of the dynasty (Fossati et al., 2020)

The case of the Banten dynasty shows that it is not only preserving but also trying to expand regional coverage, so that efforts are made to create new posts on its own initiative, such as the election of Airin in the area resulting from the division of Tangerang, namely the South Tangerang area. Nor was the case of bribery exposed to win the Regent of Lebak Amir Hamzah in the Constitutional Court.

In the end, candidate selection almost always depends on a small clique of local leaders and aides suggesting capable names to the main political party. In many cases, the electoral districts that he managed to control were considered as family property, such as the unanimous re-election of Ratu Tatu Chasanah (Atut's sister) as Chair of the Banten Province Golkar Party DPD for the 2020-2025 period and Ratu Ria Maryana being elected by acclamation to lead the Golkar Party. Serang City for the 2020-2025 period.

Finally, the victories of political dynasties remained victorious in the 2015 to 2020 Simultaneous Pilkada, such as Ratu Tatu being re-elected as Regent in Serang City, as well as in South Tangerang City, the throne left by Airin Rachmi Diany was continued by Pilar Saga Ichsan as Deputy Mayor South Tangerang City, even the expansion of the Ratu Atut political dynasty, namely in Pandeglang Regency with the election of Tanto Warsono Arban as Deputy Regent for up to two terms. This process shows that small cliques through their political dynasties want to carry out inheritance politics in the areas they have managed to control by putting their finger on the Golkar party. Political parties eventually weakened their bargaining position with the Ratu Atut dynasty, because their chances of victory were clear compared to other cadres. This is suspected from Ratu Tatu's behavior and statement that his family will always follow the policies of the Golkar Party. "As the Chairperson of the Banten Golkar DPD, I was also assigned by the DPP to win all regional elections held in Banten" (Efriza, 2016).

Meanwhile, the political dynasty in Central Maluku Regency shows a different phenomenon in the context of family or clan politics, or generally referred to as a political dynasty. Political power in the Maluku province, not just the Central Maluku district, is dominated by individuals who incidentally come from the same region, namely Saparua, Haruku, Nusa Laut, and Banda Islands. These groups are commonly referred to as the Hatuhaha group, which refers to the political and bureaucratic elites who generally come from the four regions. The Hatuhaha group dominates various strategic positions in the social life of the Maluku people.

The emergence of the Tuasikal dynasty also cannot be separated from the domination of Hatuhaha, which is based on Naomi Sakinah's opinion (Naomi Sakinah, 2015: 4) that it meets the criteria as a dynasty. The Hatuhaha political network played a major role in assisting Tuasikal in building a dynasty, from this interpretation, political dynasties in Central Maluku tended to lead to dynastic tribalism, which is a dynastic pattern based on ethnicity, clan, or kinship. Tribalism

of this dynasty for the author is more suitable to explain the relationship between the domination of the Hatuhaha and the Tuasikal political dynasty, but it is not entirely relevant to explain the pattern of political dynasties in Central Maluku.

However, the relationship between the two cannot be categorized as an ethnic-based relationship, because if it is based on ethnicity, the number of tribes in Maluku does not only consist of one tribe but thousands of clans, then it is impossible for all people in Maluku to be a circle of Tuasikal political dynasties. The Hatuhaha relationship with Tuasikal also cannot be interpreted as a clan-based relationship, because in reality Tuasikal is one clan out of hundreds of clans that are in the Hatuhaha group. Family relations tend to be more appropriate to explain the dynasty built by Tuasikal, because the transfer of power is still within the scope of lineage.

Abdullah Tuasikal is part of the Hatuhaha group from the island of Haruku. Abdullah Tuasikal served as regent of Central Maluku from 2002 to 2012. After two successful periods of occupying the seat of power in Central Maluku, Abdullah Tuasikal was not allowed under the election law to run for a third time in the regional head election in Central Maluku. However, to ensure that political power remains dominated by his family, Abdullah Tuasikal nominated his older brother as a candidate for regent of Central Maluku in the 2012 Pilkada, namely Tuasikal Abua, finally his brother was elected for two periods 2012-2017 and 2017-2022. In addition, while still serving as Regent of Central Maluku, Abdullah Tuasikal succeeded in making his wife (Miranti Dewaningsih) a member of the DPR from the Maluku region for two terms. In addition, after no longer serving as regent, Abdullah Tuasikal with the support of Abua Tuasikal, carried his son, Amrullah Amri Tuasikal as a candidate for members of the DPR and managed to win in the legislative elections for the 2014-2019 period and was re-elected in the 2019-2024 legislative elections. . However, Amrullah Amri Tuasikal finally made an Inter-Time Substitution (PAW) with Taslim Azis, due to his indiscipline and poor performance. Even today, Abdullah Tuasikal serves as a Member of the DPR for the Maluku electoral district for the 2019-2024 period and Miranti Dewaningsih is elected as a DPD member from the Maluku electoral district for the 2019-2024 period.

The Tuasikal political dynasty in Central Maluku can be considered a lineage with the core being Abdullah Tuasikal who became regent and was succeeded by himself from his family. In addition, the success of his wife and children in occupying parliamentary seats in the DPR, explains the Tuasikal political dynasty as a dynastic tribalism. However, regarding the political dynasty in Central Maluku, it has close relations with the Hatuhaha dynasty. The Tuasikal political dynasty emerged inseparable from the domination and role of the Hatuhaha group in Central Maluku, as well as the Hatuhaha group ensuring its continued dominance in Central Maluku with the ruling regent of its group. This relationship shows that

there is a close relationship between the Hatuhaha group and the Tuasikal dynasty in Central Maluku.

Thus, if we study that the Tuasikal political dynasty in Central Maluku Regency is a dynasty based on the core lineage, namely the transfer of power from brother to brother. However, the political circle of the Tuasikal dynasty, the majority is filled by the Hatuhaha group. This group also played an important role for Abdullah Tuasikal to build his dynastic network. However, the Hatuhaha group had no direct blood relationship with Tuasikal. This group also does not have the same clan because it consists of hundreds of clans.

The Tuasikal political dynasty network is also different from the network of political dynasties in other regions. Like the Queen Atut's network of political dynasties in Banten that emerged because of the personal power of champions Haji Chasan Shobib. At first glance, the political dynastic circle in Banten has similarities with the political network in Central Maluku, but the existence of historical blood relations (in the form of the Hatuhaha group) in the Tuasikal political network makes the political networks in these two regions very different. Because the strength of the network of champions in Banten participated in building and maintaining the position of the Ratu Atut dynasty, it was due to the existence of this informal institution only within the social structure of Banten society, but it did not have primary or secondary blood ties to the core circle of the Ratu Atut dynasty. In contrast to the Hatuhaha group, which emerged because of a process of transformation of cultural capital and has historical blood relations with the Tuasikal clan. Thus, the author can state that the Tuasikal political dynasty in Central Maluku Regency can be said to be a new typology, dynastic tribalism based on blood relations (kinship) from the Tuasikal political dynasty typology.

The phenomenon of political dynasties above shows that the opportunity for Pilkada is the beginning of the process of providing a stock of qualified leaders to go to the national political arena, but instead shows that it does not work from the weak role and function of political parties in carrying out recruitment functions, such as the emergence of kinship politics or political dynasties. . Kinship politics increasingly shows that political parties have failed in their role in the leadership channel process in the regions. Political parties prioritize the aspect of election victory, thus ignoring the regeneration process, finally political parties play politics that are full of pragmatism, namely nepotism becomes so prominent.

Of course, the presence of political kinship opportunities cannot be separated from the attitude of political parties that are no longer concerned with leadership regeneration, instead allowing political dynasties to occur in the regions. strong political dynasties, clans, or dynasties in certain areas, which then they close their territory, so that the constituencies are considered as family property. Thus, it will be very difficult to expect an expansion of access to power as well as a healthy and

substantial democratic process. This phenomenon has actually been around since 1984, Robert Michels has warned, stating that in the appointment of candidates for elections, we also find a symptom of a serious oligarchy, namely nepotism, this is what is happening from the ongoing politics of kinship in the regions. want to realize inheritance politics by controlling the electoral district based on the political dynasty (Paraphrasa, Robert Michels, 1984: 118-119).

The Impact of Political Dynasties

The Impact of Political Dynasties The main motive of the existence of an oligarchy is to maintain its wealth and property. The organizers of political dynasties will of course prioritize their economic and political interests rather than the interests of the community. They act in abusing power and betraying the people, the people's interests are replaced by persistent efforts for the glory and interests of their family or dynasty (Amalia Syauket, 2013).

After Tubagus Haji Chasan Sochib died in 2011, Tubagus Chaeri Wardana (Wawan) held a central position to consolidate political and economic power in Banten. Wawan is the husband of the two-term mayor of South Tangerang, Airin Rachmi Diany. Wawan who plays a central role in the leadership dynasty of Ratu Atut in Banten. The influence of Chasan Sochib was continued by Wawan so that the obedience and loyalty of Chasan Sochib's followers also changed to Wawan, who was his son, coupled with clarity on the fees for projects carried out by the Government in Banten (Amalia Syauket, 2013).

Wawan is a non-state actor who mostly acts more powerful than the formal rulers in Banten itself. Wawan is considered a project broker by using his position as Chairman of the KADIN in Banten to replace his father. Wawan is the project broker who determines who gets what, who does certain jobs, and who becomes what in government. Wawan was revealed to be very closely related to cases of bribery, money laundering, and political dynasties in Banten showing that they are intertwined with corrupt practices so that state-captured corruption is carried out by weakening the function of the Banten regional government (Amalia Syauket, 2013).

The Political Dynasty in the octopus category is shown that the head of the octopus is analogous to the local strongman from Haji Chasan Shochib being handed down to Wawan with eight octopus arms who ensnare the APBN, APBD, Assets, Natural Resources and the lives of the people of Banten, which are carried out in order to maintain the wealth and property of the family and relatives of the Ratu Clan. Banten. As a result, the province is included as a corrupt province with the occurrence of a monopoly of power in the field of government (Amalia Syauket, 2013).

The scope of government in Banten Province cannot be separated from being gripped by the monopoly of the Banten Governor's family, from the executive level at the provincial and district and city levels in Banten, as well as at the legislative level at the central to regional levels such as the DPR, DPD, and DPRD, as well as has been monopolized by the family of the Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut Choshiyah. The impact felt by the community as a result of bad behavior carried out by the Atut political dynasty in Banten was that Banten Province was recorded in the 15th position as the most corrupt province, Banten province in the dropout rate was still high, the number of poor people in Banten was also high at 5, 51 percent of the total population reached 649,190 people, and the unemployment rate in the area is still relatively high and even exceeds the national average (Amalia Syauket, 2013).

Whereas in the case in Central Maluku, when Abdullah Tuasikal occupied the seat of regent of Central Maluku, namely since 2002. Since that year, the Tuasikal clan's efforts to control economic sectors have also begun, with the aim of pursuing individual interests, clans, or to ensure the continuity of the dynasty. their politics. There are many cases of abuse of power by Tuasikal during their control of Central Maluku politics. One of the most striking is the case of the 2012 Integrated City Mandiri (KTM) realization and social assistance mega project, which allegedly resulted in a budget mark-up of 8 billion rupiah (izalrumadan.blogspot.co.id).

Other cases such as the inflated number of Regional Civil Servants (PNSD) in 2011 which aimed to ensure political support to ensure the continuity of Tuasikal's power in the 2012 Election. The acceptance of this PNSD is outside the needs of the local South Maluku bureaucracy, resulting in an extraordinary budget burden on the regional budget. . As a result of inflating the PNSD, regional finance becomes ineffective and inefficient, the impact is that the allocation of funds for development is much reduced. However, from a political point of view, this made Abua Tuasikal who is Abdullah Tuasikal's older brother, elected to be the regent of South Maluku in 2012. Some sources state that there was a consensus that Abdullah Tuasikal made with the PNSD to win Abua Tuasikal in the 2012 Pilkada.

The rent-seeking that has been carried out by Tuasikal in Central Maluku Regency since 2002 is not only for the sake of perpetuating power. Many sectors of the economy are controlled by the Tuasikal, such as families, as well as individuals who belong to the Tuasikal political dynasty. A clear example of Tuasikal's control of the economic sector is Abdullah Tuasikal's ownership of the management of Ora Beach tourist attractions since 2007. Another case is Abdullah Tuasikal was named the richest regent in Indonesia in 2008 (forum.kompas.com), this is very contradictory to Tuasikal's net worth in 2002 amounted to only hundreds of millions. Another thing that shows Tuasikal's rent-seeking is his control over the shares of several companies in Maluku (siwalimanews.com). This shows that

Abdullah Tuasikal uses his political power to control the economic sector for personal gain and strangely enough, although there have been many reports of abuse of this authority, Tuasikal, in this case Abdullah and Abua Tuasikal have not been legally processed.

The two cases above also show that the incumbent is very interested in maintaining the status quo by remaining in power. There is an effort so that a territory can be closed, so that the electoral district is considered as belonging to the family, clan, then the foundation of a political dynasty can be built and remains solid. This is done by building a circulation of genealogical core relationships, namely kinship relations and outside genealogical lines that have an interest in perpetuating that power.

On the other hand, parties have an interest in winning and/or supporting the incumbent because they have high electability. This reality has been highlighted since 1984, Robert Michels stated in the appointment of candidates for elections, we also found a symptom of a serious oligarchy, namely nepotism, that is what is happening from the ongoing politics of kinship in the regions, the broad impact is wanting to realize inheritance politics. based on the political dynasty, (Robert Michels, 2015: 118-119).

The impact of the phenomenon of political dynasties is that political parties fail to carry out regeneration on the one hand, and on the other hand there has been a leadership crisis in the regions. Instead of being part of a social institution to prepare candidates for leadership, political parties seem to only be used for pragmatic purposes by their elites. Political parties should be ashamed of the Pilkada which emphasizes recruitment based on kinship alone. But apparently that shame can easily be removed, because there are pragmatic interests earlier.

The pragmatism of political parties is a choice made by the parties in this Reformation era, the choice of shortcuts by not wanting to carry another candidate is based on the political party's fear of losing. As a form of pragmatism, the parties then participate in building coalitions by jointly carrying out candidates from political dynasties who are certain to win. Even though this should not be necessary because political parties have a long enough time to select candidate pairs before the registration deadline expires, but this seems to tend to be ignored by political parties. On the other hand, political parties choose shortcuts, namely carrying candidates who have high electability as regional head candidates even though the candidate is from a political dynasty background.

The existence of political dynasties is also inseparable from the fact that in order to become a candidate for regional head, they have to incur large costs, even this cost also includes a "dowry" from the bearers. In other words, Pilkada is only reserved for those who have big financial support. This, among other things, causes people who have credibility and capacity as candidates for regional heads to not have the

opportunity to participate in the contestation, so that the direct election democratic system actually increases the "need" for strong people and strong figures who can be sold to voters. While strong people and strong figures do not go through a natural selection process (bid) from below, but are mostly produced by the nature of patronage with an elitist nature.

What should be highlighted is the development of patronage and political oligarchy with the presence of political dynasties. The reality of the fact is that the funds needed to maintain networks and develop political parties are very large. While political parties are not able to build independent financial resources, the presence of investors and other strong people is very much needed (Andi Harianto Sinulingga, 2015: 149-150). Moreover, considering the nature of constituent support in Indonesia to date, it is still very unstable, because although most of the constituents are party members, the character of their membership hangs upwards. This means that internally within the party, members do not play an important role in determining party policies or the direction of party policies is determined from above (Warsito Ellwein and Hari Subagyo, 2011: xvii). This is what caused after the Reformation, many parties stumbled by political patronage and political oligarchy. Of course, it is related to the source of power in political parties that the decision-making positions are occupied, for example the general chairman, the two advisory councils, the chairman of the syuro council, the chairman at the provincial and district/city levels of the party-level management hierarchy, while this condition has also been controlled by them in political dynasty. This is the reality of unavoidable elitist decision-making (Habibi, 2018: 225).

The Solution to Breaking the Political Dynasty

The political dynasties that occurred in these two regions (research), namely Banten and Central Maluku, showed more of a cross-chamber form with branches of power. From the explanation described above, the author draws the common thread that dynastic politics/political dynasties as a political and economic strategy, to maintain power by passing on the power that has been held to other people who are still relatives with the aim of working themselves and/or family and perpetuate his power.

Of course, dynastic politics needs to be limited due to the following considerations (Fitra Hermansyah and Agus Suyatmoko Adi, 2017: 688): first, that dynastic politics that occurs in the regions will only strengthen negative politics. If important positions in the executive and legislative institutions are controlled by one family, the checks and balances mechanism will not be effective. As a result, it is prone to abuse of power for self and family interests. Second, dynastic politics leads to the formation of absolute power. If the position of regional head, for

example, is held by a close family that lasts a long time continuously, for example after 10 years in office, then his wife is replaced for another ten years, then by his son and so on, it will form absolute power that is prone to corruption. Third, political dynasties have had an impact on the economic decline in society, as well as the occurrence of corrupt behavior, this is due to efforts to enrich families or clans economically and maintain their political power, so that these regional heads no longer focus on developing their regions.

Fourth, dynastic politics in Indonesian society, whose political education is still relatively lacking and the legal system and law enforcement are weak, will cause the political contestation process to be unfair. Families who advance in political contestations, such as Pilkada, will easily take advantage of government facilities and networks to win the battle. Fifth, dynastic politics tend to be able to close the opportunity for other citizens outside their families to become public officials. Of course, if this happens, it will reduce the quality of democracy itself. For this reason, it is necessary to arrange so that the position of the head of the top government is not held continuously by one nuclear family in succession; and sixth, the limitation of dynastic politics is directed at increasing the degree of quality of democracy by expanding opportunities for citizens to participate in public positions and reducing abuse of office in election contestations and regional head elections.

In structuring the implementation of elections at the local level so that political dynasties do not happen again, the following efforts can be made: first, the next political step is the need for structuring the nomination mechanism by political parties to be more emphasized. Political parties must be more open in their candidacy, but not just a mere formality. Competitions involving all cadres will reduce the practice of trading candidates by a handful of political party elites (Titi Anggraini, 2011: 17).

In order for this effort to be successful, political parties as one of the pillars of democracy need to improve the mechanism for nominating candidates who will contest in the Pilkada. For example, first, political parties can carry out internal conventions in political parties, not just taking into account electability based solely on surveys that hit the public. Second, parties must also carry out a decentralized policy in making decisions at the internal level regarding who the candidate is promoted and the pair of candidates promoted, so that it is not based solely on elite votes but from various hierarchical aspirations at the internal level of each region, as well as those decisions. is a vote based on the aspirations of the constituents of a political party, not just a legitimacy based on a Party Decree. Because, if the party is not democratic, then what happens is a mere elitist decision that tends to strengthen oligarchic politics. The third method, in the process of selecting candidates for regional heads, for example, political parties make open

political recruitment involving a team of experts so that qualified candidates will be recruited (Toto Sugiarto and Agus Muhammad, 2018: 205).

Second, by providing political education to the public, it can be done by political parties and civil society so that people are not permissive every time the Pilkada is held not to choose candidates who have kinship ties who have ambitions to strengthen and enrich their families, relatives and clans only, by providing political education to the community. the way the public is given political education so that they are not easily tempted by the lure of money, basic necessities, and clothes.

Third, the need for regulatory changes to prevent dynastic politics and the practice of single candidacy in the Pilkada, such as rearranging the requirements for nominating regional heads. This effort is carried out so that there are many alternative candidates in the community and this effort is also a tactical step so that there is no expensive political cost to obtain political support from political parties, by, for example, reducing the percentage of the nomination requirements carried by political parties or individual candidates. , and set a maximum limit on the terms of its main support from the path of political parties.

CONCLUSION

Political dynasties have certainly harmed democracy. The political process is no longer based on efforts to rotate power and open political recruitment. Pilkada is no longer a means of regeneration and promotion of cadre recruitment, but has been replaced with decisions that tend to be elitist in nature. The strengthening of dynastic politics also cannot be separated from the indifference of political parties in developing democracy and strengthening the institutions of political parties themselves. Because, basically the tradition of perpetuating power is part of the instincts of every individual which is then institutionalized in groups such as dynasties based on family, clan or clan, but in the end the control, expansion and perpetuation of power can be caused by the opening of the existence of power in groups of people who can control resources. . The emergence of local strongmen is intertwined with the interests of the rulers and the opening of opportunities from the weaknesses of political party institutions so that they can be controlled by the interests of these groups.

Political dynasties are increasingly gripping also caused by the existence of high-cost politics with the presence of "political dowries" in obtaining political support in carrying out candidate pairs. When politics is controlled by a system that is elitist in nature, coupled with the reality of the existence of the political dowry, while the kinship politics of the political dynasty have been able to accumulate influence, wealth, control over certain territories, as well as economic control, it will be more likely to win political contestations, thus causing some Candidates

who have good leadership qualities tend to choose not to run as regional heads and/or deputy regional heads in the pilkada.

The presence of kinship politics or political dynasties in the elections should be taken as a serious warning that there has been a decline in democracy in the regions. This political dynasty shows a picture of the failure of political parties to produce cadres to become candidates for regional leaders. Of course, the occurrence of political dynasties is very detrimental to the community as voters to obtain democratic leaders, an area also tends to be neglected in welfare development.

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